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In this dissertation 1 develop and theorize an approach to Shakespearean 
character. 1 focus on the ways in which characters talk about knowing others and being 
known; in other words, this is an approach to characters who are themselves approaching 
characters. The plays 1 treat in detail are Coriolanus and Hamlet. The words characters 
in these plays use when they explain their decisions, avoid explaining their decisions, talk 
about others' decisions, or try to expose others' secrets, are often position-and-movement 
words. 1 argue that characters use for these purposes words related by wordplay to the 
postures and gestures invoived in crucial rituais (the "custom of request" in Coriolanus, 
the fencing match in Hamlet). At the same time, this is a metacriticai project: 1 deal with 
approaches and attitudes of Shakespeare interpreters. How do we stand in relation to 
each other? How do editors and critics echo and transform the characters' postural! 
gesturailanguage, and what are the implications of these echoes and transformations? 
Why is it worthwhile to work toward awareness of these echoes and transformations? In 
an extensive introductory section 1 theorize the kind of reading practiced here as an 
ethical practice-a practice intended to modify what Michel Foucault caUs the rapport à 
soi. 
The project's main original contribution is its way of re-conceiving the 
relationships among several currents in Shakespeare studies. My discussion engages with 
recent work in textual studies. Examples include work by Leah Marcus and Paul 
Werstine. It also engages with historically informed treatments ofwordplay. Examples 
include work by Margreta de Grazia and Patricia Parker. And it addresses work that 
could he said to be part of a move in the field toward "ethical criticism." Examples 
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include work by Stanley Cavell and John Guillory. As weH, my discussion engages with 
psychoanalytic criticism by Marjorie Garber, Coppélia Kahn, and others. While 1 do not 
consider myself a psychoanalytic critic, the affinity my approach has with psychoanalysis 
has to do with my interest in making explicit some of the implications of unreflectively 
chosen metaphors, word associations, etc. The implications that concem me most are 
those that have to do with the ways interpreters relate to each other. 
Vll 
RÉsUMÉ 
Dans ma thèse, je développe et théorise une approche au personnage 
shakespearien. J'étudie plus particulièrement la manière dont les personnages 
s'expriment lorsqu'il est question de connaître les autres et d'être connus. En d'autres 
mots, il s'agit d'une approche des personnages qui approchent eux-mêmes d'autres 
personnages. Lorsqu'ils expliquent leurs décisions, évitent de les expliquer, parlent de 
celles des autres ou essaient de présenter les secrets d'autrui, ces personnages emploient 
souvent des métaphores ayant rapport à des positions ou à des gestes concrets. Je soutiens 
que dans Carialanus et Hamlet-deux pièces que j'aborde plus en détail-les 
personnages utilisent à ces fins un vocabulaire faisant appel, par des jeux de mots, aux 
positions et aux gestes caractéristiques de rituels importants (la"custom of request" dans 
Carialanus, le combat d'escrime dans Ham/et). En même temps, ma thèse est aussi un 
projet métacritique. J'étudie les approches et les attitudes des spécialistes de l'œuvre de 
Shakespeare. Comment nous positionnons-nous les uns par rapport aux autres ? 
Comment les éditeurs et les critiques font-ils écho et transforment-ils le langage des 
personnages concernant la posture et la gestuelle? Quelles sont les implications de ces 
échos et de ces transformations? Pourquoi vaut-il la peine de travailler à en prendre 
conscience? Dans une longue section d'introduction, je théorise la sorte de lecture 
pratiquée ici en la présentant comme une pratique éthique-une pratique qui doit 
modifier ce que Michel Foucault appellait le rappart à soi. 
La principale originalité de mon projet concerne la manière de re-concevoir les 
relations entre divers courants dans les études shakespeariennes. l'entre donc en 
discussion avec les plus récentes études textuelles (pensons par exemple aux travaux de 
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Leah S. Marcus et de Paul Werstine), avec des analyses historiques des jeux de mots 
(incluant celles de Margreta de Grazia et de Patricia Parker) ainsi qu'avec les travaux qui 
peuvent être considérés comme faisant partie du mouvement vers une «critique éthique» 
qui est propre à ce domaine d'études (pensons par exemple aux travaux de Stanley Cavell 
et de John Guillory). J'entre aussi en discussion avec la critique psychanalytique de 
Marjorie Garber, de Coppélia Kahn et d'autres. Bien que je ne considère pas faire une 
critique psychanalytique, mon approche a toutefois des affinités avec la psychanalyse 
étant donné ma volonté de rendre explicites quelques-unes des implications de certaines 
métaphores choisies de manière irréfléchie et de modèles d'association de mots. 
"The 'essay'-which should be understood as the assay or 
test by which, in the game of truth, one undergoes changes, 
and not as the simplistic appropriation of others for the 
purpose of communication--is the living substance of 
philosophy, at least if we assume that philosophy is still 
what il was in Ihe past, i.e., an 'asces/s,' asklsis, an 
exercise of oneself in the activity of thought. " 
-Foucault, The Use ofPleasure 
INTRODUCTION 
The words that Shakespearean characters use when they talk about knowing and 
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being known tend to be position-and-movement words. In and of itself, this fact does not 
make the characters particularly strange or interesting: We aIl, whether we know it or 
not, use language of position and movement when we talk about discovering, disclosing, 
explaining, understanding, and so on. Consider the roots of sorne of the se words. The 
notions ofuncovering or opening implicit in words like "discover" and "disclose" are 
relatively easy to recognize, once it occurs to us to think about them; in the case of 
"explain," on the other hand, the dead metaphor in the root of the word (the Latinplanus, 
flat), and the senses of the word that stay closest to its origins-"to smooth out, make 
smooth" ("explain," OED def. 1), "to open out, unfold, spread out" ("explain," OED def. 
2a}-are not consciously in play for most CUITent English speakers most of the time. The 
same goes for the standing in "understanding": We rarely think about it. In Shakespeare, 
however, the language of knowing and being known works in special ways-ways 
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which, once 1 noticed them, made me realize that careful study of the enacted postures 
and gestures of Shakespearean characters should be of interest not only to performance 
critics, but also to critics interested in philosophy and philology. One special feature of at 
least certain focal postures and gestures in Shakespeare is their involvement in intricate 
networks ofwordplay which simultaneously: a) activate etymological, homonymic, and 
semantic links between words; and, b) thematize characters' particular ways of knowing 
and being known. It is my contention that, by studying the workings of these networks of 
wordplay and enacted postures! gestures, we can become more aware of the position-and-
movement words that we use when we talk about knowing and being known. Further, 1 
submit that "knowing it or not," when it cornes to roots of words and how they work, can 
matter. Matter for what? WeIl, 1'11 get to that. 
This dissertation, which is neither theatre history nor performance criticism, is 
about attitudes and gestures-and about interpretation of attitudes and gestures. My 
discussion focuses on the words of the texts of Corio/anus and Ham/et (1 will explain 
further on my decision to concentrate on these particular pIays), with a special emphasis 
on the ways characters talk about knowing themselves and others. 1 argue that characters 
in these plays tend to use words related by wordplay to postures and gestures invoived in 
crucial rituals (the "custom of request" in Corio/anus, the fencing match in Ham/et). One 
of this dissertation's objectives has been to re-examine these rituals: 1 have aimed to 
draw attention to the rituals' relationships to wordplay patterns developed throughout the 
plays. Relatedly, 1 have aimed to re-evaluate the rituaIs' involvement in the plays' ethical 
themes. The re-examination of the "custom of request" and the fencing match has not, 
however, been my only goal, or even my most important one. This dissertation is also 
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about how interpreters of Shakespeare stand and what we do; 1 am interested in editors' 
and critics' attitudes and gestures, as well as characters' attitudes and gestures. 
Accordingly, in the chapters that foUow, live people, dead people, and fictional people aU 
share the same stage, so to speak. 
From a certain point of view, there is nothing exceptional about this stage-
sharing: As many critics have noted, aU Shakespeare criticism involves a complex 
interaction between the living, the dead, and the fictional. The famous opening line of 
Stephen Greenblatt's Shakespearean Negotiations-"I began with the desire to speak 
with the dead" (l }-resonates with me, as it probably does with most people working in 
this field. But, also like Greenblatt, 1 have come to realize that there is no way ofhearing 
"a single voice, the voice ofthe other" (Greenblatt 20). Greenblatt explains the problem 
this way: "Plays are made up of multiple exchanges, and the exchanges are multiplied 
over time, since to the transactions through which the work first acquired social energy 
are added supplementary transactions through which the work renews its power in 
changed circumstances" (20). In other words, not only do such works start out as the 
products of a particular social context, over time they become the products of multiple 
social contexts. The conversation that keeps the plays meaningful is ongoing. Thus, 
while we can develop our attunement to the conversation--a conversation in which we 
are ourselves participants-there can be "no direct accessIt (Greenblatt 20) to 
Shakespeare-the-solitary-genius, or to "the dead" more generally. 
Nevertheless, for Greenblatt, "the early exchanges" (20), Le., those belonging to 
the late-sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century social context, have been the privileged 
object ofstudy. Greenblatt acknowledges that n[w]e can reconstruct at least aspects of 
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the conditions in which the theatre acquired its remarkable power, but we do so under the 
terms of our own interests and pleasures and in the light ofhistorical developments that 
cannot simply be stripped away" (20); however, his "principal interest" is still "in 
understanding how ... energies were first collected and deployed and returned to the 
culture from which they came" (20). It almost goes without saying that many critics have 
shared this interest, and that their energies have in the last twenty years or so generated a 
lot of worthwhile work. 
But 1 decided to stand in a different relation to those accretions that have stuck to 
Shakespearean texts-all that "cannot simply be stripped away," but especially those 
accretions that come from the editorial and literary critical traditions. 1 concentrate 
mostly on those primarily because they are the traditions 1 know best, but also because 1 
think they have been unduly denigrated in recent years (by critics and editors themselves, 
interestingly). 1 don't necessarily want to celebrate the post-Renaissance accretions, but 1 
don't think we have to he rueful about them either. A basic premise ofmine is that we 
can accept Greenblatt's "there is no mimesis without exchange" (12) and do the kind of 
character-centred criticism l've done in this dissertation. This premise sounds 
paradoxical, but it makes sense if we think of the characters as not absolutely stable, but 
instead as constituted and reconstituted in the ongoing dialogue among generations of 
interpreters. This is not to say that there is "no such thing" as a play by Shakespeare, or 
no such thing as a character created by the author. Rather, it is to think of our 
engagement with the words of the plays in what we might caU Bakhtinian terms. 
At least one recent critic has set a precedent: In Word against Word: 
Shalœspearean Utterance James R. Siemon takes from M. M. Bakhtin a particular 
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attitude toward "the distance and multiplicity separating speaker from hearer, author from 
audience, 'classic' text from modem interpreter" (24). Siemon points out that "[t]rom the 
situation of the simple utterance and its ability to arouse response despite differences in 
circumstance and interlocutors, they [i.e., Bakhtin and other members of the Bakhtin 
circle] derive consolation on a grand scale" (24). Unlike Siemon, 1 do not devote much 
space to detailed engagement with the work of the Bakhtin circle. 1 do, however, want to 
acknowledge here that my frequent use of the word "dialogue" in connection with the 
work of interpretation does register the influence of my reading of The Dialogie 
Imagination. And 1 want to acknowledge, too, that the affinity my approach has to 
Siemon's is an important one. 1 share his sense that one of the most important things we 
can find in Bakhtin's work is an attitude---one different in significant ways from those 
taken by many Shakespeare critics. Siemon asserts that "[t]o struggle with theme, to ask 
of the past utterance or of the present interlocutor the questions that we have for them, no 
matter how 'different' from the questions they may have had in mind, is to maintain what 
Bakhtin grandly caUs the 'chain of speech communion'" (25). And, really, Siemon is not 
alone: 1 would suggest that Marjorie Garber is making a related point when says that 
"Shakespeare, in short, is a process as weIl as a monument" (Symptoms 9). 
"Language in action" is, according to Garber's Manifesta for Literary Studies, 
what should be the business ofliterary scholars; or, to be more precise, Garber advocates 
lia close and passionate attention to the rich allusiveness, deep ambivalence, and powerful 
slipperiness that is language in action" (13). 1 have tried throughout the writing ofthis 
dissertation always to stay aware of slipperiness, ambivalence, and, perhaps above all, 
allusiveness, in the language of the Shakespearean texts that l've been exploring, in the 
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language of critics who have gone before me, and in my own language. And 1 want to 
emphasize, right from the outset, that my cultivation of this awareness has never been a 
matter ofleaming to watch out for danger, as if slipperiness, ambivalence, and 
allusiveness might imperil what 1 was really trying to do. This dissertation's main project 
has heen the development of a particular kind of ethical criticism. It has been a matter of 
practicing a type of criticism that focuses on questions about characters' decisions and 
motives, and that always addresses such questions via engagement with "language in 
action." As weIl, since this project is in part a metacritical one, it has also been a matter 
of subjecting interpretive engagement itselfto critical scrutiny. In other words, 1 have set 
out both to develop a new approach to Shakespearean characters and to explore sorne of 
the implications of interpreters' ways of relating to, we could say acting in relation to, 
language that is itself very much "in action." 
Of course, 1 know that so far here l've spoken only in very abstract terms, and l'm 
sure that readers will be impatient to know my answers to at least a couple of questions. 
For one thing, when 1 say 1 want to explore the "implications" of critical practices, what 
kinds of implications do 1 have in mind, exactly? Another way of putting that question 
might he: What's at stake here? Then, another important question is: Do 1 understand 
why character-centred criticism was for a numher of yearS, and indeed until quite 
recently, frowned upon by so many academic Shakespeareans in the know? These are 
sorne of the main issues 1 intend to deal with in this introductory section. 1 will also 
sketch out the relationship my approach has to several currents in Shakespeare studies. 
And 1 will provide a rationale for the possibly somewhat idiosyncratic structure of a 
dissertation that consists of two extensive discussions of two very different tragedies, 
with the later play (Carialanus) treated before the earlier one (Hamlet), and with a short 
theoretical chapter inserted between the two long chapters. First, though, 1 want to 
introduce some of my terminology and some of my major themes. 
7 
One potential problem 1 hope to avoid by clarifying my terminology early on is 
this: the possibility that, because ofmy focus here on "ethics," 1 could be suspected of 
not having paid as much attention as other people in my field have to Nietzschean, 
Foucauldian, and! or other related demystifications of "morality." ln 2000, when they 
published a collection entitled The Turn ta Ethics, editors Garber, Beatrice Hanssen, and 
Rebecca L. Walkowitz felt the need to acknowledge in their introductory essay that it had 
only recently stopped being generally the case in literary studies that people who 
practiced anything that might be called ethical criticism were automatically suspected of 
presuming "a universal humanism and an ideal, autonomous, and sovereign subject" 
(viii). Garber, Hanssen, and Walkowitz note that "to critics working in the domain of 
feminism, deconstruction, psychoanalysis, semiotics, and Marxism," an "exposé of 
ethics" for a while felt like an urgent task (viii). 
And indeed, the exposé in question has left its mark. Consider the following 
example. According to the preface to The Taming of the Shrew in the 1974 edition of The 
Riverside Shakespeare, Katherina at the end of the play "has suffered only minor physical 
discomfort and ... has learned the value of self-control and of caring about someone other 
than herself' (Barton 106). 1 remember that this shocked me when 1 encountered it as an 
undergraduate in the mid-1990s. It seemed to me that 1 was being told what to feel, and 
not only about the play, but also about what 1 might be asked to put up with in reallife, 
Because of its magisterial appeal to timeless and universal values, this preface registered 
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with me as an attack in a way that the play itself actually did not. Fortunately, 
instructors, as weIl as literary critics 1 was reading at the time, made it abundantly clear to 
me that they shared my reaction. This kind of "moral-of-the-story" criticism was "out" 
by the time 1 fust encountered it, and 1 understood why: Critics should not be passing off 
ideology as universally applicable morality. Did that mean "no more ethics-centered 
readings," then? For a time it seemed that maybe it did. When 1 started gradua te school 
in 1997, it seemed clear that we were supposed to he talking about history and politics, 
and defmitely not ethics. However, by 2000 Garber, Hanssen, and Walkowitz were able 
to announce: 
Ethics is back in literary studies, as it is in philosophy and political theory, and 
indeed the very critiques of universal man and the autonomous human subject that 
had initially produced resistance to ethics have now generated a crossover among 
these various disciplines that sees and does ethics 'otherwise.' The de-centering of 
the subject has brought about a re-centering of the ethical. (ix) 
The e1even essays in the Turn to Ethics collection address this newer deve10pment in 
literary studies; sorne, notably Judith Butler's "Ethical Ambivalence," express 
reservations about the trend, while others, for instance John Guillory's "The Ethical 
Practice ofModernity: The Example of Reading," strongly advocate it. 
Guillory makes his case for the "turn to ethics" in part by trying to draw a clear 
distinction between the terms "moral" and "ethical," and by to sorne degree valorizing the 
ethical at the expense of the moral. As Guillory notes, "the concepts of 'morality' and 
'ethics' ... are only tenuously distinct in common usage" (38); nevertheless, he makes the 
following suggestion: that the ethical is best defined as a domain of "choice between 
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goods" (38). Thus, he argues, ethics has an affinity to aesthetics, "the choice among 
objects ofbeauty" (38). Aesthetics and morality, however, he imagines as opposite poles 
on a "spectrum" along which he asks us to "suppose that conduct can be arrayed" (38). 
The "defrning character" of morality, according to this scheme, is "obligation" (36), or 
"the choice between right and wrong" (38). 1 should point out that Guillory claims not to 
want to see the aesthetic in a "negative relation to the moral" (42). But in that case the 
spectrum metaphor is perhaps unfortunate. Positing "ethics" as a middle term only makes 
it seem like a compromise position; the polarity remains. 
ln an interesting move, Guillory uses Michel Foucault's work as his warrant for 
his morality/ ethics distinctio~ though, as he emphasizes, this is not Foucault as most 
people working in literary and cultural studies know him. Guillory suggests that 
academics in this field may have "assimilated too easily" a version of Foucault which 
would reduce aU social relations to "relations of power" (37); further, he invites us to 
change our perspective. He draws our attention to what he describes as Foucault's "turn 
to the ethical"-a tum which happened "between the first and subsequent two volumes of 
The History ofSexuality" (34). According to Guillory, "Foucault tended to think that this 
domain [Le., the domain of the ethical] was usurped in modernity by morality or 
medicine, as the co-agents of power/ knowledge" (38). Now, at this point 1 have to say 
that, while 1 like the idea of finding in the French thinker's later books a corrective for 
certain excesses that may have been committed by critics infatuated with Discipline and 
Punish, 1 am not sure that the moral! ethical distinction that Guillory describes works 
exactly the way he says it does in Foucault. Certainly 1 do not see it working that way at 
aU consistently, evenjust within the later works. 
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For example, in "On the Genealogy of Ethics, " which is based on "a series of 
working sessions conducted by Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus at Berkeley in 1983 
[i.e., the year before Foucault died] " (Foucault, "Genealogy" 1 02n), Foucault talks about 
ethics as a component of morality. Note how the term "ethics" functions in the foUowing 
passage: "[T]here is another side to the moral prescriptions, which most of the time is not 
isolated as such but is, 1 think, very important: the kind of relationship you ought to have 
with yourself, rapport à soi, which 1 caU ethics, and which determines how the individual 
is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject ofhis own actions" (Foucault, 
"Genealogy" 110-11). Here the main idea to which 1 want to draw attention is the idea 
that fitting oneselfto the "moral prescriptions" always necessarily involves "ethics," 
which for Foucault is the constitution of a relationship to oneself. Morality is not, in this 
context, imagined at one end of a spectrum with aesthetics at one end and ethics in the 
middle. And, in The Use ofPleasure (Volume 2 of The History ofSexuality); Foucault in 
fact uses the phrase "'ethics-oriented' moralities" (30), clearly not intending the phrase to 
sound like an oxymoron (or a pleonasm, for that matter). He also describes some 
moralities as more "etho-poetic" (Foucault, Use of Pleasure 13)1 than others, and "etho-
poetic" and "ethics-oriented" seem to be for him more or less equivalent 
But at any rate, GuiUory does not claim to be able to stabilize the moralityl ethics 
distinction for once and for all. One persistent difficulty, as he himself notes, is that in 
English "philosophical usage" things are complicated by the influence of "the German 
idealist tradition": 
1 Foucault claims to have transposed the word "etho-poetic" from Plutarch (Use ofPleasure 13). 
Unfortunately, he does not tell us exactly where in Plutarch he found this interesting term. 
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ln English, "ethics" tends to refer to a wider domain ofreflection on right and 
wrong than "morality," and it thus names an area within the discipline of 
philosophy. "Morality" tends to be used commonly to refer to specific moral 
systems, such as "Christian morality." But in the German idealist tradition, from 
which philosophical thought on ethics largely descends, the principal 
terminological distinction is between Moralitat, as the domain of reflective and 
conscious choice between right and wrong, and Sittlichlœit, or the "ethical," which 
refers to the domain of customary morality, and which does not necessarily entail 
reflective and conscious choice. (45) 
Accordingly, Guillory concedes that we are pretty much stuck with sorne degree of 
ambiguity hetween "morality" and "ethics." For the purposes of this introduction, 
however, 1 can at least sketch out my own attempt to negotiate the ambiguity. 
My main reason for wanting to bring Guillory's essay into this discussion in the 
first place is that 1 strongly agree with him on what 1 take to be his central point, and that 
is this: It's important for those of us involved in literary studies to recognize what it is 
that we actually do, and to he honest with ourselves about what it is that we can do. 
According to Guillory, at our best we develop an "ethical practice." ln order to 
understand what this means, we have to appreciate that it is not primarily a question of 
developing a practice that is ethical as opposed to unethical, in the sense of unscrupulous, 
dishonourable, disreputable, corrupt, or depraved. And it has nothing to do with any kind 
of idea that English professors could or should adopt a code of professional ethics 
comparable to those enforced in professions like medicine or law. Rather, 1 take from 
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Foucault-as Guillory does-the idea that "ethics" is about the "relationship you ought to 
have with yourself." 
As Foucault explains in The Use ofPleasure, in the case of "techniques of the 
self" (or ethos) as practiced by the ancient Greeks, "the emphasis is on the forms of 
relations with the self, on the methods and techniques by which he [i.e., the person 
practicing] works them out, on the exercises by which he makes himself an object to be 
known, and on the practices that enable him to transform his own mode of being" (30).2 
For Guillory, reading can be comparable to such "techniques ofthe self"; the pleasure to 
be had from professional reading is in a broad sense "ascetic," by which he means that it 
derives from exercises practiced on the selfby the self, and is in that sense "a labored 
pleasure" (42). When we recognize professional reading as a "technique of the self," he 
argues, we will realize that "the end of this pleasure is lost when it is justified only in 
terms of its effect on others, an effect professional readers now like to regard as 
'political'" (42). Guillory argues that to recognize reading as an ethical practice is a 
matter ofrecognizing that its "object is fust of aIl oneself" (43). He suggests that the 
practice thus properly recognized could still he understood to be compatible with 
"political vigilance" (43), and could conceivably have positive political consequences, 
although he cautions us that such consequences are now, and probably will remain for the 
foreseeable future, always very hard to gauge. 
2 1 should add that, in the passage from which this quotation is taken, Foucault emphasizes that the "ethics-
oriented"f "code-oriented" opposition he deals in is actually not entirely a simple one, and that, relatedly, 
neither can there he a simple opposition between Christian and ancient Greek moralities. He asserts that, in 
fact, "'ethics-oriented' moralities (which do not necessarily correspond to those involving 'ascetic deniaI') 
have been very important in Christianity, functioning alongside the 'code-oriented' moralities. Between the 
two types there have been, at different times, juxtapositions, rivalries and conflicts, and compromises" (Use 
of Pleasure 30). 
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Foucault's projects on ancient Greek and Roman techniques of the selfreflect an 
interest in "[t]he idea that ethics can be a very strong structure of existence, without any 
relation with the juridical per se, with an authoritarian system, with a disciplinary 
structure" (Foucault, "Genealogy" 108). This interest in turn, of course, cornes from 
Foucault's strong belief that he was himself living in a culture in which morality was 
highly disciplinary, and not very etho-poetic at aIl. When an interviewer asked him 
whether he thought the "Greek concem with the self' was ''just an early version of our 
self-absorption, which many consider a central problem in our society" ("Genealogy" 
118), Foucault explained that, in fact, he thought in terms of a diametrical opposition 
between the ancient practices that interested him and "what you might calI the 
Californian cult of the self' ("Genealogy" 118). The reason behind this is that he 
believed that, in this culture, attempts to "discover one's true self' ("Genealogy" 118) are 
implicitly understood as underwritten in one way or another by experts in medicine and! 
or psychology who are supposed to have special knowledge of what a true self is. Such 
attempts to discover something that is thought of as more or less already known by 
someone else are very different from attempts to choose to constitute oneself as a moral 
subject in accordance with "an aesthetics of existence" ("Genealogy" 109). Foucault 
explains that he thinks that it is hard for people now to get their heads around the idea 
that "it's not at aU necessary to relate ethical problems to scientific knowledge" 
("Genealogy" 1 09). 
Here, importantly, we have to remember that by "ethical problems" he means 
problems involving what he sometimes caUs the rapport à soi-although since, as 1 noted 
earlier, the ways in which a person makes him- or herself an "object to be known" are an 
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integral part of this rapport, "the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself" 
cannot really be considered apart from the kind of relationship you imagine the self 
should have with others. Recent thinkers other than Foucault have also considered these 
and related issues;3 in fact, in this dissertation the one who gets the most space is Stanley 
Cavell, an American philosopher who is also known for his Shakespeare criticism. In 
Cavell's work we will see a lot of emphasis on the importance that our ways of 
constituting ourselves as objects to be known have for the ways we treat others, and in 
particular for the ways in which we try to know others. His phrase "the constitution of 
my relation,,4-"my relation," that is, to the world, to other people, to my self (the 
constitution of aIl these relations are, for Cavell, intimately related to each other)-is one 
1'11 use a number oftimes in the chapters that follow. The phrase may be a little wordy, 
but at times 1 have nevertheless found it convenient. 
But right now 1 need to return briefly to our friendly French thinker. When the 
same interviewer 1 mentioned earlier asked him, "Do you think that the Greeks offer an 
attractive and plausible alternative [i.e., to current ways of relating to one's own self 
(ethos)]?" ("Genealogy" 104), the response was: 
NoL.you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem 
raised at another moment by other people ... I don't accept the word alternative. 1 
3 See, for example, Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic 
Ethics. Nussbaum considers Foucault's work "though exciting, also deeply problematic" (5). The problem 
she sees has to do with what she considers Foucault's failure to make a strong distinction between Greek 
philosophers and "religious and magicaV superstitious movements ofvarious types in their culture" (5). 
Nussbaum emphasizes that "[w]hat is distinctive about the contribution of the philosophers is that they 
assert that philosophy, and not anything else, is the art we require, an art that deals in valid and sound 
arguments, an art that is committed to the truth. These philosophers claim that the pursuit of logical 
validity, intellectual coherence, and truth delivers freedom from the tyranny of custom and convention, 
creating a community ofbeings who can take charge oftheir own life story and their own thought" (5). 
4 See, for example, "Skepticism as Iconoclasm" 235. 
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would like to do the genealogy ofproblems, ofproblématiques. My point is not 
that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the 
same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. 
("Genealogy" 1 04). 
And this reply of Foucault's brings me back to what interests both Guillory and me: 1 
know l'm not, and l'm pretty sure that he's not either, interested in being a fake Greek; 
what we are interested in, though, is the potential that reading may have to work as an 
ethical practice in the current culture. Guillory claims that reading is already such a 
practice, and indeed he goes so far as to caU it "the principal ethical practice of 
modernity" (42), although he emphasizes that it is a practice that is generally 
misrecognized and underdeveloped, both inside and outside the academy. 8ince 1 should 
really just speak for myselfhere, 1 will put it this way; this is my sense ofwhat, as 
someone involved in literary studies, 1 have "to do": To develop reading as an ethical 
practice is to work toward the development of a more etho-poetic morality. And, like 
Guillory, 1 think the object ofthis practice has to be first of aIl myself. 
Note here that 1 am using the phrase "ethical practice" in more or less the same 
wayas Guillory and the later Foucault do, and 1 intend to stayas consistent as 1 cano 
"Morality," however, for me remains a somewhat more equivocal term. 1 do not equate 
it, as Guillory does, with obligation, with a domain of choices between right and wrong. 
1 have a broader sense than that in mind. 80, when 1 say that 1 think literary scholars can 
develop a more etho-poetic morality, l mean that the ethical practices we develop and 
promote can affect our rapport à soi (to use Foucault's phrase; the constitution of the 
selfs relation to the selfwould, as l've said, be another way ofputting this), and that the 
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rapport à soi would, in tum, make up part of something larger, i.e., morality. Thus, as is 
often the case in English usage, "morality" may refer to something that is to a large 
degree unreflective; in the case of a highly etho-poetic morality, however, the component 
of morality that involves the constitution of the selfs relationship to the self would have 
to be relatively weU developed and reflective. 
But, at any rate, in this dissertation 1 do not use the word "morality" very much. 1 
do use the phrase "moral argument"-a phrase which, as 1 will explain in the chapter on 
Coriolanus, 1 pick up from CayeU, and which clearly cannot very weU apply to 
something unreflective. Indeed, the several senses in which moral argument depends on 
explicitness together make up one of the major themes of the Coriolanus chapter. As for 
"the ethical" in the sense of the German Sittlich/œit, 1 do not often use the word in such a 
general sense, though 1 might have said that, since 1 deal quite prominently with social 
customs depicted in the plays (the "custom ofrequest" in Coriolanus, the fencing match 
in Hamlet), and with the social practices in which present-day literary scholars 
reflectively or unreflectively participate, this dissertation does consider the ethical in the 
sense having to do in the broadest way with custom and value. The phrase "ethical 
implications," however, is one which 1 do actually use frequently and prominently, and 1 
want to emphasize here that, for the purposes of this dissertation, the phrase refers to 
implications for the rapport à soi, implications for the constitution of the selfs relation to 
the self-which relation is itself, 1'11 emphasize again, always affecting and affected by 
the constitution of the selfs relation to others. 
In practice, 1 have in this dissertation tended to focus fust on characters' ways of 
positioning themselves in relation to others, and then from there proceeding to discuss the 
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characters' ways of talking about themse1ves. My Coriolanus and Hamlet chapters both 
start by considering characters' decisions about whether or not to go through with 
particular social rituals. Then, through close engagement with wordplay constellated 
around the postures and gestures to be enacted in the rituals, 1 consider sorne of the 
ethical implications of characters' ways of standing and moving in relation to other 
characters. Here 1 should note that 1 use the phrase "postural! gesturallanguage" a 
number of times in the dissertation; it is a phrase which is actually not entirely 
satisfactory to me, since readers are likely to take it to mean something along the lines of 
just "body language," which really doesn't coyer what 1 mean. It is my contention that an 
interesting feature of Coriolanus and Hamlet is an interplay between: a) enacted 
postures/ gestures which the texts make a focal point in sorne way, e.g., by making them 
part of a crucial ritual which characters in other parts of the play will describe or discuss; 
and, b) wordplay related to those postures and gestures. The phrase "postural/ gestural 
language," in the context of thls dissertation, should be understood to refer to the entire 
complex of postures and gestures (enacted or described in literaI or figurative terms) 
along with aIl related wordplay. 
This definition of "postural! gesturallanguage" no doubt requires further 
clarification. Here is an example ofwhat 1 mean by "re1ated wordplay": ln Coriolanus 
the "custom ofrequest" makes the candidate's bearing or "portance"--one of the tribunes 
uses that word-the focus of attention; what 1 am suggesting is that, once we start 
noticing other words with the root "port" in the play, once we start making these a focus 
of attention, interesting possibilities start to appear. "Porting" in the sense of "carrying, 
bearing" emerges as an important theme; "porting" in the sense of "gate-keeping" also 
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cornes into play. 1 argue that Coriolanus's "portance" during the "custom ofrequest" has 
a lot to do with the attitudes he has shown, in other parts of the play, toward "porting" in 
these various senses. Similarly, in Hamlet, the words "offence" and "defence," which 
occur throughout the play, become very interesting when we entertain the possibility that 
the climactic fencing match between Hamlet and Laertes may be structured in such a way 
as to allude to the earlier contexts in which characters used "-fence" words. 
Patricia Parker's work on Shakespearean wordplay has had an important influence 
on this dissertation. By reading especially her 1996 book, Shalœspeare from the 
Margins: Language, Culture, Context, and also various articles by her, then by spending 
a lot of time reading and re-reading the plays, and a lot of time perusing Shakespeare 
concordances (the electronic ones greatly facilitate this kind ofwork), 1 leamed to 
become attuned to the wordplay patterns that figure prominently in the chapters that 
follow. 1 should add, too, that my way of adapting Parker's approach has been influenced 
by a comment which Michael D. Bristol made in a review of Shalœspeare from the 
Margins. He remarked that Parker's book shows that "Shakespeare's wordplay is a 
dynamic language of physical position and movement. The resonances of that language 
are most powerfully grasped as the concrete expression of gesture, attitude, and 
disposition" (225). 
In fact, Shalœspeare from the Margins does not explicitly make exactly that point. 
However, consider sorne of the main terms Parker deals with in that book-for example, 
constructing, dilating, and translating. It's worth noting, first of all, that they are terms 
that can have both bodily and more abstract senses. But what does Bristol mean by 
"resonances"? WeIl, my own way oftrying to describe the relationship between the more 
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and less abstract meanings ofParker's key terms would be something along the following 
Hnes: Shakespeare from the Margins shows how words in the dilat-, contstruct-, and 
translat- groups fluctuate in the plays hetween meanings appropriate to descriptions of 
bodily states, positions, movements, etc., and meanings appropriate to descriptions of 
ways of using language. And when 1 say the words fluctuate, 1 do not mean that they 
alterna te in an either/ or way between meanings that have to do with the body and 
meanings that have to do with language. Rather, when constructing, dilating, or 
translating is in Shakespeare primarily a matter of speaking or writing, explaining, 
elaborating, interpreting, etc., the meanings that apply to the word in question in more 
bodily contexts resonate; that is what, according to Bristol, Parker so successfully shows. 
1 want to suggest, however, that it's equally important to note that when, in the plays, 
bodily contexts for these sorts of words are primary, the more abstract meanings of the 
word resonate. What 1 do in this dissertation depends on a willingness to follow the 
fluctuation of meanings from less to more bodily expression, and from more to less. 
So, to re-emphasize, the approach developed here depends on, among other 
things, a habit of thinking about attitude and approach in a whole range of literai and 
figurative terms. 1 particularly find the word "attitude" to he well adapted to my purposes 
because, at least in current usage, it can refer to something at once affective and more or 
less Hterally positional. The root of the word "attitude" cornes from the Latin aptus, 
"fitted, fit"; 1 would like to suggest that if you think, for a minute, of attitude in terms of 
"fitting," you may be able to get a clearer sense of what ethics, in the sense that interests 
me, has to do with postural! gesturallanguage in Shakespeare. 1 have aIready mentioned 
Foucault's idea that the rapport à soi, which he caUs "ethics," "determines how the 
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individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions." Thus, 
ethics can be considered a component of morality. And it is important to note, too, that 
the ethical component ofmorality, understood in this way, is inextricably involved with 
affect. When we say we have a rapport with another person, we mean that we have a 
certain attunement to and a certain feeling toward that person; the rapport à soi is 
analogously something affective. Accordingly, we don't just obey or not obey moral 
prescriptions; we have certain attitudes toward them-attitudes which reflect the rapport 
we have with ourselves. We can, however, cultivate a rapport; we have sorne capacity to 
change our attitudes by means of ethical practices. And ethical practices, if they do 
anything, will affect both how we feel and what we do. 1 might put it this way: We can 
fit ourselves to moral prescriptions. Understood in this way, ethics-the constitution of 
the selfs relation to the self-is a matter of positioning, of attitude, of fitting. 
ln this connection, we can think of something Menenius says in Act 2, scene 2 of 
Coriolanus. When Coriolanus lets the senators know that he wants to he allowed to 
become consul without having to appear in the traditional candidate's gown (indeed, he 
goes so far as to insistthat he "cannot/ Put on the gown" (2.2.131-32)),5 Menenius 
responds: 
Pray you, go fit you to the custom and 
Take to you, as your predecessors have, 
Your honour with your form. (2.2.138-40) 
5 As in the Corio/anus chapter, ail quotations from Corio/anus are, except where otherwise noted, from Lee 
Bliss's Cambridge edition. 
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These are important Hnes; 1 would suggest that it's worth thinking about this play's major 
themes in terms of fitting. 6 The main character's refusaI to fit himself to the custom has, 
of course, disastrous consequences for himself, his family, and his country. Even though 
he does end up bowing to pressure and putting on the candidate's costume (yes, there may 
be wordplay on customl costume in Menenius's "fit you to the custom" admonition), 
Coriolanus never does the kind of fitting, the kind of adjustment of the rapport à soi, 
which Foucault described as the "ethical" component ofmorality. 
In the chapters that follow, 1 refer a number of times to "attitudes"-sometimes in 
connection with characters, sometimes in connection with literary or theatrical 
interpreters. 1 should note here, however, that the word "attitude" does not appear in 
Shakespeare. Indeed, the OED's earliest citation for "attitude" dates from 1668. For this 
reason, 1 often tend instead, particularly in the parts of the dissertation where 1 am most 
concemed with staying as close as possible to the language of the plays, to use phrases 
such as "stand (or move) in relation to ... " These phrases have the advantage of being 
especially readily literalized, easily imagined in terms ofbodily position or movement, by 
present-day readers. Nevertheless, 1 did not want to abandon words like "attitude" (which 
is important throughout the dissertation), or "explicit" (which is particularly important in 
the Coriolanus chapter), or "analysis" (which is particularly important in the Hamlet 
chapter), even though these terms do not appear in the plays. 1 saw advantages to moving 
back and forth between the position-and-movement words of the plays and the largely 
unrecognized position-and-movement words that interpreters ofthe plays have used. 1 
6 In the Coriolanus chapter itselfI say that it's worth thinking about the play in terms of standing (and 
indeed stand- words do appear more frequently than fit- words). Here 1 want to note that "standing" and 
"fitting" come together in the play's "porting" wordplay: "port" can mean both "bearing" and, via a 
bilingual pun, "wearing" (French porter, "to wear"). 
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suggested earlier that abstract senses of certain crucial words in Shakespeare can resonate 
when more bodily senses of the same words are in the foreground. In the chapters that 
follow, 1 will examine a number of instances in which interpreters have apparently picked 
up on those resonances. Interpreters often deliberately echo the plays' language. Sorne 
of the most interesting echoes, however, are those we hear in works by interpreters who 
have made word associations that suggest an engagement with networks of postural! 
gestural wordplay of which they seem not to be fully aware. 
Of course, 1 know that sorne people consider this kind of close attention to 
allusion and echo to be much too readerly an approach to Shakespearean texts, since, 
after aIl, these were originally intended as play texts, and when we attend to the plays in 
performance we cannot possibly catch all these details.7 And, as a matter of fact, it has 
happened to me that Shakespeareans l've met have taken it upon themselves to remind 
me that these are plays we're talking about here. "With that in mind," they asked, "since 
that is what they are, does it really make sense to do this kind of readerly and minute 
analysis?" 1 happened to he in the early, uncertain stages ofthis project when 1 was first 
confronted with this obviously rhetorical question, and 1 will admit that 1 was somewhat 
unsettled. 
At this point, though, 1 wish l'd had the nerve to go ahead and answer the 
rhetorical question. 1 should have said, first of all, that we do not, in fact, have to equate 
what the plays are with what they originally were. Then 1 should have said that, in my 
7 See, for example, Richard Levin's New Readings vs. Old Plays. Levin, who takes a dim view of ail 
markedly readerly responses to English Renaissance plays, positions himself as a defender of "our 
traditional views" (ix). He asserts that these views have been "held, so far as we can tell, by virtually ail 
spectators and readers down to the present time" (ix). See a1so Harry Berger, Jr.'s intelligent and witty 
response to Levin. Berger descnbes "Levin's army" as follows: "It includes ail who gather together under 
the slogan 'What may be digested in a [performed] play' and who follow theÏr leader's charge against 
outlaw readings that threaten them with indigestion" (Imaginary Audition 13). 
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view, the litmus test (so to speak) for whether or not it makes sense to practice a certain 
type of criticism should be the following question: "Does this critical practice help us 
think, as Garber puts it, 'through and with' the plays?" "Thinking through and with 
literature" (Garber, Manifèsto 13) means asking questions both about the whats and about 
the hows of verbal meaning. Like Garber, 1 think that our ability to ask such questions is 
"[ w]hat literary scholars can offer to the readers of all texts (not just those explicitly 
certified as 'literature')" (Manifesto 12). So, in other words, my justification for my 
"readerly" approach to Shakespeare is two-fold: 1) There is a well-established tradition 
of treating these plays as literature--a tradition the value of which is not necessarily 
cancelled out by the fact that the plays were not originally intended to be treated this way; 
2) Even if we decide to accept that the plays are first and foremost plays, we can still 
accept the applicability of sorne of the literary scholar's most important skills. 
Now, here 1 feel 1 should acknowledge that this dissertation's subtitle ("An 
Approach to Shakespearean Character") has probably led most of my readers to expect to 
find in these pages a type of literary criticism that deals mainly with the mimetic 
dimension of the plays, criticism that might be called "ethical" primarily on the grounds 
that it focuses on fictional selves represented in the plays. My readers may expect this 
from me even in spite of what 1 said, in my opening pages, about wanting to work with 
Greenblatt's "there is no mimesis without exchange" principle. And, even though 1 trust 
that by now 1 have made it clear that 1 am equally interested in interpreters, their selves, 
and their rapport à soi, 1 realize that it may not yet be entirely clear how that interest 
makes me any different from old-fashioned critics who valued the possibility that readers 
or theatre-goers could be improved as a result of their encounters with depicted lives. 
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Well, 1 suppose 1 wouldn't want to say that 1 would hope to have nothing in 
common with the old character critics. At least in the work of the best of them, there is 
still a lot to admire. lfwe consider the example of A. C. Bradley, it is at least worth 
thinking about what John Russell Brown has to say in the introduction to the 1985 St. 
Martin's Press edition of Shalœspearean Tragedy (Bradley's famous collection of essays, 
originally published in 1904). Brown goes so far as to assert that "[i]f such a book were 
published today, critics would praise its author as an adventurer for whom knowledge 
was not fixed but always in process, who sought an ordered coherence but was 
committed to distrust and dissatisfaction, who tested each hypothesis and guaranteed no 
more than an encounter with Shakespeare's text" (xiv). By way of illustration, Brown 
points out that Bradley was very much one for re-writing, that he often corrected his own 
conclusions, but also left what he had written earlier in place alongside the corrections, 
"so that we are encouraged to think it out for ourselves" (xiV).8 So, in other words, we 
could caU Bradley an "essayist" in the literalized sense of "one who tries." And, at least 
sorne of the time, he seems conscious of himself as an essayist in this sense, and he 
apparently values the process of testing and changing so much that he chose to leave the 
signs ofit visible. Bradley "proceeded by questioning," writes Brown (xiv), and this is 
something 1 have tried to make a feature of my work as weIL 
lndeed, 1 open both my Coriolanus chapter and my Hamlet chapter with questions 
which may strike readers as quite Bradleyan. According to Philip Armstrong, at least, 
8 See, for example, Shakespearean Tragedy 127-28, where Bradley struggles with certain questions about 
Ramlet's relationship to Ophelia. Why does Ramlet not allude to her in his soliloquies? Why does he not 
seem to care, particularly, about how Polonius's death will affect her? Bradley weighs the pros and cons of 
attaching a lot of importance to these questions, and he admits that for a long time he did not even think to 
ask them. The discussion ofthese problems finally concludes with a remark enclosed in square brackets: 
"[This paragraph states my view imperfectly.]" (Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy 128). 
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"'Why does X act as he or she does?' is the Bradleyan enquiry par excellence" (15), and, 
sure enough, my opening questions have exactly that structure. Why does Coriolanus not 
do what is expected of him as a candidate for political office when what's expected seems 
so minor, so easy to perform? Why does Hamlet go through with the fencing match at 
the end of the play when that seems so obviously dangerous a thing to do? 1 will, of 
course, have more to say further on about these opening questions of mine, but for now 
what 1 want to say is that 1 have deliberately organized my discussions of the plays in 
such a way as to bring the reader through a long process of questioning. 1 am a lot less 
interested in for once and for aIl persuading anyone of my interpretations of these 
characters' decisions and motives than 1 am in showing that to begin a discussion of the 
plays with such questions is not necessarily a hope1essly clued-out, outmoded, and 
irre1evant thing to do. To proceed by this kind of questioning can be, as it often is in 
Bradley's work, a dynamic and exploratory way of engaging with the plays. 
Furthermore, 1 contend that a line of inquiry that starts with questions about 
characters-and 1 think most teachers will acknowledge that undergraduate students, for 
example, still tend to ask what we might caU Bradleyan questions-is a lot more 
compatible than specialists often think with sorne of the major currents in recent research. 
This dissertation's main original contribution is its way of re-conceiving the relationships 
among several important currents in Shakespeare studies. My discussion engages with 
recent work in textual studies (examples include work by Leah S. Marcus, Jerome 
McGann, and Paul Werstine) and historically informed treatment of wordplay (examples 
include work by Margreta de Grazia, Parker, and Gordon Williams), as weIl as with work 
which could be said to be part of "the turn to ethics" described by Guillory, Garber, and 
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her fellow editors. My discussion also engages with psychoanalytic criticism by Garber, 
Coppélia Kahn, and others; while 1 do not consider myself a psychoanalytic critic, the 
affinity my approach has with psychoanalysis has to do with my interest in making 
explicit some of the implications of unreflectively chosen metaphors, patterns of word 
association, etc. 
In connection with textual and philological studies, ethical criticism, and 
psychoanalytic criticism, 1 have found that my approach to characters' decisions and 
motives can readily meet up with, and become closely involved with, sorne of the rnost 
au courant thinking in the broad field of Shakespeare studies. Such an assertion may be 
controversial, but one of my major objectives is to show that the exclusion of certain 
kinds of questions about characters is not a necessary consequence of sophisticated 
thinking about language, history, and textual production and transmission. 1 would 
suggest as well that the approach could be adapted for classroom use; if it were, it could 
work as a way of engaging students with up-to-date research problems without having to 
train them out of asking the kinds of questions that they are often inclined to ask-
questions which often are in a sense "Bradleyan" (although of course students don't 
usually use that term), in that they address characters' decisions and motives. 
Bradley was not one of the original inspirations for this project, however. By the 
tirne 1 started writing this dissertation, 1 had been in the presence of Shakespeareans who 
had heaped scorn upon him, and 1 had also been in the presence of Shakespeareans who 
had spoken ofhim nostalgically. In published criticism, too, 1 had encountered passages 
in which it is treated more or less as a given that right-thinking Shakespeareans would 
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define their work in opposition to Bradley's.9 And 1 had also read, in very recent 
criticism, passages in which hip critics come out as Bradley fans. Garber, for example, in 
an essay on "the dangers and slippages of the word character" ("Fatal Cleopatra" 214), 
has this to say: "Part of my objective and pleasure in working on this topic has been to 
bring back into prominence sorne ... once-central voices in Shakespeare studies, especially 
those who have fallen out of favor in recent decades. No critic has been more devalued 
than A. C. Bradley" ("Fatal Cleopatra" 225). So 1 was aware, in the beginning stages of 
this project, that 1 would have to consider Bradley, and 1 was aware that the opening 
questions of my two extensive chapters might be called Bradleyan, but 1 deliberately put 
off reading him until 1 had finished writing most of the dissertation. Having now read 
him for myself, my view is that it is important to recognize the exploratory and 
experimental dimension of what he did; however, in significant ways 1 have tried to be 
more explora tory than Bradley. 
One reason the explora tory aspect of Bradley's work is worth noting at aIl is that 
what people in recent years often fault him for is precisely his failure to interrogate his 
own assumptions. And, really, whatever his strengths, and in spite of the mental 
flexibility that he does show, his critics have cause to fault him. Where 1 find Bradley's 
work disappointing, sometimes just plain puzzling, and occasionally appalling, are those 
places in which he lapses into hyperbolical and over-generalized statements about 
audiences' affective responses: "We love" this character, "we love" that character. Far 
too often my response has been: "What? 1 don't." For instance, Coriolanus is, to me, 
many things, but he is certainly not "lovable" (Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy 64). 
And although it does happen reasonably often that Bradley and 1 love the same 
9 See, for example, Parker's Shakespeare from the Margins 16-17. 
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characters, 1 sometimes tind the explanation he gives for his response to be weird, and! or 
based on incorrect information. "We love" Feste, the fool in Twelfth Night, according to 
Bradley, for a number ofreasons, one ofwhich is that "from tirst to last, ... he keeps his 
tongue free from obscenity" ("Feste the Jester" 19-20); in other words, he is not a lewd 
foo1. 1 personally love Feste, and for a number of reasons, but he is manifestly as lewd as 
the next foo1. Think, for example, ofhis jokes about being "weIl hanged" (1.5.4), which 
recent editors Roger Warren and Stanley Wells, following Leslie Hotson, gloss as 
"sexually endowed, as in modem sexual slang 'weIl hung'" (103n). 
And there are times in Bradley's work when, much as in the Riverside preface to 
The Taming of the Shrew, ideology not only rears its head, but also seems to be doing 
most of the talking. For example, Bradley argues that Hamlet's "chief desire" during the 
"closet scene" (Ham/et Act 3, scene 4), in which he confronts his mother and kills 
Polonius, is "to save [his mother's] soul" (Shakespearean Tragedy 110). Bradley 
elaborates: ''No father-confessor could be more selflessly set upon his end of redeeming 
a fellow-creature from degradation, more stem or pitiless in denouncing the sin, or more 
eager to welcome the tirst token of repentance. There is something infinitely beautiful in 
that sudden sunshine of faith and love which breaks out. .. at the Queen's surrender" 
(Shakespearean Tragedy 110). My Ham/et chapter's discussion of the scene in question 
will make apparent the extent to which 1 disagree with this reading of Bradley's. One of 
the themes of that chapter is critics' tendency to repeat Hamlet's mistakes, their tendency 
to reflect the character's most problematic attitudes-which is exactly what 1 think 
Bradley is doing in the passage quoted above: He's identifying with Hamlet, and 
repeating Hamlet's rationalizations. 
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1 want to suggest that the approach developed in this dissertation promotes the 
kind of awareness that Bradley sometimes lacks. Although 1 originally intended the 
dissertation's metacritical sections to be basically justificatory-in other words, 1 wanted 
to write about characters' decisions and motives, but 1 realized that 1 was going to come 
across as very naïve unless 1 could explain where 1 stood in relation to the dominant 
trends in Shakespeare studies-I gradually came to take quite a different view of my 
metacritical sections. As 1 continued to write and re-write them, it became increasingly 
c1ear that these sections had taken on something other than a simply explanatory purpose. 
1 now think: of my approach to Shakespearean character as an ethical practice. The 
metacritical sections are integral to the project because they foster an interpretive 
explicitness which turns out to have, in the context of this dissertation, a strongly ethical 
valence. Explicitness, as 1 will explain in chapter one, can be an attitude; it can be a way 
of standing (so to speak), both in relation to others and in relation to oneself. To work 
toward explicitness can be to adjust one's rapport à soi. 
This point brings me to one of my main reasons for putting my Corio/anus 
chapter ahead of my Ham/et chapter: 1 derive from my reading of Corio/anus, with help 
from my reading of Cavell, my understanding of the sense in which explicitness can be 
an attitude. The idea of explicitness as an attitude to be cultivated is an important 
subtextual issue in the Ham/et chapter as weIl; however, as chapter one will show, 
because of its particular aesthetic, Corio/anus brings the explicitness-as-attitude theme 
into especially intense focus. And there is another, equally important factor that 
contrlbuted to my decision to put Coriolanus ahead of Hamlet in this dissertation: that is, 
the fact that the critical and editorial traditions for the Roman tragedy are far less 
complicated than they are for Ham/et. Since 1 have an unconventional way of dealing 
with these traditions, 1 thought the dissertation would be more readable if 1 could start 
with a simpler case before moving on to treat a more difficult case. 
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Hamlet is, of course, a difficult case-so difficult, in fact, that 1 decided that 1 
needed to insert a theoretical chapter between chapters one and three in order to prepare 
my readers for the application to Hamlet of the approach that 1 develop in chapter one. 
Chapter two, "On Our Relation to Edited Texts," addresses the following question: How 
can 1 think that close, detailed engagement with the postural! gesturallanguage in Hamlet 
is worthwhile if 1 realize that the text of the play exists in multiple versions? Chapter one 
deals with some issues related to differences between modem versions of Coriolanus; 
however, differences between editions of Hamlet are far greater than differences between 
editions of plays like Coriolanus for which we have only one early printed text. Hamlet 
exists in three early printed versions, and differences between the versions are 
considerable. Differences between various modem editors' ways of dealing with the 
differences between the early versions are also significant. What to do? 1 can't just leave 
it to the editors to worry about this problem. In chapter two 1 acknowledge that literary 
critics' increased awareness, since the 1980s, of issues in textual studies has had 
implications that are impossible to ignore; nobody can really get away with assuming that 
there should be a firm textual scholarship/literary criticism divide. 
1 go on, however, to examine the arguments of certain prominent scholars whose 
response to their own heightened awareness of the complicated history of Shakespearean 
texts has been to become very skeptical of the value of doing "readings" of the plays. 
Such scholars do not want to make the mistake of "closely read[ing] printed texts as if 
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they were authorial compositions" (de Grazia and Stallybrass, "Materiality" 256). So, 
instead, they have become experts on the literaI material object, the Renaissance book 
and its constituent parts: ink, paper, glue, and so on. They draw attention to the 
forgotten labours of actors, scribes, and operators of printing presses. They focus on the 
social practices that have given shape to what we knowas "Shakespeare." My response 
to these scholars has not been to react against their emphasis on social practices. 1 do not 
try to re-throne Shakespeare-the-timeless-and-solitary-genius. Rather, 1 suggest that 
sorne of the most prominent literary critics for whom writing about sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century social practices is a specialty have tended to be insufficiently 
reflective about the current-day practices in which they themselves are involved. 
Following Guillory's lead, 1 suggest that writing about past social practices in the 
context of literary studies should be properly recognized as an ethical practice. What do 
we get out of reading a book on Renaissance material cultures? Let's take as an example 
the 1996 collection Subject and Object in Renaissance Culture, edited by Margreta de 
Grazia, Maureen Quilligan, and Peter Stallybrass. Why would we want to entertain 
alternative ways ofthinking about subjects and objects? The answer must be one or both 
of the following: 1) We are curious; 2) We are willing to involve ourselves in a practice 
that may modify our ethies, our rapport à soi. Denaturalizing our usual ways of thinking 
about, for example, gender may indirectly affect our political behaviour; any such 
political effects, however, will be secondary to effects on the constitution of the selfs 
relation to the self. In general, when Shakespeareans focus on Renaissance material 
cultures, their projects are better understood as a kind of self-help therapy than as 
advoeacy. 1 should specify that 1 do not, of course, mean that such projects promote the 
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vulgar se1f-help-as-self-discovery notion on which the self-help books that tend to show 
up on current bestseller lists depend. Instead, 1 would say that books like Subject and 
Object in Renaissance Culture, at their best, may help readers to deve10P their own 
ability to choose to constitute themselves in accordance with, as Foucault puts it, "an 
aesthetics of existence." 1 want to make it clear that 1 am not making this remark about 
"self-help therapy" because 1 wish to denigrate the work of scholars who have focused on 
Renaissance material cultures. What 1 hope is that clearer recognition of the ways in 
which their work develops and promotes an ethical practice will tend to open up the 
possibility for other kinds of literary scholars to develop other, different, but possibly 
compatible, ethical practices. 1 hope that interesting avenues for discussion will open up 
where previously they were blocked. For my own part, 1 attempt in this dissertation to 
develop an ethical practice that involves detailed engagement with the words of edited 
texts-texts which have been, and continue to be, constituted and reconstituted in a 
complex ongoing dialogue. 




FOLDING AND UNFOLDING: CORIOLANUS 
Why does Coriolanus make such a big deal about the "custom of request"? Why 
won't he do what he's supposed to do? The custom in question requires a candidate for 
consul to appear in the marketplace, show his war wounds, tell the stories ofhow he got 
the wounds, and ask for the citizens' votes. Coriolanus does~ontemptuously-ask the 
citizens for their "voices," but he refuses to tell them about his military deeds, and he 
withholds from them the sight ofhis wounds. This behaviour seems ail the more 
important to think about when we realize that in Plutarch's ParaUel Lives, Shakespeare's 
main source for this play, Coriolanus goes through with the ritual; he doesn't make a big 
deal about this custom. In the version Shakespeare would have known, Sir Thomas 
North's English translation ofPlutarch, 1 Coriolanus, "following [the] custom, showed 
many wounds and cuts upon his body, which he had received in seventeen years' service 
in the wars" (15). 
1 North's version is actually a translation of a translation. It is based, not on Plutarch directly, but on a 
French translation by Jacques Amyot. 
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While Plutarch's Coriolanus does come into conflict with the citizens, in his case 
the conflict flares up as a result ofhis insistence that the hungry plebeians should not 
receive free corn. Shakespeare's character holds the same opinion about the corn, and his 
position on this point becomes an important issue in this version of the story as weIl. But 
what the play does that Plutarch's account does not is make the "custom of request, " and 
specifically the postures and gestures it requires of the candidate, bring into focus 
Coriolanus's generally begrudging attitude toward the common people. The custom 
becomes a central focus for the plebeians, for the tribunes, for the patricians, and for us. 
It is literally central in that it is almost exactly in the middle of the play (Act 2, scene 3); 
it is pivotai in that the sequence of events that will see Coriolanus banished from Rome 
greatly speeds up from the point at which he refuses to do the expected showing and 
telling while wearing the special candidate's toga. Indeed, he will be banished within 
hours. 
So, clearly, this ritual has a special place in the play and, accordingly, audiences 
and readers may want to pay particularly close attention to what Coriolanus and other 
characters have to say about the custom and about the main character's handling of it. 
One thing we find is that the play represents almost all the other characters trying to 
figure Coriolanus out; or, to be more specific, it represents them trying to figure out 
what's wrong with him. A number of characters are also apt to tell him what's wrong 
with him. As they engage in this description, analysis, and rebuke, most if not aIl of 
these characters have a strong tendency to use what 1 calI position-and-movement or 
postural/ gestural words. Sorne ofthe words 1 will consider here include: "discover," 
"dispose," "wind," and "unknit." 1 will show how these words which are used, almost 
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always figuratively, by secondary characters are relevant to the postures and gestures to 
be enacted by the candidate and interpreted by everyone else in the "custom ofrequest." 
Of course, when 1 deal with characters' remarks on Coriolanus's behaviour, 1 intend 
always to keep in mind the partiality of their comments. 1 will also keep in mind the risk 
of slipping into the rebuking! moralizing mode of sorne of the characters. 1 do not want 
to align myself with any character or group of characters; 1 want to include various 
voices. 
As for Coriolanus himself, making sense of what he has to say about the custom 
turns out to be quite difficult-not because his speeches on this subject are complex or 
nuanced, but because he seems to have trouble making a moral argument. Relatedly, he 
is not good at articulating his state of mind. One of this chapter's purposes is to show 
what the relation is between: a) the character's failure to make coherent moral arguments; 
and, b) his inability, or simple refusal, to explain his private mental states. 
Coriolanus is probably Shakespeare's least introspective tragic hero. In fact, it is 
tempting for me, especially since 1 am going to be dealing with Ham/et in a later chapter, 
to calI him the anti-Hamlet. He has a total of only two soliloquies in the play. Both are 
notably awkward and neither is insightful. One-the one that 1 am going to treat in 
detail, returning to it a number of times in this chapter-is so awkward that, according to 
R. B. Parker, it "suggests discomfort with thought" (71). This is the soliloquy that 
Coriolanus speaks while he is standing in the marketplace wearing the candidate's robe; it 
is his pseudo-explanation for his decision about the "custom of request." Although it is 
very well suited to the character, this is one Shakespearean speech that does not get 
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quoted by people who aim to impress. It's hard to imagine anyone performing this one as 
a party trick: 
Better it is to die, better to starve, 
Than crave the hire which first we do deserve. 
Why in this wolvish toge should 1 stand here 
To beg ofHob and Dick that does appear 
Their needless vouches? Custom caUs me to' t. 
What custom wills, in all things should we do' t, 
The dust on antique time would lie unswept 
And mountainous error be too highly heaped 
For truth to o'erpeer. Rather than fool it so, 
Let the high office and the honour go 
To one who would do thus. 1 am haIfthrough; 
The one part suffered, the other will 1 do. (2.3.99-110i 
But what has he decided to do, anyway? Why? He argues in favour of rejecting the 
ritual and walking away. But then we get the apparent non sequitur of the fmal rhyming 
couplet. And then he would seem to reverse himself again, since, in the event, he does 
not fully comply with the custom's remaining requirements-although, actually, it would 
be something of an exaggeration to caU this a complete reversaI, since he does not walk 
away from the marketpIace. He keeps standing there, but now he launches into sarcastic 
flattery of the plebeians, confusing them with his rather passive-aggressive resistance to 
thecustom. 
2 Except where otherwise noted, quotations from Corio/anus are from Lee Bliss's Cambridge edition. 
37 
In performance, of course, this speech will tend to seem less ambiguous, if only 
because it will go by fast enough that most audience members will just get a general 
impression that Coriolanus is doing some grouchy grumbling. The discussion that 
follows here is, however, based on the foUowing premise: It is worthwhile to take the 
disjointedness of Coriolanus's argument seriously. Both Harry Berger, Jr. and John 
Ripley have influenced my formulation of this premise. Berger, writing about 
Shakespeare plays in general, urges us "to decelerate the language, dislocate it, listen for 
the meaning in the sound, understand the words beyond the fury" (Making Trifles 69). 
Ripley, who, unlike the very readerly Berger, is a theatre historian, advocates a careful re-
examination ofthis play specifically. Such a re-examination is called for, he argues, 
because Corio/anus's particular aesthetic has not been respected, or even recognized, by 
theatre directors. Stage-centred as he is, Ripley caUs for a return to the text in order that 
careful re-reading may teach directors to recognize, among other things, the play's 
implicit "movement score" (341). This "movement score" inc1udes "severe but eloquent 
blocking, pattemed entrances and exits, identical gesture in multiple contexts, aIl of 
which accentuate, comment upon, and modulate particular themes" (Ripley 341). 
My own thesis, highly compatible with Ripley's recommendations, though not 
primarily developed with performance in mind, is the foUowing: Coriolanus's attempts to 
make a moral argument tum out to be disjointed within themselves, but carefully woven 
into the design of the play as a who le; indeed, the design of the whole offers implicit 
comment on the reasons for the disjointedness of the characters' speeches. 1 treat as 
elements of the design the pattemed blocking, entrances, exits, and gestures that Ripley 
describes. How can enacted movements implicitly comment on a character's inadequate 
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self-understanding? That is the obvious question to ask at this point. The answer is that 
the highly stylized movements in Coriolanus bring crucial ironies into focus. Irony and 
paradox are very important in this play-a point which the movement score emphasizes. 
No matter how Coriolanus tries to think ofhimself, he ends up mirroring, in his enacted 
postures/ gestures and in his language, exactly those people from whom he insists he 
wants to separa te hlmself. 
As 1 explained in my introduction, 1 am not doing performance criticism or theatre 
history in this dissertation. Nevertheless, this chapter is informed in part by Ripley's 
Coriolanus on Stage in England and America, 1609-1994. Ripley makes the bold 
assertion that "never, it is safe to say, has the play been staged without apology by a first-
class company as a fully realized masterpiece" (334). Why not? WeIl, according to 
Ripley, 
Coriolanus's stage history is driven by the theater's conviction that the play is 
tlawed, that its idiosyncratic character is the product not of aesthetic strategy but 
defective craft. To render the piece agreeable to actors and marketable to 
audiences, its wayward indeterminacy must be stabilized, its multiple perspectives 
focused, its grim and overdetermined personalities glamorized and rendered 
psychologically transparent, its bleak ambiance warmed and colored, and its 
conclusion endowed with a measure oftranscendence or emotional release. (334) 
Like Ripley, 1 believe that Coriolanus has its own, probably underappreciated, aesthetic. 
My sense ofhow that aesthetic works is also quite similar to Ripley's. 1 share his sense of 
the importance ofindeterminacy and overdeterminacy; 1 agree as weIl that "[m]uch of the 
play's indeterminacy results from characters' failure to explain their motivation or their 
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state ofmind" (Ripley 335). And, as 1 noted above, 1 think that what Ripley caUs the 
play's movement score implicitly comments on this failure on the part of the characters. 
There is, however, one element of Carialanus's aesthetic to which Ripley does not draw 
attention, one which is closely involved with the movement score. That additional 
element is wordplay. 
Wordplay is more important in this not-very-playful play than most people think. 
On the one hand, it's not surprising that people don't expect wordplay in Carialanus, 
since several of the elements that are, in other Shakespeare plays, associated with 
wordplay are, in fact, absent from this one. For one thing, there is no licensed fool. And 
the main character doesn'tjoke around; unlike Hamlet, he has no "antic disposition," put 
on or otherwise. The plebeians aren't funny, either; they don't generate hilarious 
malapropisms the way Shakespeare's common people often do elsewhere-think of the 
gravediggers in Hamlet, for example. As well, sexual themes are for the most part not 
obvious in this play,3 so we don't necessarily expect to find bawdy humour and the sexual 
puns that often go with that kind of humour. On the other hand, though, it is unfortunate 
that wordplay in Carialanus has gone under recognized. There is a great deal of 
wordplay in Carialanus, although it is not a kind to which we are likely to be 
accustomed. 
1 should note here that in connection with early modem English wordplay 
generally, the application of the word "pun" may be problematic. Although Frankie 
Rubinstein, author of a respected and helpful dictionary of Shakespeare's sexuallanguage 
(A Dictianary of Shakespeare's Sexual Puns and their Significance), does use the word, 
3 Audiences do, however, sometimes pick up on something that seems to be going on between Aufidius and 
the main character. Jonathan Goldberg has written an article-entitled "The Anus in Coriolanus"-which 
addresses, among other things, the relationship between those characters. 
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there are good reasons to avoid it. 1 use the word "pun" at this early point in my chapter 
for the sake of ease of comprehension for non-specialist readers. A little further on 1 will 
explain what the problem with that word is. But, for the moment, 1 will make my 
assertion about wordplay in Coriolanus in the following terms: There are a lot of what 
we might call sexual puns in the play, but they are generally unfunny. 
Or maybe 1 should say they're just not funny in the usual nudge-nudge-wink-wink 
way; 1 actually think they are funny in another way. They are, in my view, important to 
the play's commentary on the ideology of gender; they end up highlighting the ironies in 
the main character's insistence on his masculinity. And that irony makes me laugh; 
maybe it makes, or could make, other people laugh too. At any rate, this chapter 
develops a particular understanding of the play's aesthetic-i.e., that what Ripley calls 
Coriolanus's "aesthetic strategy" is a strategy of extreme involution. For me this tragedy 
offers no traditional Aristotelian catharsis; rather, the release available is one of laughter 
when 1 realize how very far this play goes with mirroring, paradox, and 
overdeterminacy.4 According to this view, wordplay is crucially involved in this play's 
poetics, and in its philosophical content. 
The Importance of Portance 
ln what follows 1 will devote a lot of space to the word "portance," which is a 
word that the tribune Sicinius uses when he is coaching the plebeians on how they should 
4 For quite a different view, see Kenneth Burke's "Coriolanus--and the Delights of Faction." Interestingly, 
Burke, who does consider Coriolanus to he cathartic, notes that "some critics have called [this play] a 
'satiric' tragedy" (92). While he insists that Coriolanus is not being satirized--and that is the point on 
which 1 obviously disagree with Burke-he acknowledges that "Coriolanus rather resembles a character in 
a satyr play. He is almost like a throwback to the kind of scurrilities that AristotIe associates with the 
origins of the tragic iamb, in relation to the traditional meter of lampoons (See Poetics N)" (92). 
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go about revoking their election of Coriolanus. He urges one of the citizens to tell 
everyone that they have made a mistake. The candidate's bad handling of the "custom of 
request" has failed to register with them: "your loves,/ Thinking upon his services, took 
from youl Th' apprehension ofhis present portance" (2.3.208-1O), says Sicinius. 
"Portance" is an unusual word in Shakespeare; it shows up only one other time {in 
Othello).5 It means, in the sense in which Sicinius uses it, carriage, bearing. In 
Coriolanus it brings a kind ofhomonymic activity into play. 
The phrase "homonymic activity" is Margreta de Grazia's (although she does not 
use it in connection with Coriolan us). In her article on "Homonyms before and after 
Lexical Standardization" she argues that it is not really appropriate to talk about "puns" in 
Shakespeare. She poses the question, "what happens if our determination of the 
linguistically like and unlike, same and different, do not correspond to Shakespeare's?" 
("Homonyms" 155). She argues that it is significant that the word "pun" did not come 
into use until probably the mid-seventeenth century. According to de Grazia, "before 
words were committed to [al Lockean lexical grid, they may have moved on a different 
axis altogether that would have allowed (even facilitated) rather than debarred phonetic 
overlappings. What were subsequently singled out as accidentaI quirks might have been 
integral to language, directing and encouraging associations that made sense" 
("Homonyms" 155). She concludes that there is, in fact, a real difference between what 
5 The word "portance" is found in Act 1, when Othello is eXplaining to the Duke that Desdemona's father 
Brabantio had often invited him over, and had "question'd [him] the story of [his] life" (1.3.129). OtheUo 
tells the Duke that he had told Brabantio the whole story: everything that had happened to him, and his 
"portance in Chis] travers history." 1 should note that the First Folio (F) version bas "travelours," not 
"travers"; the First Quarto (QI) has "travels"; QI does not contain the word "portance" at an, but rather 
bas, instead of "portance in," "with it aU" (see Evans 1242). Interestingly, posturaV gesturallanguage 
continues to figure importantly in this speech, as OtheUo adds the foUowing comment: "These things to 
hear! would Desdemona seriously incline" (1.3.146). We can readily imagine this inclining as something 
both bodily and mental. 
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counts as a single word for us and what counted as a single word in Shakespeare's time. 
Accordingly, she suggests that when we encounter wordplay in early modem English, 
instead of thinking of it as being a matter of equivocating on two or more words that 
happen-for no interesting reason-to sound the same, we should think of it as a matter 
of activating multiple authentically interconnected meanings of a single word. The 
associations that early modem wordplay brought out "made sense," as de Grazia puts it, 
because they illuminated what were thought of as real connections between the meanings 
ofa word. 
As 1 will show, Coriolanus's portance during the "custom of request" is connected 
by wordplay to ports, porting, and porters, and although most of us probably tend to think 
of sorne port- words as having to do with carrying and others as having to do with 
entrances and! or boundaries (doors, gates, walled cities),6 in order to understand this play 
we need to get in the habit of thinking in terms of meaningful connections between what 
we are used to thinking of as only obscurely related words. According to the Emout-
Meillet Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine, the Latin verb portare, "to carry" 
and the nouns porta and portus, which both mean "passage," are considered by modem 
standards to be authentically related; portare originally meant "to pass, transport, to the 
port.,,7 1 am not sure whether or to what extent having a relatively recent authority vouch 
for the authenticity of etymologicallinks between the port- words will for modem 
readers make this wordplay in Coriolanus seem different than instances in Shakespeare in 
which homonymie play activa tes what we might consider faise etymologies. What is 
6 The OED bas ten distinct entries for "port" as a noun; however, it notes that the relationships between the 
etymologies of the various ports are not entirely clear in aIl cases. 
7 The translation ofEmout's and Meillet's French is mine. They have "faire passer, transporter, amener au 
port" (756). 
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most important is that readers be open to the possibility that words associated by 
activated etymologicallinks may in Shakespeare be illuminating, and not just 
illuminating of each other, but also illuminating of the nature of what they name. The 
constellation ofinterrelated port- words works in Corio/anus to crystallize certain crucial 
qualities of the main character. 
One deftnition the OED gives for ~'porter" is: "One who has charge of a door or 
gate, especially at the entrance of a fortifted town or a castle or other large building, a 
public institution, etc.; a gate-keeper, door keeper, janitor ... " (nI def. la). The word 
"porter" is explicitly used in this sense when one of Aufidius's servingmen reports to 
another that Coriolanus plans to "sowl the porter of Rome gates by th' ears" (4.5.193-94). 
The sense of "porter" that is most common in current usage is the one that has to do with 
carrying, not gates; for us a porter is usually a "person whose employment is to carry 
burdensll (OED n2 def. la). This and other related senses-sometimes quite extended 
senses, too-are in play in Corio/anus, speciftcally, 1 will argue, in connection with the 
kind of carrying (Le., of a child) that an expectant mother does. Janitor, fetcher-carrier, 
and pregnant woman-these are exactly what Coriolanus is not, right? Otherwise, what 
do these "porters" have to do with him? Just about everything, it turns out. 
In order to understand why porters matter so much, we need to think more about 
what the play does with the language of gates and carrying. One thing worth noting is the 
fact that the play uses the word "carry," which of course is semantically linked to 
"portance," in connection with a political candidate's winning of an election, and in 
connection with a military leader's expected conquering of a city. In Act 4, Aufidius's 
lieutenant asks his commander whether he thinks that the exiled Coriolanus will 
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successfully conquer Rome: "think you he'll carry Rome?" (4.7.27), he asks. Coriolanus 
can be used by the people he serves--and, of course, things are complicated by the 
important fact that his allegiances change during the course of the play-as a defender of 
boundaries, and as a transgressor ofthem. He is explicitly called the defender of Rome's 
gates: "you have pushed out your gates the very defender ofthem" (5.2.41), says one of 
the Volscian guards when Menenius asks to be allowed to plead with Coriolanus to spare 
hls city. The porter/ gate-keeper, having been deported (pushed out the city's ports/ 
gates), is about to retum to port! carry Rome. The irony here may be connected to the 
irony of the name Coriolanus: Caius Martius gets hls additional name for conquering 
Corioles, not for being from there, but then he cornes back to conquer Rome on behalf of 
the Voiscians, who include the people of Corioles. 80 the same name ends up being apt, 
for new reasons, after he changes sides; analogously, he is Rome's porter in one sense 
before his banishment, in another sense after he changes hls allegiances. 
Another fact whlch suggests the importance of ports in Coriolanus is this: 
Interestingly, in both the first and last Acts the gates of Corioles are called "ports." ln 
Act 1, the part of the play that includes the Roman soldiers' crucial refusai to follow 
Martius through the gates of Corioles, Titus Lartius refers to the gates as "the ports" 
(1.7.1). In Act 5, after Coriolanus has called off the invasion of Rome, the play's final 
scene begins with Aufidius speaking the following Hnes to hls attendants: 
Go, tell the lords 0' th' city 1 am here. 
Deliver them this paper. Having read it, 
Bid them repair to th' market place 
... Him 1 accuse 
The city ports by this hath entered and 
Intends t' appear before the people, hoping 
To purge himselfwith words. (5.6.1-8) 
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Not only is it notable that the play's fmal scene begins with a mention of city ports, it is 
also interesting that this mention of ports appears in the context of a crucial instance of 
ironic mirroring. We find out from Aufidius's speech that, as in the "custom ofrequest," 
Coriolanus is again expected to appear in a marketplace and speak to the public, though 
in this case the marketplace is in Corioles, not Rome. And this time the character is not 
running for political office; rather, he is just trying to save his own life, having proven 
himself doubly a traitor-a traitor first to the Romans, and now to the Voiscians. We 
soon find out, too, that this time he is much more willing to go through with the public 
appearance; he flatters the Voiscians, and gives a rather dishonest account ofhis truce 
with the Romans-an account designed only to put himself in a good light. 
Recall that in Act 2, scene 3 Coriolanus refuses to narrate his own deeds or to 
give reasons for which the plebeians should give him their voices. We should recall as 
weIl, however, that in Act 3, scene 1 he shows himself quite willing to narrate the 
plebeians' misdeeds and to give his reasons for his conduct toward them. In the speech 
beginning "1'11 give my reasons,/ More worthierthan their voices" (3.1.120-21), 
Coriolanus complains that the plebeians, "Being pressed to th' war,/ Even when the navel 
of the state was touched,/ They would not thread the gates" (3.1.123-25). As Bliss points 
out, although the parallel passage in Plutarch "is general and condemns the conscripted 
commoners for often refusing to go to the wars (i.e. 'thread' the gates of Rome), the 
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phrasing here evokes memories of the soldiers who refused to follow Martius through the 
gates ofCorioles" (186n). 
When the main character blames the plebeians for their refusaI to thread the gates! 
ports, we could say that he is accusing them of bad portance. He is also saying that his 
behaviour during the "custom of request" is justified on the basis of their bad portance. 
He sees his portance (we might say "attitude") as a reflection oftheirs. Of course, they 
could retort that their portance in Act 3, scene 3-that is, their banishment ofhim 
("Come, come, Iet's see him out at gates!" (3.3.150»-is a reflection ofhis banishment, 
so to speak, of them during the "custom of request" with his closed, withholding posture. 
Probably only readers could appreciate and hold in tension the several 
perspectives from which it is possible to make a connection between sorne idea of the 
toga-as-city-gates and Sicinius's "Where is this viper! That would depopulate the city 
and! Be every man himself?" (3.1.265-67); nevertheless, at least as an experiment, 1 want 
to see what happens if we do attempt to trace such connections. If Coriolanus's toga is 
read as the city gates, then he himself stands for the city. When he assumes his folded 
posture during the "custom ofrequest," he closes the togal gates, he shuts the people out, 
literally excluding them, in other words, or banishing them. Yet, from a certain 
perspective, he is also being banished (self-banished): "What is the city but the people?" 
(3.1.200), says Sicinius to the senators-and the plebeians echo him with "True. The 
people are the city" (3.1.201). And it is also possible, from another perspective, to see 
folding inward as a gesture of inclusion, if we understand depopulating the city and being 
every man himself as a matter of consuming the inhabitants. This is consumption as the 
most extreme kind of inclusion (being everyone by eating everyone). 
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By now it should he clear that it is my contention that in Coriolanus wordplay 
often either looks forward or connects back to the enacted postures and gestures of Act 2, 
scene 3, and that something interesting happens when we make a connection between 
"the ports" of Corioles and Rome and the "portance" of Coriolanus--especially his way 
of carrying himself during the "custom of request." Another thing that will come out here 
is that much of the play's action-directly presented action and action described in the 
characters' speeches-is linked to the "custom of request" by way of an interplay between 
wordplay and enacted postures and gestures. 
When earlier 1 described this play's aesthetic strategy as one of extreme involution 
1 had this in mind: The gate-keeping, child-hearing, and conquering that gets done or that 
gets talked about elsewhere in the play gets folded into the "custom ofrequest"; these 
actions become part of the ritual's symbolism. Most ofthe actions are not postural or 
gestural in the other contexts in which they appear in the play. But they become postural/ 
gestural as they become implicit figures in the "custom of request." In refusing to unfold 
the toga to show his wounds, Coriolanus is a gate-shutter, a banisher, a conqueror, and 
more. He also is himself shut out, banished, and occupied, as we'll see. And we'll see too 
that gate-shutting, banishing, and conquering aIl mean more than one thing in 
Coriolanus. As he resists the requirements of the ritual, almost everything else the play 
represents him as ever having done gets folded into the symbolism of the rituai. He may 
not like what the "custom of request" is supposed to mean, but he cannot stop it from 
meaning. It might even be fair to say that the more he resists, the more he stays foided 
up, the more meanings get folded into the ritual. 
48 
Why am 1 using the word "fold" so insistently? WeIl, one thing 1 have in mind is 
one of Coriolanus's most ill-humoured lines (one of many ill-humoured lines, of course), 
his defiant response to the tribunes' charge that he is a "traitor to the people" (3.3.71). 
"The fires i' th' lowest hell fold in the people!" (3.3.73), he says. l'm going to suggest that 
certain patterns in the figurative postural/ gesturallanguage of the dialogue provide 
implied clues that suggest that the candidate's posture in the toga during the custom 
should be a folded one. He both literally and figuratively folds in on himself in order to 
separate himself from the people; as we'll see, however, by standing that way he manages 
to achieve only an extremely unstable form of privacy. 
There is, it's important to note, a lot oftalk about standing in Coriolanus. The 
combined total for the words "stand," "standing," "stands," "stand'st," and "stood" is 
forty-five instances, not that the number by itself means much. There is talk of standing 
fast, standing up, standing in, standing here, standing upon, standing against, standing 
out, standing to, standing with, standing before, standing naked, standing as if, and 
standing for. Importantly, in this play, to be, as we might say, up for the office of consul 
is to "stand for consul." There is, of course, both literaI and figurative standing involved 
in standing for consul. It involves offering oneself as a candidate, and it involves literaI 
standing in the marketpIace. 
The plebeians who participate in the ritual do not ever really describe Coriolanus's 
stance, though one citizen does mention him waving his hat in scorn (2.3.153); however, 
one thing we are told is that he keeps his wounds covered. And we can find another hint 
ifwe look ahead to what his mother, Volumnia, says in Act 3. Here we may not get any 
closer to a literaI description, but we do come to an important paradox. This paradox 
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may help us find an appropriate way of interpreting Coriolanus's postures and gestures. 
Volumnia, rebuking her son for his way of dealing with the plebeians, says, "Lesser had 
beenl The checkings8 of yOUf dispositions, if! You had not showed them how ye were 
disposed" (3.2.21-23). "Dispositions" and "disposed" here can be taken as referring both 
to mental and to bodily attitude-ought to be, 1 think, especially since this rebuke comes 
shortly before Volumnia's "action is eloquence" speech (3.2.73-87), in which she coaches 
her son on how to hold his hat, how to kneel, how to wave his head when addressing the 
plebeians. The rebuke is relevant to Coriolanus's handling of the "custom ofrequest" 
(though it more immediately follows his outbUfSt in Act 3, scene 1), in that, while he 
refuses to show what the ritual requires him to show, his self-concealing way of standing 
is seIf-revelatory. His refusaI to dispose his body as he is supposed to shows the 
plebeians how he is disposed. 
IfVolumnia's comment looks back at the "custom of request, " a comment made 
by one of the officers laying cushions in the capitol in Act 2, scene 2 looks forward to it. 
Speaking to a fellow cushion distributor, this officer says that Coriolanus "seeks their 
[Le., the plebeians1 hate with greater devotion than they can render it him and leaves 
nothing undone that may fully discover him their opposite" (2.2.16-18). During the 
"custom ofrequest," one citizen responds to Coriolanus's sarcastic "1 pray, yOUf price 0' 
th' consulship?" (2.3.66) by saying, "The price is to ask it kindly" (2.3.67)-a reply which 
means more than something along the lines of "we'll give you what you want when you 
give us what we want, and what we happen to want is to he asked nicely." One theme the 
plebeian brings out with his reply is the dimension of Coriolanus's refusai to ask kindly 
8 The First Folio bas "things"; G. Blakemore Evans's Riverside Shakespeare bas "thwartings"; R. B. 
Parker's edition bas "tryings." 
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that is his refusaI to discover himself the plebeians' kin. If a candidate would, by 
uncovering his wounds, offer symbolic acknowledgment ofhis participation in the 
society in which the plebeians also participate, then-and this is where the relevance of 
the officer's comment in Act 2, scene 2 cornes in-Coriolanus discovers himself the 
plebeians' opposite during the ritual by refusing to uncover himself. This paradox is 
closely related to the paradox implicit in Volumnia's rebuke in Act 3. 
Another related paradox, and this one is also developed in postural! gestural 
terms, appears if we juxtapose two comments that the tribune Sicinius makes. The frrst 
ofthese comments cornes from Act 3, scene 3, the scene in which the tribunes publicly 
charge and sentence Coriolanus: Sicinius accuses him of contriving to "wind/ [himself] 
into a power tyrannical" (3.3.69-70). The second ofthese comments cornes frorn Act 4, 
scene 2: When Volumnia, Virgilia, and Menenius happen upon the tribunes and curse 
them for banishing Coriolanus, Sicinius responds by saying, "1 would he had continued to 
his country/ As he began and not unknit himself/ The noble knot he made" (4.2.33-34). 
So, for Sicinius, at least, Coriolanus in a sense unknits hirnselfby winding himselfup. 
To juxtapose the parallel phrases contained in Sicinius's two comments-"wind 
yourself'/ "unknit hirnself'-is to engage in deceleration and dislocation of the language 
of the text. As Berger notes, such decelerating and dislocating is a readerly activity; in 
performance, the play goes by too fast to allow spectators to do it (Making Trifles 68-69). 
This kind of reading cau, however, sornetimes make us see details that are relevant to 
performance. In this case, the juxtaposition may provide us with information about 
Coriolanus's bodily posture in the toga-about how to perform it as weIl as about how to 
understand it. 
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The words "wind" and "unknit" are both relevant to the toga; this is another 
reason for c10sely associating with the "custom of request" Sicinius's two comments. 
Knitting and unknitting are relevant to the wool of the toga; winding and unwinding are 
relevant to the toga's folds. Just as Coriolanus discovers himself the plebeians' opposite 
by covering himself, he unknits the bond ofreciprocity, which we might say is 
symbolized in this play by, among other things, the woollen "gown ofhumility," by 
assuming a done-up, wound-up, we could say knit-up (does that imply crossed arms?) 
posture. As for the folds in the toga, "wind," as in "wind yourself into a power 
tyrannical," is the literaI meaning of the Latin insinuare. And a sinus, as readers of 
Roman literature know, can he a fold, lap, bosom, or hiding-place in a toga. We can 
think of Coriolanus's wound-up posture as creating deeper folds in the toga, making his 
lap or bosom a hiding-place. 
As Lee Bliss notes in her gloss on "noble knot," "the knot is 'noble' because based 
on reciprocity, the virtues that hold socièty together, not because Coriolanus is a 
patrician" (217n). Like other editors, Bliss interprets this knot as a bond of service on 
Coriolanus's part, gratitude on the part of the citizens. This understanding of nobility and 
reciprocity is contested and then reaffirmed in the conversation that three of the plebeians 
have at the opening of Act 2, scene 3. There, one of the citizens asserts that the "custom 
of request" gives them the power to deny Coriolanus the consulship. The other two 
citizens, however, do not share this perspective; they feel that the custom imposes an 
obligation on them as much as on the candidate. One of them puts it this way: "if he tell 
us his noble deeds, we must also tell him our noble acceptance ofthem" (2.3.7-8). But, 
of course, Coriolanus does not tell them his deeds, or show them his wounds. He unknits 
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the noble knot ofreciprocity by winding himselfinto another kind ofknot. We might say 
that this one reflects a different interpretation of "noble." 
Coriolanus insists upon his patrician status. Here it may be worth considering the 
root of the word "insist"-the Latin insistere, to stand upon-which calls to mind 
Menenius's response to Coriolanus's reaction to being told that he must go through with 
the "custom of request." Coriolanus says that he cannot do it; the people are too far 
beneath him, and disgust him too much. Menenius's response is: "do not stand upon't" 
(2.2.145). He does stand upon it, though, and attempts to wind himself into what, from 
Sicinius's point of view, is a "power tyrannical." To refer back to the officer's comment 
in Act 2, scene 2 (his assertion that Coriolanus "leaves nothing undone that may fully 
discover him their [i.e., the plebeians'] opposite"), we might say that one of the things 
Coriolanus does not leave undone is his posture during the "custom ofrequest." 1 am 
suggesting, then, that decelerating and dislocating the play's postural! gesturallanguage 
reveals the following hint relevant to staging: An actor, ifhe is going to follow the hints 
embedded in the text (and 1 acknowledge that there may be good reasons for certain kinds 
of productions to have other priorities), will interpret Coriolanus's standing upon it and 
winding himself up as a done-up, wound-up posture during the "custom of request." 
"Who does the wolf love?" 
Now, 1 want to return to Coriolanus's soliloquy in Act 2, scene 3. Specifically, 1 
will consider what his posture in the gown shows us about how to read the soliloquy. 
There is, as 1 mentioned earlier, very little soliloquy in this play. The soliloquy we do get 
in Act 2, scene 3 is somewhat frustrating. R. B. Parker has described it-and all 
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soliloquy in this play-as "significantly non-introspective" (71). According to him, this 
speech "merely express [ es] irritation at canvassing in a series of proverbial phrases 
whose triteness is emphasized by rhyme" (71). 1 want to suggest, however, that ifwe 
read the speech in the context of the postures and gestures of the "custom of request, " we 
reveal something related to what Berger caUs "structural irony." ln structural irony "a 
character intends to communicate one message, but his language, speaking through him 
and in spite ofhis effort to control it, conveys another that he didn't intend" (Making 
Trifles 52). Structural irony can, according to Berger, disclose itse1f only through 
reading. 
The reason the irony that 1 am going to bring out here is not a perfect example of 
Berger's structural irony (it is only "related toIt it), has to do with the emphasis 1 place on 
enacted posture and gesture. Like Berger's, my approach is very readerly. But, at least in 
the case of Coriolanus (which play Berger does not discuss in any detail in Making 
Trifles ofTerrors), 1 have a very different attitude toward enacted rituals than Berger 
does. Berger places a lot of importance on what he considers antitheatrical critique in 
Shakespeare. He argues that enacted rituals-he deals explicitly with "[h]istorical 
victories and theatrical closures punctuated by athletic swordplay and other conventions 
that sound the 'music at the close"'-are often in the plays "dispIayed as 'smooth comforts 
faIse'" (Making Trifles xvii). According to Berger, "the plays thematize the function of 
displacement-from the textual site of discourse networks to the theatrico-historicaI site 
of performing bodies-as essential to those structures or strategies by which knowledge 
is disowned, complicities redistributed, and terrors made trifles" (Making Trifles xvii). 
Toward the end ofthis dissertation 1 will discuss this idea of Berger's in connection with 
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Hamlet, a play for which 1 think his argument works much better. In Coriolanus, 
however, we get a central ritual in which are concentrated several issues having to do 
with the ways the main character positions himself in relation to other people. The 
"custom ofrequest" is not a matter of comforting-but-not-really-adequate substitution. 
Rather, this rituai makes inescapable the ethical issues that the main character tries to 
evade. 
ln the soiiIoquy in question, Coriolanus asks himself (in the Bliss Cambridge 
edition and the Parker Oxford edition), "Why in this wolvish toge should 1 stand here/ To 
beg ofHob and Dick that does appear/ Their needless vouches?" (2.3.101-03). The First 
Folio (which text will often henceforth be referred to as "F") has "Wooluish tongue" 
(TLN 1506).9 Modem editors have done a few different things with this phrase. There 
seems to be consensus that "tongue" here is a mistake; the same error shows up in an 
early printing of Othello ("Tongued Consuls" for "toged consuls"). 10 1 will want to retum 
to this issue, but, for now, following the editorial tradition, 1 will work with "toge" rather 
than "tongue." As for "Wooluish," sorne editors are inclined to read it as referring to a 
toga made of wool, while others are more inclined to read it as associating the toga with a 
wolf. In a note Bliss explains that "Coriolanus sees himself wearing the 'napless vesture 
ofhumility' ... as the proverbial wolf in sheep's clothing (punning on 'wool') ... F's 
9 "TLN" stands for "Through Line Numbers." Charlton Hinman established them; he uses them in The 
Norton Facsimile: The First Folio of Shakespeare. 
10 See Othello, Act 1, scene 1. Here Iago is (in conversation with Roderigo) heaping scom upon Cassio: 
Forsooth, a great arithmetician, 
One Michael Cassio, a Florentine 
(A feHow almost damn'd in a fair wife), 
That never set a squadron in the field, 
Nor the division of a battle knows 
More than a spinster-unless the bookish theoric, 
Wherein the [toged] consuls can propose 
As masterly as he. Mere prattle, without practice, 
Is aH bis soldiership. (1.1.19-27) 
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'Wooluish' might be a misreading of'Woolish' (i.e. woolyish), referring to the fact that 
the gown ofhumility is a coarse woollen coat like that of the 'woollen vassals' he 
despises" (l74n). The spelling "wolvish," however, favours the association with a wolf. 
In this instance, 1 prefer the Riverside Shalœspeare's "woolvish," because it better 
preserves the ambiguity. This reading has the advantage ofpreserving a Hnk between 
Coriolanus's soliloquy in Act 2, scene 3 and Menenius's question to the tribunes in Act 2, 
scene 1 ("Who does the wolflove?" (2.1.6». 
"Who does the wolf love?"-this question interests Stanley Cavell so much that 
he made it the subtitle ofhis essay "Coriolanus and Interpretations ofPolitics." The 
question intrigues Cavell because it can be read in two directions: Its subject and object 
are reversible. In other words, the question can be read as "asking for the object of the 
wolfs affection" (Disowning Knowledge 151); and, also, it can be read "as asking whose 
object of affection the wolf is" (Disowning Knowledge 152). In the tirst case, Cavell 
notes that "the more nearly correct grammar would seem to be 'Whom does the wolf 
love?' But this correctness ... would rule out taking the question also in its opposite 
direction" (Disowning Knowledge 151-52). 
The question :tirst cornes up in response to Sicinius's ''Nature teaches beasts to 
know their friends" (2.1.5), which had been his reply to Menenius's remark that the 
people "love not Martius" (2.1.3-4). Coming from Menenius, the rhetorical question, 
"Who does the wolflove?" implies that the plebeian wolves love nobody, know no 
friends. The initially rhetorical question becomes a reversible question with Sicinius's 
reply-"The lamb" (2.1.7). Here, as Cavell points out, the way you interpret Menenius's 
question "will be a function of what or whom you take the lamb to be, hence what the 
56 
wolf' (Disowning Knowledge 152). For Menenius, the lamb becomes a figure for 
Coriolanus: "Ay, to devour him, as the hungry plebeians would the noble Martius" 
(2.1.8-9). Brutus then revises Menenius's interpretation (though, as Cavell notes, he 
"does not unambiguously deny it" (Disowning Knowledge 150»), replying with, "He's a 
lamb indeed, that baas like a bear" (2.1.10). And then we get a reversaI with Menenius's 
"He's a bear indeed, that lives like a lamb" (2.1.11). 
We can best see how to read the phrase "woolvish toge," with the ambiguity it 
captures between sheep and wolf, if we consider it in conjunction with the candidate's 
folded posture. This is how it works: Even as Coriolanus folds inward to shut out the 
people, sheep and wolf are bound more c10sely together in an ambiguous image of 
embracement and consumption. If we take seriously the possible connection, noted by 
various editors, between the "woolvish toge" and the wolf in sheep's c1othing, then, as 
Coriolanus pulls the "sheep's c1othing" toward himself (the wolf), he enacts a sheep's 
enfolding of a wolf. (Who does love the wolf? The lamb). It would, of course, be 
equally possible to associate "woolvish" with the plebeian "wolves"; in complaining 
about the woolvishl wolvish toga, Coriolanus could be complaining that the "gown of 
humility" makes him look like one of the plebeians-"the hungry plebeians" who would, 
according to Menenius, "devour the noble Martius," whom Menenius figures as a lamb. 
In that case, Coriolanus enfolding himself in the toga enacts a wolfs grasping of a lamb. 
(Whom does the wolflove? The lamb.) 
My reading c1early accords to the candidate's toga an overdetennined symbolism. 
At one point here so far the toga has stood for the city gates; at another point it has stood 
for the people, whether they are sheep or wolves. It may also function as a synecdoche 
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for the "custom of request," or, more generally, as a symbol of reciprocity. One reason 
for wbich tbis is noteworthy is that, if we look back at sorne of the best-known 
descriptions of the peculiar quality of tbis play's language, we will find that the language 
tends to be called unusually rigid, severe, and definite. G. Wilson Knight, for example, 
repeatedly used the words "hard" and "metallic" to describe it, and he associated these 
qualities with the hostile cities "here ringed as with the iron walls of war, inimical, deadly 
to each other, self-contained" (156). Lawrt(nce Danson, who sets out to account for what 
he calls the play's "peculiar stylistic barrenness" (142) and "the peculiarly narrow effect 
of the play" (157), declares that the peculiarity "cornes very largely from the unusual 
prominence given to metonymy and synecdoche" (143). According to Danson, "whereas 
metaphor reaches out to broaden a play's poetic world through the addition of other 
worlds to it, metonymy separates, parses, even diminishes, but also clarifies, the elements 
of Corio/anus's world" (157-58). While 1 agree with Danson that metonymy, and its 
close relative, synecdoche, have special importance in tbis play, 1 have reservations about 
bis description ofwhat metonymy does. Since, in metonymy, the name of one thing is 
given to another related thing, two things that already had something to do with each 
other are now covered by a single name. 1 might say that metonymy condenses, 
concentrates. And indeed, "synecdoche" is Greek for "taking up together." Danson's 
description of what metonymy does works better as a description of what the character 
Coriolanus tries to do. The character works hard to separate himself, and to parse Roman 
society (that is, resolve it into its components), but is it really fair to say that the language 
of the whole play does that kind of parsing? 
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ln important ways the language of Corio/anus works against the making of sharp 
distinctions, the c1arifying of limits, and the establishment of constant boundaries. Critics 
who talk about the language of this play in tenus of sharpness, rigidity, and definition 
tend to cite Coriolanus's joyful "0' me alone? Make you a sword of me?" (1.6.76).11 This 
line gives us a c1ear example ofmetonymy. And a sword is sharp, dense, and has definite 
boundaries. Also, it is, of course, used to defend boundaries, or to establish new ones. 
This figure certainly says a lot about the character's desire to be sharp and definite. But 
there are several other contiguous-but in important ways shifting, conflicting, and! or 
paradoxical-figures for Coriolanus himself in the play. 
Before 1 go on to show how these figures work, however, 1 should note that when 
1 refer to contiguous figures in Corio/anus, 1 have in mind, as Danson does when he uses 
similar phrases, René Wellek's and Austin Warren's distinction between "figures of 
contiguity" (i.e., metonymy and synecdoche) and "figures of similarity" (i.e., metaphor 
and simile) (Wellek and Warren 194-95; Danson 157). But what 1 am specifically 
concerned with here are, as we'll see, not simple metonymies and synecdoches, but rather 
c1usters of related figures. These are groups of contiguous figures of contiguity, if you 
will. 
1 should note too that in at least sorne important instances what brings the 
metonymiesl synecdoches in these groups into relationship with each other, what allows 
the individual figures of contiguity to be imagined as in a sense touching each other, in 
other words, is a kind ofhomonymic play. As 1 have aIready suggested, the role of such 
homonymic play in Corio/anus has been underestimated. 1 also think that enacted 
Il Philip Brockbank's Arden Corio/anus differs from most recent editions when it cornes to the assignation 
of this line. Brockbank gives this line to the soldiers. 
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postures and gestures are involved in the clusters ofrelated figures of contiguity. Perhaps 
this inter-involvement should not be surprising: ln characters' positions and movements 
we see relations of contiguity, proximity, or distance literally enacted. At any rate, my 
overarching claim here is that three elements-and those are: wordplay, metonymy/ 
synecdoche, and posture/ gesture-need to be considered together if a new description of 
this play's language is to do more than the old ones. 1 should specify that "doing more" 
would be a matter of getting beyond the limitations of descriptions that place an overly 
simple emphasis on rigidity and definition. 
People who have tried to describe this play's aesthetic have often quoted 
Aufidius's analysis ofhis rival's weaknesses: Aufidius suggests that it was Coriolanus's 
"nature,/Not to be other than one thing" (4.7.41-42). As Aufidius says, Coriolanus has 
trouble "moving/ From th' casque to th' cushion" (4.7.42-43). But, though he tries to 
command "peace/ Even with the same austerity and garb/ As he controlled the war" 
(4.7.43-45), though when he "stand[s] for consul" he tries to stand in the toga as ifhe 
were taking a position against an enemy,12 the toga is, as we have seen, more than one 
thing in this play, as Coriolanus is as weIl. The toga synecdoche is condensed and 
focused, but also complex; there is an overlapping of contiguous figures, and a shifting 
among them. Metonymies/ synecdoches in Corio/anus tend to take a lot of things up 
together. Like the character who folds inward in his toga, this play's language embraces 
as it concentrates. Because ofthis complexity, symbolism is often overdetermined. And 
because of the shifting between contiguous figures, we might say that symbolism does 
not tend to stay constant throughout the play. 
12 OED gives as one definition of the verb "to stand": "To take up an offensive or defensive position 
against an enemy, to present a firm front; to await an onset and keep one's ground without budging. Of 
soldiers: to be drawn up in battle array" (def. 10). 
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What does it mean to be constant, though? That is an important question for 
Coriolanus, and for Coriolanus. As we'll see, constancy tums out to be gendered: There 
is a masculine version and a feminine version. Unfortunately for the play's main 
character, his masculine constancy tums out not to be a stable virtue. It is something he 
tries to hold onto, but the attempt is futile. 
In the subsections that follow, one feature of my approach will be a kind of 
juxtaposition of Hnes from the play with excerpts from critical texts. This juxtapositional 
method will bring out an interplay between postural! gesturallanguage in selected critical 
texts and the postural! gesturallanguage of the play's text. How has the postural/ gestural 
language of interpreters shed light on Coriolanus? How does the play shed light on the 
interpreters' postural! gesturallanguage? My approach will allow me to consider such 
questions. 
Womanish Toge? 
Certain editions of Shakespeare's collected works currently quite widely used in 
universities treat the First Folio's "Wooluish" as a mistake. Stanley Wells and Gary 
Taylor depart from the long editorial tradition of pointing to wool and! or wolves. The 
Wells-Taylor Oxford Shakespeare prints "Womanish togue" (1296) in the "original 
spelling" edition, and "womanish toge" (2.3.115) in the modernized spelling edition. The 
Norton Shakespeare, since it is based on the Wells-Taylor text, also prints "womanish 
toge." In their Textual Companion, Wells and Taylor explain their choices as follows: 
The toge is a garment ofhumility, and can scarcely be wolfish. 'Woolish' or 
'woolyish' similarly seems contradicted by 'Naples' (2.1.231/ 987); either suggests 
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a resemblance rather than a fabric, is unexampled elsewhere in Shakespeare, and, 
especially in combination with 'toge', is quaint if not ridiculous. The beginning 
and end of the emendation 'Womanish' are the same as those ofF's reading; n/u is 
the simplest misreading. How the middle of the word came to be corrupted is not 
clear in detail and may involve compound error with tongue (a miscorrection from 
fouI proof?). Womanish is disyllabic elsewhere in Shakespeare, and in another 
Roman tragedy is descriptive of enduring 'Our yoake, and sufferance' (Caesar 
1.3.83/481). As weIl as symbolizing 'Womanish' submission, the toge 
presumably reminds the manly Coriolanus of a woman's gown. (596) 
The assertion that the toga "can scarcely" be wolfish ifit is a garment ofhumility seems 
too strong, at least in the absence of any attempt to reconcile it with the fact that 
elsewhere in the play the plebeians are associated with wolves. 1 have already discussed 
one instance in which this is the case. Another instance occurs in Act 4, when Coininius 
says that the people are in no position to ask Coriolanus to show mercy to Rome: "the 
people/ Deserve such pity ofhim as the wolf! Does of the shepherds" (4.6.114-16). The 
objection that "woolish" or "woolyish" is incompatible with "Naples" ("napless vesture of 
humility" (2.1.208)) may seem somewhat more compelling. J. Payne Collier must have 
decided to print "woolless" (608)13 for more or less this reason. But does "napless" 
necessarily contradict "woolish"? Can't a wool garment he threadbare? 
With their observation that "woolish" and "woolyish" are "unexampled elsewhere 
in Shakespeare" Wells and Taylor make a relevant appeal to internai evidence. On its 
own, however, this bit of evidence does not make their case. It is not ail that rare for a 
13 Collier's 1853 edition does not include line numbers. The parenthetical reference in my text gives the 
relevant page number. 
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word to appear only once in Shakespeare. 14 As for the quaintness and possible 
ridiculousness of the phrase "woolvish toge," we may or may not endorse this judgement, 
but even if we do, it does not necessarily support a case for emendation. We could say 
that Coriolanus in this speech uses quaint and ridiculous language in order to express his 
contempt for the custom he is describing. He considers the custom quaint and ridiculous. 
Then there is the problematic concession that "[h]ow the middle of the word [i.e., 
'womanish'] came to be corrupted is not clear in detail." The rhetoric here is interesting: 
The statement seems modest, but at the same time it also implies that there is sorne 
evidence of the way the change came about, even if that evidence is not as clear or as 
detailed as one might like. In fact, no such evidence exists at aIl. The miscorrected fouI 
proofs exist only in conjecture. 
And yet, even if the Textual Companion does not make a fully convincing case 
for the emendation, 1 still, in a way, share Wells's and Taylor's sense that "womanish" :tits 
here. The First Folio is the only early printing ofthis play, and (as with aIl the other 
plays in the Shakespeare canon) nothing written in the author's hand survives. Neither do 
we have the hypothetical scribal transcript which sorne editors believe was the basis for 
F. In the absence of any evidence of what-if anything-was ever there before 
"Wooluish" found its way into the speech, the only reason Wells and Taylor can really 
have for objecting to "Wooluish" is theu- own intuitive sense that "womanish" :tits better. 
My main objections to Wells's and Taylor's argument in favour ofthe emendation to 
"womanish" are: 1) that their rhetoric obscures the real (intuitive/ aesthetic) basis oftheir 
14 Readers can easily test my claim: Just flip through a Shakespeare concordance looking for entries for 
which there is onlyone citation. Ifyou start with the letter "A," it will only take you a few minutes to fmd 
multiple examples. 
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argument; and 2) that 1 think 1 can do a better job of defending "Wooluish" on aesthetic 
grounds than the Textual Companion does of defending "womanish." But though Wells 
and Taylor diverge from editorial tradition by printing "womanish," their version of the 
speech does not come out of the blue. Their choice attests to something that many good 
readers have found in this play: ln having their Coriolanus ask, "Why in this womanish 
toge should 1 stand here ... ?" (2.3 .115), Wells and Taylor point to a sense in which the 
positions the main character takes are closely involved with the ways gender works in the 
play. 
The possibility ofthinking of the "toge" as woolish/ wolvish and as womanish 
appeals to me because 1 have a strong sense-what this is based on will become clearer 
as this chapter progresses-that my discussion of the candidate's posture in the toga in 
Act 2, scene 3 should be developed with reference both to c1ass and to gender. A reading 
that focuses on the woolish/ wolvish ambiguity emphasizes the conflict between 
Coriolanus and the plebeians, and is bound to include sorne discussion of his self-
understanding as a patrician; a reading that works with the phrase "womanish toge" is 
bound to address Coriolanus's self-understanding as a man. The rest of this chapter will 
show how these two elements of the character's self-understanding are related. They are 
certainly closely related, and 1 like the woolish/ wolvish/ womanish ambiguity for the 
way it focuses the issue of their relationship at this crucial point in the scene. 
1 expect, however, that this attitude toward the text will meet with skepticism or 
disapproval in certain quarters. Sorne people will just ask whether the woolvish/ wolvish/ 
womanish ambiguity can be preserved in performance. Ifthe answer is "no"-which 1 
think it is, although it might be quite interesting to see and hear theatre practitioners 
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experiment with various costuming and pronunciation possibilities-then such people 
will consider that there is nothing more to be said on the subject: This is a play script 
we're talking about, and so if a reading isn't performable, then it's not relevant. Other 
people are highly mistrustful of editorial intervention, and so may want simply to 
discount the Wells-Taylor "womanish toge." Such people may cite the arguments of 
critics like Leah S. Marcus and Margreta de Grazia, who have drawn our attention to the 
ways in which editors' assumptions, which are often ideologically motivated and 
unacknowledged, have left their mark on the transmitted Shakespeare text. De Grazia 
daims "not necessarily" to be out to "strip Shakespeare ofhis modern textual investiture" 
(Verbatim 13);15 Marcus, however, goes so far as to caU for "temporary abandonment of 
modern editions" (5). 
Marcus favours instead the use of Renaissance editions, though not because she 
thinks they give us the text as the author intended it. Marcus is very aware that actors, 
scribes, compositors, and other extra-authorial agents have left their mark on the 
Renaissance editions. Indeed, one of her beefs with modern editors has to do with the 
attempts made by many of them to produce a text with all signs of such contributions 
effaced. Like de Grazia, she wants these contributions taken into account. The study of 
Renaissance modes of book production is a kind of work that de Grazia and Marcus both 
very much want people to be doing. But is that where we aIl have to end up if we are to 
have learned anything from critiques of modem scholarly editing? Can we do other kinds 
of work with a critical attitude toward editors' unacknowledged assumptions? 1 would 
15 See also "The Materiality of the Shakespearean Text," where de Grazia and Peter StaHybrass conclude 
that "[t]here is no intrinsic reason not to have a modernized, translated, rewritten 'Shakespeare.' In an 
important sense, that is aH we can have, because the material signs of early modem quartos and folios will 
themselves necessarily mean differently when read within new systems oftextual production" (282). 
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suggest that we cano There isn't even any real reason to assume that anyone who finds 
Marcus persuasive automatically has to mIe out the kind of reflective use of modem 
editions that 1 have in mind. It is important to note that, if we look closely at her proposaI 
of the ban on modem editions, it turns out that this ban may be a very ternporary one 
indeed: "'Unediting the Renaissance' is proposed not as a permanent condition, but as an 
activity that all editors should engage in as part of their own revisionary efforts, that aIl 
readers should practice even as they make use of an edited text" (5). In other words, 
"Unediting the Renaissance" is not supposed to be a matter of "no using anything but 
Renaissance editions for the next x-number ofyears!"-though readers ofher book may, 
with sorne cause, be left with the impression that Marcus's discussion does actually end 
up tending that way.16 "Unediting" is to be part of editing, and part of the reading of 
modem editions. 1 will come back to this issue more than once in this dissertation. 
For now 1 just want to suggest that in at least certain cases-and "womanish toge" 
is one such case---it may be worthwhile to consider modem editorial interventions, even 
when editors have not done a particularly good job of making their assumptions explicit. 
In what context might such an intervention be considered? 1 would suggest that we 
consider such an intervention in relation to literary critical work. In the case at hand, we 
might ask what Wells and Taylor might be picking up on that literary critics have also 
seen. With what sorts of interpretations might their intervention be aligned? Since, as 1 
have explained, Wells and Taylor are in possession of no special documents or 
information that can justify the change they have introduced here, they can most 
16 Michael D. Bristol compares Marcos to G. E. Bentley, who insisted that students in his graduate seminars 
on Renaissance drama at Princeton "use early printed texts as the basis for citation in their term papers. 
Bentley himself spent hours in Firestone Library checking these citations for accuracy" ("Recent Studies" 
367). 
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appropriately be treated-at least on this point-as readers and interpreters of the text, on 
par with other readers and interpreters. 1 have provisionally aligned their version of Act 
2, scene 3's soliloquy with interpretations that focus on the ways in which the positions 
that Coriolanus takes are involved with the ways gender works in the plays. 80, now the 
question is, which critics have argued this? How are such interpretations worked out? 
And, as for the objection 1 have anticipated from critics concemed primarily with 
performance, to such people 1 would say that, if it is true that the woolishl wolvishl 
womanish ambiguity cannot be preserved in performance, then theatre practitioners have 
to make decisions about how to resolve the ambiguity. They have to ask themselves 
which way they want to go here, with pronunciation and with costuming. 1 would 
suggest that the discussion that follows brings out some of the issues they might find 
relevant. In the presence of only limited information about the text's origins, the kind of 
discussion 1 am developing is relevant to theatre practitioners who need to decide how 
they are going to handle the phrase. What do they want the audience to hear when the 
actor says "woolvish toge"? What would it do to the play if Coriolanus were to say 
"womanish"? Which aspects of the play would be emphasized by such a choice? With 
what sorts of interpretations would a given choice for performance be aligned? 
A number of critics-among them Janet Adelman, Richard P. Wheeler, Page Du 
Bois, and Madelon 8prengnether-have written about Volumnia in connection with 
Coriolanus's military masculinity. These critics describe a Coriolanus anxious about his 
masculinity, and they connect this anxiety to his dependence on his mother. As Adelman 
puts it, "even the very role through which he claims his independence was designed by 
her-as she never tires ofpointing out" (134). Wheeler puts it this way: "Coriolanus's 
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savage masculinity remains bound to the overpowering mother who invented it and filled 
it with her son" (160). So, Coriolanus's "overpowering" mother demands that he be 
submissive to her, but independent of everyone else. Or, actually, the demands he faces 
are more thoroughly paradoxical than that. Volumnia is not just the designer or inventor 
of her son's role, but also the model for it. Du Bois provides a pithy description of the 
problem this creates: "He must be a man, but a man like her, that is, a woman. And he 
is, tenuously, man and woman at once" (195). 
In what sense is Coriolanus a woman? Critics who use psychoanalytic paradigms 
(and Adelman, Wheeler, Du Bois, and Sprengnether all do) usually make a case for the 
importance to the whole play of a hostility between Coriolanus and Volumnia. This 
hostility only really surfaces at certain crucial moments. At least according to these 
critics, however, its influence is pervasive. The story goes something like this: The 
mother hates her son for being the man she wishes she could be herself; the son hates his 
mother for her insistence on his submission to her, and for her eagemess to have him 
wounded in battle. The son's wounds are a sign ofhis bravery in war. But, in 
Coriolanus's particular situation, since he senses that his mother's enthusiasm for seeing 
him wounded expresses hostility toward him, the wounds also for him represent "loss and 
castration" (Du Bois 197). For Volumnia, sending her son to the wars is a way for her to 
achieve through him what she can't achieve in her own person: He'll be a man. And, at 
the same rime, it is a way for her to get her revenge, to punish him by having him 
castrated: Since, in this kind of reading, castration is feminization, the wounded 
Coriolanus will be a man like his mother-that is, a castrated man, or, in other words, a 
woman. 
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Adelrnan, Wheeler, Du Bois, and Sprengnether aIl rnake a connection between 
Coriolanus's problern with his rnother and his refusaI to show his wounds to the 
piebeians. Sprengnether sees it like this: 
While Coriolanus can accept his rnother's dernand that he be wounded on the 
battlefield, he cannot accept her request that he reveai his wounds in public. 
While the former supports his fragile self-definition, the latter subverts it by 
revealing the contradiction at its heart. For Coriolanus to show his wounds is to 
expose his incornpleteness, his implicitly castrated condition. (101) 
According to Adelman, Coriolanus tries to live "heroicaIly rnantled in his self-
sufficiency, alone" (144). It is unc1ear whether or to what extent Adelman is thinking of 
the candidate's toga when she refers to the character's atternpt to "mantle" himself in self-
sufficiency. But, as 1 proceed here, 1 want to show how the kind of reading 1 began to 
develop early in this chapter-a kind of reading c10sely involved in the play's postural/ 
gesturallanguage-works with readings committed to exploration of the play's sexual 
politics. Indeed, close attention to postural! gesturallanguage may do something to show 
how aspects of the play brought out by sorne such readings-by sorne readings much 
more than by others--are discoverable in the text. 
It turns out that even Volumnia's name may qualify as, or at least be closely 
related to, what 1 have been calling postural/ gesturallanguage. As Coppélia Kahn points 
out, 
The word volumen, from which Volumnia's name rnay be derived, rneans that 
which is rolled, a coil, whirl, wreath, fold, eddy, or a roll ofwriting-a book or 
volume or part of one. The name can be associated with the complex interior 
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circular spaces of the female reproductive organs as weIl as with the religious and 
legal textual inscriptions that delineate the social formation. In Shakespeare's 
play, Volumnia and virtus, womb and state, mother and son form a metaphorical 
and dramatic coil or fold which can be unrolled only for the purpose of analysis. 
(150) 
Unlike other critics who have written about Volumnia, Kahn makes a point oflooking at 
her in a way other than as the cause of her son's problems (and, through him, Rome's 
problems). Kahn treats Coriolanus's masculinity "less as an intra-psychic phenomenon 
and more as an ideology discursively maintained" (2). She sees the process involved as a 
matter of folding. She argues that the play in fact draws attention to this folding, and 
shows what's ideological about it. The "central claim" ofKahn's book is "that 
Shakespeare's Roman works articulate a critique of the ideology of gender on which the 
Renaissance understanding of Rome was based" (1). "Like any discursive construction 
of gender difference," she notes, " ... virtus [i.e., Roman manly virtuel proves to be at 
odds with itself, and its contradictions give these texts their complexity and energy" (15). 
"1 am constant" 
We have already seen that Coriolanus is a character who takes positions that 
involve him in contradictions. But how exactly do the contradictions that we have 
already considered relate to the contradictions that interest Kahn? Consider tirst the 
intriguing connection between Kahn's derivation ofVolumnia's name and Coriolanus's 
enacted postures during the "custom of request." Kahn at no point says anything about 
the candidate's posture in the toga. But, if she had, she might have made her point about 
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the mutual enfolding of "Volumnia and virtus, womb and state, mother and son" aIl the 
more effectively. 1 take very seriously the language offolding used by Kahn, and 1 want 
to emphasize its discoverability in the text. It is not merely, in a vague or general way, 
language that "can be associated with" Volumnia's name; rather, the significance of 
folding and unfolding is carefully developed throughout the play in the context of a group 
of related actions. These actions are carefully associated in specific ways. The network 
of relationships in Coriolanus among folding and unfolding, covering and discovering, 
shutting out and opening up, banishing from and laying siege to, and so on, is describable 
in detail. 
As 1 have already noted, this language in Coriolanus has a way of either looking 
forward to or reflecting back on the "custom of request." And, indeed, the contradictions 
that interest Kahn are: 1) developed throughout the play; and, 2) brought into sharp focus 
in the conjunction of the mother's name and the son's folded posture during this crucial 
ritual. My discussion of this name and this posture will in sorne ways look quite parallel 
to my reading of the phrase "woolvish toge" in relation to the same posture. It may seem 
that these are presented as two alternative ways of reading the same thing, two different 
possible emphases. Perhaps that is a perfectly good way oflooking at it, though 1 am not, 
in fact, trying to set up two alternative readings, but rather to show shared involvement in 
a group of related figures. 
Due to the way symbolism works in this play-recall that, earlier in this chapter, 1 
described the workings of groups of contiguous, overlapping figures-we get a kind of 
concentration effect. One aspect of this is, in at least certain crucial instances, a 
concentration of cause~and~effect relationships and! or a collapsing, or near collapsing, of 
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subject-object distinctions. As Wellek and Warren note, there is a type ofmetonymy that 
makes an effect a figure for its cause, or a cause a figure for its effect (194). So, to the 
extent that there is this peculiarity in the handling of cause and effect, subject and object, 
in Caria/anus, it could be related to the special importance ofmetonymy in the play. 
What we end up seeing, particularly in the case of some of the main character's actions, is 
that cause and effect are focused in a single posture or gesture. 17 One way of talking 
about the" custom of request" might be to say that as a result of his refusaI to reveal his 
wounds, Coriolanus is banished, and that then in response to his sentence he banishes 
Rome ("1 banish you." (3.3.l31)). But another way would be to say that, in using his toga 
to shut out the plebeians, Coriolanus is aIready both banishing the plebeians and being 
banished (self-banished). Similarly, Coriolanus can be seen as both starving the 
plebeians (who were ready, most ofthem, to take his wounds in their mouths: As one 
citizen says, "we are to put our tongues into those wounds and speak for them" (2.3.6-7») 
and being starved (self-starved: He says, "Better it is to die, better to starve,/ Than crave 
the hire which fust we do deserve" (2.3.99-100)). And, as we've seen, characters reflect 
each others' attitudes in this play (see my discussion, above, of the problem ofwhose 
portance-the plebeians' or the main character's-reflects whose). In the case of 
Volumnia, as she says herself, she hopes or helps18 to "frame" (5.3.63) Coriolanus as a 
warrlor. He reflects her disposition in a number of important ways and, since she is "the 
honoured mould/ Wherein [his] trunk was framed" (5.3.22-23), it is of course thanks to 
17 Cavell puts it this way: the character Coriolanus is "a figure whose every act is, by that act, done to him 
so perfectly that the distinction between action and passion seems to lose its sense" (Disowning Knowledge 
144). 
lB The First Folio has "Thou art my Warriour, 1 hope to frame thee" (3414); Bliss, like most recent editors, 
has "1 holp to frame thee" (5.3.63). 
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another kind of portance, her bearing ofher son, that he is what he is. Her bearing ofhim 
obviously precedes, temporally, his handling of the "custom of request, " his portance or 
bearing then. But, because of what Kahn describes as the coil formed by womb and state, 
mother and son, Volumnia and virtus, the play does not simply present the mother as the 
cause, the son as the effect. 
Psychoanalytic critics have tended, as 1 have noted, to point to a causallink 
between the main character's problematic relationship with his mother and his bad 
attitude toward the plebeians. Sueh erities have tended to subordinate the political to the 
personal, inviting us to imagine a bad childhood for the main character, and emphasizing 
the ways his bad upbringing can be understood as the cause ofhis bad attitude. One of 
the advantages of Kahn's reading is that it does not make everything ultimately 
Volumnia's fault. Adelman goes so far as to end her essay on Coriolanus by referring to 
"the awful triumph ofVolumnia"; she quotes the main character's "terribly painful cry: 
'0 mother, mother/ What have you done?'" (145), as ifthat line summed up everything. 
Mother blaming, is, from my perspective, at least a bit tiresome. But that is not the only 
reason to prefer Kahn's approaeh. Like Kahn, 1 would point to the ways in whieh earlier 
psyehoanalytie erities, by stopping at Volumnia, oversimplify the play's handling of 
cause and effect. 
One thing we can clearly say about the bodily position that Coriolanus assumes 
during the "custom ofrequest" is that the more he winds himselfup, the more he makes 
himselflook like a coil, fold, wreath, eddy, or roll. In other words, the more he resists the 
eustom, the more he embodies his mother's name. And indeed, he claims to have learned 
his disdain for the plebeians from her: She was, he says, "wontl To caU them woollen 
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vassals, things created/ To buy and sell with groats" (3.2.10-11). (So, this is another 
resonance we can hear in "Wooluish": The adjective that Coriolanus in ms soliloquy 
applies to the candidate's toga echoes a word he remembers his mother applying to the 
plebeians.) But, it turns out that, in this case, Volumnia expects her son to comply with 
the demands of the custom. This expectation baffles and hurts him: "Would you have 
me/ False to my nature?" he asks, "Rather say 1 play/ The man 1 am" (3.2.15-17). It 
becomes clear that he opposes the "man 1 am" to something like "the woman 1 don't want 
to be." At Volumnia's urging, he agrees to speak to the plebeians, to try to make up for 
his offensive handling of the "custom of request"; however, he portrays the behaviour his 
mother expects ofhim in terms of, as Kahn puts it, "transformation to the feminine" 
(155). And, importantly, the imagined sex change is also an imagined age change, and 
class change: 
Away, my disposition, and possess me 
Some harlot's spirit! My throat of war he turned, 
Which choired with my drum, into a pipe 
Small as an eunuch or the virgin voice 
That babies lull asleep! The smiles ofknaves 
Tent in my cheeks, and schoolboys' tears take up 
The glasses of my sight! A beggar's tongue 
Make motion through my lips, and my armed knees, 
Who bowed but in my stirrup, bend like bis 
That hath received an alms! (3.2.112-21) 
74 
This transformation is so repellent to him that he immediately erupts with "1 will not do 
't" (3.2.121). He fears that his "body's action" may "teach [his] mimI! A most inherent 
baseness" (3.2.123-24). Ifwe read this speech on its own, we leam that, for Coriolanus, 
to capitulate to the demands of the plebeians and ofhis mother-to assume a physical 
disposition that conceals his mental disposition-would be to teach his mind the baseness 
of a woman (whether a "barlot" or a "virgin"), a eunuch, a child, a servant, or a beggar. 
But, ifwe consider his posture in conjunction with his mother's name, that tells us 
something else. That tells us that to resist is to be like his mother. AlI folded up in a coil 
he is, to come back to Du Bois's phrase, "a man like her, that is, a woman." 
So, wrapping himself in what, in the WeUs-Taylor version, he disdainfuUy caUs 
the "womanish toge,11 he binds himselfto his mother (or, at least, to her name). Kahn, as 
we have seen, refers to "a metaphorical and dramatic coil"-a phrase 1 like to think of in 
relation to my sense of the interplay in Coriolanus between figurative postural! gestural 
language (though, as we've seen, metonymy plays at least as important a role as 
metaphor) and enacted/ dramatic posture and gesture. It is a littie hard to know to what 
extent this interpretation is warranted, though, since Kahn does not do much to unpack 
her phrase. She does not explain in what way the coiling or mutuai enfolding is 
dramatized. She bas quite a lot to say about, for example, the language ofbonds and 
binding, but she does not deal with whether or how this language is enacted. But let's 
imagine Coriolanus standing there covering himself up in bis folded, done-up, wound-up 
posture. 1 want to suggest that there is an implicit toga-as-womb figure. 
It tums out that wombs, like a number of other things we have looked at here, aiso 
belong to the play's group of figures for the state. This becomes most explicit in Act 5, 
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when Volumnia comes up with a striking image. She refers to her own womb in a way 
that makes it a figure for Rome: She says to her son, 
... thou shalt no sooner 
March to assault thy country than to tread-
Trust to 't, thou shalt not--on thy mother's womb 
That brought thee to this world. (5.3.122-24) 
Coriolanus's wife, Virgilia, seconds this pronouncement: "Ay, and mine,! That brought 
you forth this boy" (5.3.125-26). It would be difficult to provide a comprehensive 
description of the network of relationships among the figures in the womb/ state group. 
But it is important to note that there is such a network of relationships. So 1 will provide 
a partial description. The relationship between the womb-as-Rome figure and the people-
as-Rome ("The people are the city") figure is obvious. There is what may be considered 
either a metonymic or a synecdochic link between the variables in these two figures-
between wombs and people, that is. AlI of the people were once in wombs (container-
for-the-thing-contained; that's metonymy). Half of the people have wombs (part-for-the-
whole; that's synecdoche). But now, and this is a little more complicated, what is the 
relationship between the womb figures and the candidate's-stance-in-the-toga figure? 
This is crucial if we are really to discover in the text the folding that interests Kahn. 
According to Kahn, chastity is "the female counterpart to virtus" (156) in 
Shakespeare's Rome. It's worth thinking about this in connection with what Bliss calls 
"metaphors drawn from siege warfare" (204n) in the "Away, my disposition" speech, and 
in connection with Coriolanus's posture during the "custom of request." 19 The language 
19 The wolf in "woolvish toge" could also be another link between the soliloquy in 2.3 and the "Away, my 
disposition" speech. The second ofthese two speeches puts more obvions emphasis on chastity, but it 
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of the speech in question would make Coriolanus's own disposition-the one his mother 
would have him banish-a matter of resistance, shut gates, a refusaI to be occupied. If he 
does what his mother asks, knaves and schoolboys will "tent in" him (i.e., "encamp"), and 
"take" (i.e., "capture," "occupy") him. A "harlot's spirit" will "possess" him. The speech 
can be described as, among other things, an attempt to show how his mother's request that 
he apologize for his bad handIing of the "custom ofrequest" puts him in a ridiculous 
position. Coriolanus protests, even as he temporarily agrees to what his mother wants, 
that it is absurd that he should be had by those who should be had. Here it's important to 
note that, as Patricia Parker has pointed out, "occupation" often has a sexual or quasi-
sexual sense in Shakespeare-a sense that depends on thinking of sex in terms of 
ownership and property (Margins 8). But now, consider what happens, according to the 
logic of the speech, when Coriolanus resists. This is certainly one place where the 
contradictions in virtus as Coriolanus tries to embody it show up. The structure of a 
particular construction of masculine and feminine positions contains the contradiction in 
which Coriolanus gets caught. 
could be that Coriolanus talks about bis position in tenns of chastity in both. Rubinstein and Gordon 
Williams both include an entry for "wolf" in their dictionaries of Shakespearean sexuallanguage. 
According to Rubinstein, a "wolf" is a "she-wolf; whore" (308); according to Williams, a "wolf' is a 
"whore or whoremonger" (1542). For Rubinstein, Coriolanus's "Better it is to die ... Than crave the hire 
which fust we do deserve./ Why in tbis woolvish toge should 1 stand here ... " refers to "the hire and dress of 
the WOLF (whore)" (141). Rubinstein also thinks that the question "who does the wolflove?" has to do 
with this meaning of "wolf." If it does, then the implied dispute, in the dialogue between Menenius and the 
tribunes, over who-Coriolanus or the plebeians-is the wolf and who is the lamb becomes in part a 
dispute over who is the whore. But the issue is further complicated ifwe accept Williams's suggestion that 
"wolf' could mean "whoremonger" too. And it is also complicated by the fact that "mutton" is often a 
word for prostitute. This could he another aspect of the sheepl wolf amhiguity in Coriolanus. Earlier 1 
argued that Coriolanus's posture in the "woolvish toge" fonns an ambiguous image of embracement and 
consumption. Prostitution could be caUed an ambiguous business of embracement and consumption. To 
caU a prostitute a wolf is to think of himI her as aggressive and indiscriminate. To cali a prostitute mutton 
is to think ofhiml her as something consumable by the aggressive and indiscriminate. Interestingly too, 
prostitution is linked to the myth of the founding of Rome; Rubinstein and Williams both note that the wolf 
that suclded Romulus and Remus is associated with prostitutes. Williams cites an example from Fletcher 
(Bonduca), in wbich Roman rapists are called "Dogs, To whose brave founders a salt whore gave suck" 
(qtd. in Williams 1543). 
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Ifby his body's action he admits the base occupiers he has imagined, they could 
in sorne way really stick around, he thinks. They could stick around and change his 
mind; they could make him base like them. So he will refuse to admit them. But, it 
would seem, he is stuck in a degraded position whether he admits them or not. Since he 
speaks and behaves as if the imagined occupiers pose a real threat (however much he 
objects to the situation that makes this threat possible), he must understand himself as 
someone who can be occupied. He must understand himself as, in a sense, female. 
Though he may try to embody virtus, his words here attach military masculinity to the 
imagined occupiers. The virtue he asserts for himself in this speech is tending to sound 
less like virtus, and more like its female counterpart-i.e., chastity or feminine constancy. 
This speech makes him sound like a woman protecting her chastity. So, maybe, ifhe 
refuses to apologize for his handling of the "custom of request, " he can avoid being a 
harlot. But though he can try to cling to one kind of constancy, he will still he inconstant 
in the sense of changeable: In his defensive position he will change into, or at least 
become like, another one of the occupiers-not the harlot, but rather the virgin 
contemptuously mentioned in the speech. 
How much sense does the main character's problem, as delineated in the "Away, 
my disposition" speech, make, though? The occupiers are imaginary. The threat is 
imaginary. It might even he fair to say that the play as a whole suggests that there is no 
necessary reason that receptivity, which is described with such revulsion in this speech, 
should be considered a bad thing. Indeed, Wes Folkerth has persuasively argued that one 
of the most important things that Coriolanus does is to show the disastrous consequences, 
for the polity and for the main character, of an idea1 of impenetrability: "Acceptance of 
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diverse voices .. .is represented as necessary to the survival ofthe polity, just as eating is 
necessary to physical existence" (79); as for Coriolanus himself, his destruction is 
"brought about by ... his vulnerability to the idea of invulnerability" (85). The idea of 
invulnerability, as Coriolanus receives and deploys it, is compelling for this character. 
Yet, when we examine it critically, it stops making sense. It does important work for 
him: It is involved in a crucial way in his self-understanding as a man, as a war hero, and 
as a patrician. And yet, the idea of invulnerability involves Coriolanus in serious 
contradictions. He cannot maintain his self-understanding without ignoring these 
contradictions, and he has to deceive himself in order to ignore them. So, in other words, 
Coriolanus exposes as ideology a certain idea of invulnerability.20 
l've said that the "Away, my disposition" speech makes Coriolanus sound like a 
woman trying to preserve her chastity. From a certain perspective, his folded posture 
during the "custom of request" makes him look one too. Parker's discussion of unfolding, 
display, dilation, and "female show"-specifically as it is developed in her chapter, in 
Shakespeare /rom the Margins, on "Spying, Discovery, Secret Faults"-is relevant here. 
The chapter deals with Othello and Hamlet, and does not address Coriolanus at aIL 
Nevertheless, its treatment of the connection, which a number of Renaissance texts make, 
between rhetorical and sexual dilation presents interesting possibilities for this play. 
Coriolanus, of course, refuses to do the rhetorical dilating that the "custom of 
request" requires of him; he refuses to narrate his deeds. Parker explains that rhetorical 
dilation is a matter of "expanding or discursively spreading out something originally 
20 1 find Bristol's definition of ideology concise and helpful. It is as follows: "ideology differs both from 
knowledge and from deliberate or malicious deception. Ideology is false consciousness or distorted 
communication that nevertheless has a functional equivalence to truth" (Shakespeare's America 9). 
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smaller or more constricted" (Margins 235). In the case of Coriolanus, the plebeians 
know what he has done for their country, but the candidate is still expected to elaborate, 
to tell them his deeds in detail. Further, rhetorical dilating was understood, Parker tells 
us, as a matter of figuratively bringing something before the eye. Rhetorical dilation is a 
kind of telling that is simultaneously a kind of opening up and showing, in other words. 
Parker also draws our attention to the figure that "made rhetoric itself a form of 
opening"-i.e., "the figure of the open palm in contrast to logic's closed fist" (Margins 
235). She then goes on to point to a connection between "the open hand or palm taken 
(as in Othello or The Winter's Tale) as sign of the openness of a woman and her sensual 
appetite, a 'frank' and 'liberal' hand that argues a licentious or a 'liberal heart'" (Margins 
235). Thus, a bit of figurative gesturallanguage (rhetoric's open palm) links the literally 
open mouth of the speaker (or, in the case of a rhetorician who is a writer and not literally 
a speaker, the figuratively open mouth) to sexual openness (a kind of openness that can 
be both literaI and figurative). Chastity, on the other hand, is associated with a closed 
mouth and with other kinds of literai and figurative closing, folding, or covering. Parker 
refers to "the proverbial inability of women in particular to keep from disclosing what 
should be hid, a clear link with the secret sexual place they are to guard from show" 
(Margins 253). 
Here it may be interesting to reconsider the First Folio's "tongue," in the phrase 
"Wooluish tongue." As we've seen, editors generally replace "tongue" with "toge." And 
there are good reasons to prefer "toge" to "tongue." 1 have already mentioned the 
precedent the editors cite-Le., the phrase "Tongued Consuls," which editors of Othello 
emend to "toged consuls." Another reason to prefer "toge" to "tongue" is that it makes 
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the syntax of the speech in question less tortured. But "tongue" still works. Consider this 
part of the soliloquy again: "Why in this woolvish [or womanish] toge should 1 stand 
here/ To beg ofHob and Dick that does appear/ Their needless vouches?"; "Why in this 
woolvish [or womanish] tongue should 1 stand here/ To beg of Hob and Dick that does 
appear ... ?" Coriolanus could he asking why he should stand here in the toge; or, he could 
be asking why he should stand here to beg in a woolvishl womanish tongue. The latter 
possibility seems to me much weaker than the former. But, still, 1 find the toge/ tongue 
ambiguity appealing, because it crystallizes the ambiguity between the showing and the 
telling involved in rhetorical dilation. Ifwe temporarily entertain both the "toge" ofmost 
modem editions and the "tongue" ofthe First Folio, we capture the ambiguity at this one 
point. It is an ambiguity that is basic to the structure of the "custom ofrequest." 
Clearly, the "custom ofrequest" requires both rhetorical dilation and a kind of 
literalized dilation: As the candidate figuratively brings his deeds before the plebeians' 
eyes through his narration, he also literally opens up the toga and brings the wounds 
(which stand as a metonymy for the deeds) before their eyes. And, partly because 
"wound" was, in the Renaissance, a common euphemism for vagina, 21 the literalized 
dilation to which Coriolanus is averse invites consideration in terms of sexual dilation. 
Also, since Coriolanus refers to his unwillingness to "hear [bis] nothings monstered" 
(2.2.71), this has the effect of compounding the association hetween sexual dilation and 
the unfolding that he refuses to do. The "nothings" he refers to here are, of course, the 
21 According to Williams's Dictionary ofSexual Language and Imagery in Shalœspearean and Stuart 
Literature, "[tlhis depends in part on the idea of a woman as mutilated man ... But there is the 
supplementary idea of wounded chastity" (1551). Williams gives a number of examples in which 
pregnancy is described as a wound, and also a number in which intercourse, whether consensual or not, is 
described as wounding to a woman. In sorne cases, the wound is actually described as a kind of war wound 
"caused during the sexual combat." (Williams 1551). Intercourse can also he wounding to a man, ifhe 
catches a disease: Williams gives an example in which pox is descrihed as a wound a man can get from his 
mistress. See Williams 1551-52. 
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same deeds that he is supposed to describe during the "custom of request"-and 
"nothing" is, as Parker notes, a "familiar 8hakespearean euphemism for the female sexual 
orifice" (Margins 236). 80, since Coriolanus's wounds stand in a relation of metonymy 
to his nothings/ deeds, we get one such euphemism (wounds) standing for another 
(nothings). 
1 have already alluded to the fact that female sexual organs were often described, 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in terms of other key words we have already 
considered here in relation to the "custom of request." These include ports, gates, and 
doors.22 As Parker notes, 
The language of the close or secret--of a hidden matter or matrix to be dilated, 
opened and displayed-pervades the literature on the 'privities' of woman in 
contrast to the exteriorized sexual parts of man. Helkiah Crooke's "Of the Lap or 
Privities" ... treats, for example, of 'the outward privity or lap' of a woman as a 
'cleft' that like a 'doore' might be opened or shut-a sense of the close or closeted 
behind a door that pervades medical as weIl as popular references to this secret 
place. (Margins 236) 
1 have already discussed, in connection with the candidate's portance in the toga, portance 
as gate-keeping and as child-bearing.23 Now we have to consider portance/ gate-opening 
or -closing interms ofphysical dilation-notjust the dilation involved in childbirth, but 
also the dilation of the "outward privity" involved in female arousal. Both kinds of 
22 See Williams 1073-74 for numerous examples of the word "port" used in such a way as to mean 
"vagina." Here is just one: "Conquer'd Virgin (1690; Pepys Bal/ads V. 178 provides a context of siege 
warfare: '1 storm'd her Fort for half an hour, The Port she did Surrender' ... )" (Williams 1073). 
23 See also Parker, "Temporal Gestation, Legal Contracts, and the Promissory Economies of The Winter's 
Tale"-an essay which treats another Shakespeare play's language of "bearing." Especially of interest in 
relation to my treatment of Coriolanus's port- words is Parker's treatment of The Winter's Tale's "Mistress 
Tale-porter," the midwife mentioned in Act 4 ofthat play. 
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dilation are relevant to the "custom of request." The custom has to be understood as 
involving both opening for givinglletting something out and opening for receivingl 
letting something in. Coriolanus's resistance, his refusaI to unfold, has these two aspects: 
It is both a refusaI to give and a refusaI to receive. 
This double-faceted refusal has been discussed in various terms by various critics. 
Folkerth's emphasis is on receptivity; he develops his discussion primarily in terms of 
Coriolanus's refusaI to hear. Danson, for his part, describes what he thinks of as the 
character's inability to speak. Many critics have discussed feeding and eating, and 
Coriolanus's and! or Volumnia's reluctance to do either. The text accommodates aIl of 
these different emphases, because of the way the play's overdetermined symbolism 
works. If 1 were asked to sum up in one sentence what 1 think this play is about, my best 
attempt at a provisional answer would be: Coriolanus is about literaI and figurative 
standing. This answer is less reductive than it may at tirst sound, since "stand[ing] for 
consul" includes a number of symbolic actions: Sexual dilation, like speaking, hearing, 
feeding, and eating, becomes a figure implicit in the candidate's postures and gestures 
during the "custom ofrequest." 
1 have attempted to show how a reading that makes explicit the figures involved 
in the "custom of request" can also bring out the involvement of ideology in the main 
character's way of standing in relation to others. We have seen that bringing out the 
aspect of the "custom of request" that has to do with sexual dilation reveals at least part 
ofwhat's ideological in Coriolanus's position. By "position" 1 mean both his physical 
position and the moral position he attempts to articulate in speeches like Act 2, scene 3's 
soliloquy and the "Away, my disposition" speech; or, more specificaIly, 1 mean the 
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interplay between these two kinds of position. To the extent that it emphasizes the ways 
that Corio/anus reveals the working of an ideology of masculinity, my reading is clearly 
akin to Kahn's. 1 am also, however, interested in how Kahn's basic insight may be 
combined with that of Geoffrey Miles, who argues that constancy "was for Shakespeare 
and his contemporaries perhaps the quintessential Roman virtue" (1). Constancy is 
crucial in Corio/anus, and constancy is very much involved in an ideology of 
masculinity. And, 1 would add, constancy in this play is, at least in part, developed in 
postural! gestural terms. 
Figurative standing in Corio/anus includes resistance, constancy, and obstinacy 
(aU ofwhich have the Latin root "stare," "to stand"). As Miles points out, "constancyas 
a moral term" (6) has three meanings. The first has to do with steadfastness. The second 
has to do with consistency. Miles himself is concemed mainly with a tension he 
perceives between these two kinds of constancy in Shakespeare's Roman plays. But he 
acknowledges that a third meaning is also very important. This meaning has to do with 
fidelity.24 And it is, in fact, in this third sense that the Martius of Act 1, scene 1 (who has 
not yet been given the new name Coriolanus) claims to be constant. His assertion cornes 
in response to a reminder from a senator and Cominius. He has previously agreed to 
serve under Cominius's command in the wars against the Volscians: "It is your former 
promise" (1.1.222), says Cominius; "Sir, it isj And 1 am constant" (1.1.222-23), replies 
Martius. 
Crucially, though, the "custom ofrequest" requires that he show constancy to the 
plebeians, but instead he does his best to dissociate himself from them. Since he believes 
24 The OED defmes "constancy" in this sense as: "Steadfastness of attachment to a person or cause; 
faithfulness, fidelity" (def. 2). 
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that they are undeserving, however, he sees his resistance to the custom as justified. 
When Coriolanus and the tribunes talk about lawand custom, what they say tends to be 
very se1f-serving. That said, Sicinius's "He hath resisted law" (3.1.269) should be taken 
seriously, though not really (or not only) for the reasons which the tribune himselfputs 
forth. Coriolanus's resistance to the "custom of request" has implications (negative ones, 
c1early) for his self-understanding, his ability to make a moral argument, his self-
consistency, and his steadfastness. In other words, a kind of law of constancy seems to 
be operative in this play, and Coriolanus cannot escape it: Refusalofattachment, 
fidelity, solidarity (constancy as standing with?) undermines constancy as standing firm, 
and constancy as consistency. 
Insolence and Inexplicitness 
As 1 have noted, the plebeians/ tribunes and Coriolanus tend to accuse each other 
of the same attitude problems. In this final section 1 want to deal with the accusation of 
"insolence," which is made on both sides (though it may be worth noting that Coriolanus 
is called insolent or accused of insolence four times, the plebeians only once). It is also 
an accusation made explicitly by Aufidius. The importance of insolence to this play is 
highlighted by the fact that the last line addressed to Coriolanus is Aufidius's "Insolent 
villain!" (5.6.131). This is immediately followed by the conspirators' "Kill, kill, kill, kill, 
kill him!" (5.6.132), and then by one of the most memorable physical poses in this play: 
Aufidius standing on the body. The Voiscian lords are appa1led. "Tread not upon him" 
(5.6.136), says one ofthem. One of the lords had stepped in to warn Aufidius that 
Coriolanus's offences must "have judicious hearing" (5.6.128). "Stand, Aufidius,/ And 
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trouble not the peace," (5.6.129) he had said. In standing on the body Aufidius is himself 
insolent. 
"Insolence" bears an interesting relation to the word "custom"; in fact, the final 
exchange between the main character, ms rival-ally, and the Voiscian lords can be read as 
activating the word's etymology. Though "insolence" has come to mean simply proud, 
overbearing, or contemptuous, it comes from the Latin word inso/ere, where so/ere 
originally meant "to be accustomed." ln this section 1 want to show why it makes sense 
to think of insolence in Corio/anus in terms of resistance to, contempt for, or rejection of 
custom. 
Also in this section 1 will discuss the "custom of request" in connection with one 
of the crucial terms in Cavell's work on Shakespeare--i.e., "acknowledgment" (for which 
Cavell develops a specialized sense). My approach to questions relating to Coriolanus's 
motive and attitude differs considerably from Cavell's. He does not literalize these 
matters the way 1 do; he does not develop ms discussion in terms of the play's language 
of position and movement. Nor, in ms discussion of Corio/anus, does he even pay much 
attention to the "custom of request." Nevertheless, Cavell's analysis lends itself very weIl 
to my approach. It readily accommodates my emphasis on postural! gesturallanguage. 
Cavell deals with the ethical implications of characters' particular ways of attempting to 
know others, and of their ways of allowing-or refusing to allow-others to know them. 
This section explores the implications of "insolence" in the sense of resistance to custom, 
in a case where the custom in question is a matter of ritualized knowingl being known. 1 
am particularly interested in connecting to the "custom of request" Cavell's claim that 
Coriolanus shows the tragic consequences of "interpret[ing] privacy as inexplicitness" 
(Disowning Knowledge 176). 
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For Cavell, acknowledging people involves "put[ting] ourse Ives in their 
presence"; it requires us to "reveal ourselves to them" (Disowning Knowledge 103). In 
order to acknowledge someone (in Cavell's sense), we need to take a certain attitude in 
relation to that person. Acknowledgment also involves a response to that person. It is a 
matter of: 1) being receptive; and, 2) doing something based on what you receive. What 
you receive is not certain knowledge. Cavell argues that it is destructive to try to know 
another mind with certainty. We cannot have certain knowledge of other minds; we have 
to acknowledge them instead. Of course, in ordinary speech we say all the time that we 
"know" someone. And this does, according to Cavell, mean something. He sometimes 
caUs a failure to acknowledge a matter of "disowning knowledge." Acknowledging is 
thus a matter of owning knowledge, which means that whatever a person in a receptive 
attitude receives from another person is knowledge. This makes sense, as long as we 
understand that this knowledge is not certain knowledge. There is one kind of knowledge 
that is a component of acknowledgment; there is another kind that Cavell defmes in 
contrast to acknowledgment. 
If we return again to the dialogue that begins Act 2, scene 3 (we have looked at 
parts ofthis already), we find that one of the three plebeians who speak there---the one 
who seems to have taken on the task of explaining the ritual to the other two---can sound 
like a proponent of Cavellian acknowledgment. This citizen is the first character in the 
scene to offer an analysis of the gestures required by the "custom of request." He tells his 
companions that "if [Coriolanus] show us his wounds and tell us his deeds, we are to put 
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our tongues into those wounds and speak for them; so if he tell us his noble deeds, we 
must also tell him our noble acceptance ofthem" (2.3.5-8). Taken on its own, the last 
part ofthis description ("ifhe tell us his noble deeds, we must also tell him our noble 
acceptance ofthem") seems to describe a pretty basic tit-for-tat reciprocity: He gives us 
something, then we give him something. The striking image of putting tongues into 
wounds and speaking for them, however, points to a more complex interpretation of the 
ritual giving and receiving-one according to which accepting knowledge of the 
candidate's deeds is conceived as something involving both taking something in and 
letting something out, both giving and receiving. In that they are imagined as taking in 
their mouths what the candidate gives them, we may think of the plebeians as being fed: 
they are to incorporate knowledge of what he has done for them. But the plebeians are 
also supposed to speak for the wounds. And this speaking, like the candidate's showing 
and telling, is something directed outward. 
Importantly, the citizen's description of the plebeians' obligations emphasizes the 
inseparability of the giving and taking involved in accepting knowledge of the candidate. 
So, here, giving and taking are perhaps not merely imagined as components of 
acknowledgment, but also as aspects of a single acknowledging gesture. In other words, 
giving and taking are not just elements that should be put together; in a sense they are 
both part of the citizen's imagined gesture in the fust place, and we can shift from tending 
to see giving to tending to see taking (or vice versa) by slightly shifting our way of 
looking at the gesture. 
In his essay on "Knowing and Acknowledging" Cavell explains the outward-
directed component or aspect of acknowledgment by saying that "Acknowledgment goes 
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beyond knowledge. (Goes beyond not, so to speak, in the order ofknowledge, but in its 
requirement that 1 do something or reveal something on the basis ofthat knowledge)" 
(Must We Mean What We Say? 257). As for the inward-directed component of 
acknowledgment, Cavell has a number of ways of describing it, one of which is: It is a 
matter of allowing oneself to be impressed.25 One way of talking about acknowledgment 
(both components/ aspects included) rnight be to say that it involves both letting yOUfself 
be impressed and confessing that you have been impressed. Indeed, one of the officers 
laying cushions in the Capitol articulates in similar terms his understanding of what the 
"custom ofrequest" requires of the plebeians. According to this officer, Coriolanus "hath 
so planted his honoUfs in [the plebeians'] eyes and his actions in their hearts that for their 
tongues to be silent and not confess so much were a kind of ingrateful injury" (2.2.23-
26). 
What the officer has to say here about the plebeians' obligations sheds more light 
on the "custom of request," how the ritual works, and what the implications of the main 
character's resistance are, if it is juxtaposed with Cominius's charge of ingratitude against 
Martius/ Coriolanus. The charge in question cornes at the beginning of the speech that 
ends with the renaming of the main character. Martius has expressed his unwillingness to 
hear himself praised, and Cominius responds: 
Too modest are you, 
More cruel to yoUf good report than grateful 
To us that give you truly. By yoUf patience, 
If 'gainst yourself you be incensed, we'll put you, 
Like one that means his proper harm, in manacles, 
25 See Cavell's "Skepticism as Iconoclasm: The Saturation of the Shakespearean Text." 
Then reason safely with you. (1.9.52-57) 
This is the same speech that ends like this: 
For what he did before Corioles caU him, 
With aU th' applause and clamour of the host, 
Martius Caius Coriolanus. 
Bear the addition nobly ever! (1.9.62-65) 
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So, the speech in which Coriolanus officially becomes Coriolanus begins with an image 
ofhim as a suicidaI madman in restraints. Though, obviously, the threatened use of 
manacles should not be taken literally, the image is striking, and the passage should get 
us thinking about the ways in which the main character is, in fact, subjected to coercion. 
One might even compare the "custom of request" to Cominius's manacles. The custom 
provides little scope for the individual candidate's disposition. It dictates his positions 
and movemehts, almost as (one could say) physical restraints fix the body's position and 
limits its movement. Cominius realizes that, ifCoriolanus is aUowed to move freely, his 
disposition will express ingratitude. And Coriolanus is disposed to injure himself rather 
than be receptive to what others offer him. The "custom of request" could be said to 
force the postures and gestures of gratitude--both from the candidate and from the 
citizens. The plebeians (sorne more willingly than others) accept the way the ritual 
works; they accept the way it structures verbal exchange and knowingl acknowledging. 
Coriolanus, for his part, resists, is insolent. And his refusaI to put himself in the 
plebeians' presence is injuring to him, in a number of ways. 
As many readers have noted, Coriolanus sets up a striking contrast between the 
main character's extreme willingness to expose himself on the battlefield and his extreme 
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unwillingness to expose himself to the plebeians during the "custom of request." He also 
shows a reckless inclination to expose himself immediately upon his banishment. 
Volumnia, distressed that he is leaving Rome alone and apparently without a plan, 
implores him to "Determine on sorne course/ More than a wild exposure26 to each 
chancel That starts i' th' way before thee" (4.1.35-37). Here is another aspect ofhis 
insolence/ resistance to custom: his wild exposure to chance. Or, rather, perhaps 1 
should say, his wild exposure to Aufidius-because, although Volumnia does not know 
it, her son does have something of a plan. He will fmd his rival and stand, wrapped in a 
cloak, in front ofhim. Then he will reveal himself and give Aufidius a choice: Use him 
or kill him. To me this looks like wilful self-destruction as a way of asserting self-
control. IfI'm sticking more closely to terms derived from the language of the play, 
though, 1 should calI it instead insolent self-exposure-insolent in the sense that it is 
clearly opposed to the self-exposure required by the "custom ofrequest." It is opposed to 
it, but, actually, it ends up looking like a parodie version ofit: note the humble apparel, 
26 F has "exposture." Bliss notes that the OED "also cites Shakespeare for the tirst examples of 
'exposure' .... He may not yet have decided on the form of his neologism, or 'exposture' may have been the 
compositor's misreading of the, to him, equally unfamiliar 'exposure'" (214n). The verb "to expose" was in 
use in the tifteenth century. Interestingly, though, we find "exposde" used in a bit of an unusual sense in 
the Ficst Quarto (QI) version of Ham/et-a sense that is arguably quite relevant to Corio/anus. It seems to 
mean more or less the same thing as "posed," as in "posed the question." Importantly, though, "exposde" in 
QI Ham/et may have at least something to do with the usuai sense of the word: Rossencraft (sic) and 
Gilderstone (sic) have been ordered to ask Ramlet questions in an attempt to expose his secrets. 
Giiderstone says to the King, 
My lord, we haue done all the best we could, 
To wring from him the cause of aU bis griefe, 
But still he puts vs off, and by no meanes 
Wouldmake ananswere to that we exposde. (QI Ham/etTLN 1169-72, qtd. from The Three-Text 
Ham/et) 
It is appealing to think of this passage in connection with the "custom of request," because, there, the 
candidate bas to ask for something, and he has literally to uncover himself. One might say, then, that the 
exposurel exposture expected ofhim has a double sense-much as the dilating he is expected to do is both 
bodily and rhetorical. 
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the self-uncovering, and the asking involved both in the custom and in the strange visit to 
Aufidius in Act 4. 
If the candidate did what he was supposed to do, in assuming an unfolded posture 
he would both give and receive; he would grant the plebeians sight ofhis wounds and 
receive their gaze. A candidate who maintains a folded posture blocks this exchange. 
Coriolanus does his best to avoid putting himself in the plebeians' presence. But his self-
concealing and self-grasping yield only a very unstable kind ofprivacy. Even as his 
posture blocks exchange with the plebeians, it ironically undermines his own self-
possession. We saw how in the "woolvish toge" soliloquy, his efforts to shut out the 
plebeians bound him aIl the more closely to them. We saw something similar in his way 
of positioning himself in relation to his mother: He was aIl the more closely involved 
with Volumnia as he attempted to resist her. And we saw his ability to make a moral 
argument thoroughly undermined. 
For Cavell, making a moral argument, like acknowledging, is a matter ofbeing 
explicit. Coriolanus's refusaI to partake in conversation is what Cavell has in mind when 
he refers, in his essay on this play, to inexplicitness and its tragic consequences. 1 am 
interested in the way the character's handling of the "custom ofrequest" may he said to 
literalize inexplicitness. The root of the word is the Latinplicare, "to fold." Implicare 
means "to enfold"; explicare means "to unfold." Since "inexplicit" does not actually 
appear in the play's text (it is a nineteenth-century word), 1 should really say, rather, that 
in talking about "inexplicitness," Cavell is making abstract something that is developed in 
more concrete terms in the play. Of course, the candidate's posture in the toga is also, as 
1 have explained, a point at which a numher of related symbols-speaking, hearing, 
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eating, banishing, etc.-are focused. According to Cavell, partaking in conversation 
involves being partaken of. The citizen quoted above, the one who talked about putting 
tongues in wounds, would seem to agree. In the case of Coriolanus, the attempt to stay 
covered may be interpreted as an attempt to guard privacy, self-possession. The refusaI 
to unfold is a refusaI to partake in conversation and to be partaken of, a refusaI to put 
himself in the plebeians' presence, and a failure to take responsibility for his moral 
position. 
The "custom ofrequest" has the main character enact, in a very literaI way, his 
positioning ofhimselfin relation to the plebeians. Especially with Coriolanus's 
profoundly ambiguous attempts to justify his postural and moral position while 
continuing to block out discussion, the scene links: a) his apparent lack of self-
knowledge; and, b) his way of orienting himself to others who seek knowledge of him. 
ln The Claim of Reason Cavell concludes his discussion of the nature of moral . 
argument with the following: 
1 have described moral arguments as ones whose direct point is to determine the 
positions we are assuming or are able or willing to assume responsibility for, and 
discussion is necessary because our responsibilities, the extension of our cares 
and commitments, and the implications of our conduct, are not obvious; because 
the selfis not obvious to the self ... [The] rationality [ofmoral argument] lies in 
following the methods which lead to a knowledge of our own position, of where 
we stand; in short, to a knowledge and definition of ourselves. (312) 
To say that taking an inexplicit posture in relation to others has consequences for one's 
self-knowledge might be one way of putting this conclusion-a way of re-interpreting it 
in language relevant to Coriolanus and to Cavell's conclusion about the tragic 
consequences of interpreting privacy as inexplicitness. 
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One thing we may find ourselves wondering about at this point, though, is 
whether there is sorne other, preferable way of interpreting privacy. If so, what is it? 
Sorne of us, too, may detect in ourselves a certain degree of resistance to anything that 
Cavell in particular has to say about privacy. After all, because he places a tremendous 
amount of value on private experiences of reading, his work has been vulnerable to 
certain kinds of political criticism. The next chapter will address these issues, among 
others, as it prepares the way for my engagement with Hamlet-a play which presents 
particularly daunting challenges to the interpreter. My own response to the issue of 
Cavell's vulnerability to political criticism is closely involved with my sense of what his 
treatment of explicitness has to offer to people faced with the complicated textual 
situation of a play like Hamlet. 
2. 
"Wittgenstein speaks of his philosophical procedures as 
bringing words back from their metaphysical to their 
everyday use--as if our words are away, not al home, and 
as ifit takes the best efforts ofphilosophy to recognize 
when and where our words have strayed into 
metaphysics." -CaveU, "PoUlies as Opposed to What?" 
ON OUR RELATION TO EDITED TEXTS 
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Before 1 explain my response to sorne of the negative things that critics have had 
to say about Stanley Cavell, 1 want to say a bit about what exactly his vulnerabilities are, 
and about what form political criticism of his work has taken. So, how is Cavell open to 
attack? WeIl, a big part of the problem is how marriage-and-family-centric he can be. In 
his famous essay on King Lear, for example, he explains that he has in much ofhis work 
"identified what philosophy ... calls the ordinary or everyday with what in literature is 
thematized as the domestic, or marriage" (Disowning Knowledge 29). To an unmarried 
reader this way offraming the "ordinary" (the redemptive ordinary, he means, not the 
boring ordinary) can he a little off-putting, though not necessarily deeply problematic. 
But maybe the problem is in fact worth taking more seriously. As Michael D. Bristol 
points out, in universalizing the experience of the bourgeois family, Cavell does not stop 
to reflect on the ways in which this experience is "historically related to the mode of 
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subjectivity brought into being by bourgeois political economy and the elaboration of 
civil society" (Shalœspeare's America 195). Bristol goes so far as to assert that Cavell's 
"philosophical position makes it impossible to speak of the social except in terms of a 
private, affective dimension of interpersonal relationships" (Shalœspeare's America 195). 
ln other words, even when Cavell writes about relationships that do not take place within 
a bourgeois couple or family, he still understands these other relationships in terms that 
are entirely based on his un-historicized understanding of the ordinary. 
Thus, according to Bristol, Cavell in a sense even wants to marry Shakespeare, or 
at least he wants to have with Shakespeare something as much like a marriage as 
possible: "Cavell wants to bring himself into relation with Shakespeare as significant 
other" (Shalœspeare's America 197). As funny as this statement can seem from a certain 
point ofview (it puts me in mind of the way seven-year-olds typically put down each 
other's expressions of enthusiasm: "1 love peanut butter!" "Ha! Why don't you marry it 
then?"), 1 actually very much agree with Bristol on this point. However, what 1 think: is 
missing from the picture he paints is Cavell's idea that, by means of the right kind of 
intimate relationship to Shakespeare, the reader may be modified in such a way as to be 
fitted for society-for solidarity, and indeed for aIl those kinds of relations which Bristol 
says it's impossible for Cavell to think about. In order to achieve a balanced view of the 
political implications of Cavell's thinking, we need to consider moments like the 
following: The essay "Politics as Opposed to What?" mentions Henry David Thoreau's 
way ofusing the phrase "our present constitution," which Cavell interprets as "our 
political constitution, with its slaves" and also "what permits this constitution in our 
souls" (177). He explains that his intimate relationship with Thoreau's text allows in him 
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"the moming of mourning" ("Politics" 177), which he imagines as the beginning of an 
alteration of the constitution ofhis soul. He is imagining that in exposing himselfto 
Thoreau he is engaging in an ethical practice which should, if it works, be conducive to 
better participation in politicallife. To involve oneself in an intima te relationship, 
whether with a text or a person, that does not do anything to fit one for society is, if 1 
understand Cavell rightly, to do something that he in The Claim of Reason caUs "hiding 
inside a marriage" (439)-a bad thing to do, or at least a sad, and sadly common, 
mistake. 
Cavell says that we "live our skepticism" (Claim of Reason 440) in relation to 
other minds. But what does he mean? He is so often hard to understand. Does he think 
that living our skepticism is a good thing? A bad thing? 1 think he means neither. 
Living our skepticism is not something we should foster or combat; rather it is something 
we should leam to recognize and accept: 
ln saying that we live our skepticism, 1 mean to register ... ignorance about our 
everyday position toward others-not that we positively know that we are never, 
or not ordinarily, in best cases for knowing of the existence of others, but that we 
are rather disappointed in our occasions for knowing, as though we have, or have 
lost, sorne picture ofwhat knowing another, or being known by another, would 
really come to-a hannony, a concord, a union, a transparence, a govemance, a 
power-against which our actual successes at knowing, and being known, are 
poor things. (Claim of Reason 440) 
Skepticism about other minds is something that cornes from living; it cornes fIfSt of aIl 
from disappointing life experiences, not originally from doubt. The philosophical 
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position of skeptical doubt is secondary; the feeling of disappointment is primary. The 
reason to want to "marry" Shakespeare is actually precisely not to experience an ideal 
union, but rather to experience and accept a therapeutic disappointment, to experience 
what Cavell refers to as "the stillness of the text" ("Politics" 175). This stillness "should 
be interpretable politically as rebuke and confrontation and be interpretable 
epistemologically as the withholding of assertion" ("Politics" 175). The people we speak 
to, even marry, have a similar stillness or resistance to them. It is interpretable as rebuk:e, 
confrontation, and withholding, in that it reminds us of what we cannot know (know with 
certainty, that is). It reminds us ofwhat we instead have to acknowledge. 
What, then, would it mean for my practice of literary criticism to accept and 
incorporate an understanding of what Cavell means? 1 suppose 1 would have to say that 
in relation to a literary text 1 live my skepticism. At any given moment 1 could be wrong, 
say, about what 1 thought 1 knew about commonalities between myself and sixteenth- or 
seventeenth-century selves; but having to remember that such differences matter does not 
mean having to start with, for example, an assertion that 1 cannot or should not try to 
empathize with a Shakespearean character. At my best 1 will recognize that the 
inclination to make such an assertion ("1 absolutely must not try to do such a naïve 
thing! ") derives from a feeling of disappointment, not originally from doubt-which is 
not to say that the recognition and acceptance of the doubt's psychological basis 
discredits the doubt and gives us a warrant for insisting on renewed certainty. But then, if 
1 choose not to deny the disappointment, if 1 resist the temptation to insist on doubt or on 
certainty, where does that leave me? The purpose ofthis chapter is to suggest that the 
attitude of explicitness-and explicitness here has to be understood as a matter of being 
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open, not as a matter ofbeing definite--which CavelI's moral philosophy advocates is 
compatible with a practice of literary criticism that incorporates a historically aware 
approach to Shakespearean texts. 
Words Get Away and Lost 
Challenges to the traditional textual scholarship/ literary criticism divide have left 
their mark. 1 In 1993 Margreta de Grazia and Peter Sta11ybrass, in an essay on "The 
Materiality of the Shakespearean Text," declared that literary critics' increased level of 
understanding of King Lear's particular textual situation constituted "a radical change 
indeed" (255). A notable result ofthis change was, they said, "mounting resentment 
toward the editorial tradition" (255). But it still remained, theyadded, for literary critics 
to recognize the extent to which they themselves "have assumed and perpetuated the 
terms through which Shakespeare was reproduced in the eighteenth century" (255): 
Formalists calI for exacting attention to the minutiae of literary language without 
giving thought to the printing-house practices that have in modem editions 
produced them. Historicists, tracing in Shakespeare's works the discursive 
structures specific to the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, have 
ignored the extent to which these structures are eighteenth-century constructs. 
This inattention to the textual object catches both approaches in methodological 
paradox: formalists closely read printed texts as if they were authorial 
1 In the field of Shakespeare studies, books that deal with or explicitly make challenges to the textual 
scholarship/ literary criticism divide include (to cite just a few): Margreta de Grazia's Shakespeare 
Verbatim: The Reproduction of Authenticity and the 1790 Apparatus; Graham Holderness's Textual 
Shakespeare: Writing and the Word; Grace Ioppolo's Revising Shakespeare; Leah Marcus's Unediting the 
Renaissance: Shakespeare, Marlowe, Milton; Robert Weimann's Author's Pen and Actor's Voice: Playing 
and Writing in Shakespeare's Theatre. 
compositions; historicists anachronistically read Enlightenment texts as if they 
were Renaissance discourses. (256) 
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The warning contained in this passage is very pertinent to someone like me. 1 intend to 
go on, in my next chapter, to do sorne very detailed reading of Hamlet's postural! gestural 
language. But how can 1 do it if 1 recognize-and 1 do--that the text is not as fixable as a 
lot of editors have tried to make it, or as established as literary critics would probably 
sometimes stilllike to assume it is? 
1 would suggest that the approach 1 worked with in my chapter on Coriolanus 
avoids the pitfalls to which de Grazia and Stallybrass point. Unlike the formalists they 
take to task, 1 did not treat modem texts-or the early printed text, for that matter-as 
purely authorial compositions. 1 understood the texts to he the product of a dialogue, and 
editors, as 1 conceive ofthem, are participants in that dialogue. 1 shouid emphasize that 1 
am working here with a broad definition of editing. It includes both the sense which has 
the strongest positive valence, and the sense which usually has the most negative valence. 
The sense of the verb "to edit" which 1 consider most positive is the one that cornes 
closest to a literaI translation of the word's etymology: The Latin root is edere, which in 
turn cornes from e, "out" + dare "to put, give"; accordingly, to edit is to put something 
out, "to give to the world" (OED def. la). On the other hand, "to edit" can also be taken 
to mean to "garble, 'cookllt (OED def. lb). In my view, an editor is inevitably both a 
giver and a garbler. So, here is my definition of "editor": An editor is anyone who both 
gives and garbles a text. In other words, 1 would include agents not commonly 
considered editors: compositors, scribes, actors, and possibly others. And so, even when 
1 turn to the earliest printing of the play, 1 do not consider it to be unedited Shakespeare. 
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Further, since 1 take it as axiomatic that it is impossible for people to edit without 
interpreting what they edit, when 1 say that there is no unedited Shakespeare 1 mean also 
that there is no uninterpreted Shakespeare. Hundreds of years' worth of interpretation 
and reinterpretation marks the transmitted text. And, as de Grazia and Stallybrass note, 
modem readers carry with them expectations shaped by their experience of modem 
editions even when they read the plays in their earliest versions (282); modem readers of 
the early printed versions may be said to edit the texts mentally. No matter what, then, 
we do not just experience sixteenth- or seventeenth-century texts when we read these 
plays; rather, we enter into a complex dialogue. The readings that 1 pursue in this 
dissertation are premised on the idea that it is possible to do readings that take into 
account the great complexity of the exchange that is inescapably part of any 
Shakespearean text. Readings can work with this complexity in various interesting and 
worthwhile ways. 
Of course, such readings cannot treat the interpretive/ editorial traditions in any 
exhaustive way. And even ifwe forgoexhaustiveness as a goal, the situation is, at least 
initially, fairly daunting. Also, Hamlet really presents more of a challenge than 
Coriolanus does, since it has not one, but rather three, early printed versions. Modem 
editions of Hamlet, because there are so many possible ways for editors to deal with the 
three early versions, tend to differ much more than modem editions of Coriolanus differ. 
And then there's all the literary critical work that has been done on Hamlet. It both 
informs and is informed by editors' decisions about how to handle the three early 
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versions.2 Textual questions are, indeed, so pressing in the case ofthis play that it did not 
even seem to me possible to start in on my detailed reading of the play without carefully 
theorizing my way of responding to such questions. 1 needed to make it clear that, in a 
way, 1 start out on the same page as de Grazia and Stallybrass. Now 1 will go on to 
explain why 1 end up sharing a lot ofCavell's reservations about their essay, and even 
adding sorne other reservations of my OWll. 
Cavell's reservations have to do primarily with the "Materiality" essay's treatment 
of the reader's relation to the text. He finds its handling of this issue to be evasive and! or 
pre-emptive in significant ways. De Grazia and Stallybrass urge their readers to "reject 
depth as the object of analysis" (280). They add that "we will at the same time have to 
transform our notion of surface" (280). This directive then leads to two suggestions: 1) 
that we consider the possibility that paper or, more specifically, its absorbency, may 
provide us with a helpful metaphor, one that gives us a way ofthinking ofthe text 
without thinking in terms of the surface/ depth dichotomy; 2) that we devote ourselves to 
the study of paper making. So, what's wrong with these suggestions? Why does Cavell 
think de Grazia and Stallybrass are evading anything? We can spot the problem in the 
confused or underdeveloped relationship, in the "Materiality" essay, between the two 
2 Paul Werstine argues in "The Textuai Mystery of Ham/et" that "much of the enduring mystery that is 
Ham/et! HamIet has been produced through the editorial construction of Ham/et as the combination of the 
second-quarto (Q2) and Folio (F) versions" (2). He cites as a specific example the fact that "almost aIl 
editions since the eighteenth century" include "both of the alternative motives provided in Q2 and F for the 
apology that Hamiet offers to Laertes before the fencing match in the last scene" (3). Hamlet's motivation 
will seem simpler to a reader who reads Q2 aione, or F aione. But readers tend to Iike the more complex 
and mysterious Hamiet they know from contlated Hamlet(s) and from criticism and productions that 
engage with conflated text(s). So, editors continue to put out conflated editions. According to Werstine, 
that is not necessarily a bad thing. See also the compatible view expressed by Barbara Mowat in "The 
Form of Hamlefs Fortunes." 
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suggestions listed above (the one about absorbency as a good metaphor and the one about 
labour history as a worthwhile pursuit). 
Various things could be done with the absorbency metaphor. 1 personally like it 
because it works very weIl with my sense that the Shakespearean text is constituted in an 
ongoing dialogue of editor-interpreters. Just as printed words are only readable on paper 
because the paper absorbs the ink, the Shakespearean text is only readable because it 
absorbs the editors. The editors give us access to the text; we would not have it without 
them. The editors themselves necessarily become part of what we are given. As the 
Shakespearean text absorbs more and more editors, we may say that it gets increasingly 
contaminated by them; however, we may equally say that it has an unusually great 
absorptive capacity. And it may also have a certain tendency to absorb sorne things more 
readily than others. There may be something that regulates what it will absorb and what 
it will not. 1 might suggest (only in a provisional way, for now) that a dialogue of 
interpreters perfonns this regulative function. That is where 1 would go with the 
absorbency metaphor, but it has other potentialities too? 
As for what de Grazia and Stallybrass like about the metaphor, they say 
approvingly that it cornes from "outside metaphysics" (280). This is the reason they give 
for preferring it to the depth metaphor (as in "Hamlet is a play with a lot of depth"). 
However, their way of thinking of absorbency as a "way of conceptualizing the text" 
("Materiality" 280) ends up being metaphysical. Strictly speaking, both the absorbency 
metaphor and the depth metaphor come from outside metaphysics-not surprisingly, 
3 Cavell picks up on the absorbency metaphor also. The subtitle to the essay in which he responds to de 
Grazia and Stallybrass is "The Saturation of the Shakespearean Text." He never elaborates on his subtitle, 
however. So it remains unclear, to me at least, what exactly he bas in mind. 
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since that's how metaphysical thinking works. It is dependent on such metaphors. How 
else could you talk about what's not empirical? Of course, one can speak metaphorically 
without speaking metaphysically, but de Grazia and Stallybrass do in fact get 
metaphysical. 
It turns out that they are not really interested in developing the absorbency 
metaphor; instead, they are inspired by the metaphor to literalize the metaphor. What 
inspires them is its eluding of the surface/ depth dichotomy. What they are inspired to do 
is to study the history of paper making. This makes exactly as much logical sense as it 
would make if people fond of thinking of the text in terms of inner depths were to come 
to see that metaphor as pointing them toward the study of the history of mining. Perhaps 
they could still work in English departments if they linked this study to the study of the 
metallurgy involved in the production of the metal parts of the printing press. 
In other words, the relationship between the empirical and the metaphysical is 
problematic in the "Materiality" essay. Cavell cornes at this same problem from a 
different angle. He notes that aIl the facts the essay cites about the production and 
transmission of the Shakespearean text can prove that the text has "from the 
beginning ... existed only in its partial recoverings" ("Iconoclasm" 236). But it does not 
make sense, according to Cavell, to jump from the kind of evidence the essay presents to 
an assertion like the following: "'The thing itself,' the authentic Shakespeare, is itself a 
problematic category, based on a metaphysics of origin and presence that 
poststructuralism has taught us to suspect" (de Grazia and Stallybrass 256).4 This is, 
Cavell argues, "the empirical describing its discoveries in a metaphysical or hyperbolical 
4 Bristol quotes this same passage, and comments on it as follows: "In making this statement, de Grazia 
and Stallybrass are invoking the authority of Jacques Derrida in exactly the same way that medieval writers 
might have invoked the authority of Aristotle" ("Evidence" 40). 
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register" ("Iconoclasm" 234). So, for Cavell, one way de Grazia and Stallybrass "leave 
out or pre-empt," as he puts it, discussion of "the constitution of my relation to the 
existence of such knowable objects as ones that fall under, for example, the concept of a 
text, and that of a Shakespearean text ... however fouI or editorially repossessed it may 
be" ("Iconoclasm" 235) is by using metaphysical arguments in a basically rhetorical 
manner. 
One reason, then, that the "Materiality" essay's mode of argumentation is 
troubling to Cavell is that he is a philosopher and not disposed to ignore such 
inconsistencies; another related reason is that the essay's rhetorical use of metaphysical 
arguments is, so to speak, a way of standing or moving, not only in relation to the text, 
but also in relation to other people. Rhetorical moves are social moves, and the 
"Materiality" essay is insufficiently explicit about the social moves it makes. As weIl, 
although Cavell does not emphasize this aspect of the problem, 1 would say that the essay 
in question is aiso not explicit enough about the ways in which it conceives the 
production, interpretation, and transmission of Shakespearean texts as social practices. 
These two problems will turn out to he related, as we'll see. They would not be such big 
problems if social practices were not such an important focus of the essay. 
De Grazia and Stallybrass evidently value sociallife very highly. They do not 
really spell out their values themselves, but we need to work with at least a provisional 
articulation ofwhat they are valuing and why. It is only in such a context that we can 
understand their agenda and their rhetoric. According to Bristol, their essay reflects "a 
sincere aversion to certain pemicious effects of an exacerbated individualism and ... a 
sincere belief that these effects would be greatly diminished if only the demons of 
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authorship could be exorcised" ("Evidence" 41). Ifthis interpretation ofwhere they are 
coming from is fair, we could say that de Grazia and Stallybrass hope to influence the 
quality of present sociallife by influencing the direction of Shakespeare studies. 
Although they tend not to be explicitly reflective about their own values and assumptions, 
they are emphatic in their essay about what they want other people in their field to be 
doing. They want us to change our habits; specificalIy, they want us to break "our 
modem habit of probing the text for an imagined complexity of character" (273); they 
want us to study Renaissance social practices instead. 
They imagine the study of such practices as offering a kind of therapy. This 
implied therapeutic ideal emerges a few times, but nowhere more emphatically than in 
the essay's final passage. The "Materiality" essay ends with an exhortation. De Grazia 
and Stallybrass ask us to "imagine ourselves critically positioned" in something they calI 
a "great bibliographic divide" (283). This divide is, for them, the space between 
Renaissance and modernized Shakespearean texts and! or the space between different 
Renaissance versions. The point of this exercise in imaginary positioning is that it "might 
take our minds off the solitary genius immanent in the text and removed from the means 
ofmechanical and theatrical reproduction" (de Grazia and Stallybrass 283). We should 
want to have our minds redirected because "genius is, after aIl, an impoverished, ghostly 
thing compared to the complex social practices that shaped, and still shape, the absorbent 
surface of the Shakespearean text" (de Grazia and Stallybrass 283). We are accordingly 
offered the following suggestion: "Perhaps it is these practices that should be the objects 
not only of our labors but also of our desires" (de Grazia and Stallybrass 283). Clearly 
there is an appeal to emotion here. But it is hard to know how to respond when it is not 
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clear how we are supposed to take the most important terms (social practices, absorbent 
surface, our labours, our desires). 
Literary interpretation is a social practice. Even a mode of interpretation that 
valorizes solitary genius in authors and promotes exacerbated individualism among 
readers is a social practice. It is arguably an undesirable one--maybe even highly 
undesirable. Even if it is, though, calling solitary genius a "ghostly thing" is no argument 
against the practice. For the purposes oftheir final exhortation, de Grazia and Stallybrass 
set up a contrast between, on the one hand, "social practices," and, on the other hand, 
"this ghostly thing." But the tradition of valorization of genius is itself surely part of "the 
complex social practices that shaped, and still shape, the absorbent surface of the 
Shakespearean text." Or at least that is a fair statement as long as "absorbent surface" is 
not taken to meanjust "paper." It makes sense, in other words, ifyou take "absorbent 
surface" in something like the metaphorical sense 1 developed above. It is not clear, 
however, whether in this final passage of the "Materiality" essay we are supposed to take 
the absorbent surface to he something material, something metaphorical, or possibly 
somehow both. 
And to whom is the exhortation at the end of the essay addressed? Whose desires 
is it meant to move? Whose labours is it trying to redirect? The passage must be 
understood as aimed at readers of Shakespeare Quarter/y, since that is where the article 
was published. Most of the work that most readers of that journal do consists of practices 
that are themselves necessarily complexly social. This includes editorial work (several 
kinds), textual criticism, literary criticism, classroom teaching, and gradua te supervision. 
These kinds of work are aIl a matter of, so to speak, talking to someone-and what 
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exactly we are going to say and how we are going to do it will be in part shaped by our 
expectations of our audiences. The constitution of these audiences is affected by a 
number ofthings, sorne ofwhich are at least partly political (who gets into university, 
who can afford to go, who will be drawn to and do well in a subject like English, etc.). In 
the case of published work, editors and! or copy-editors, among other agents, willleave 
sorne mark on it. In the case of teaching, too, various agents contribute directly and 
indirectly. 
De Grazia and Stallybrass are well aware of the social practices involved in 
present-day teaching and publishing, of course. Their aim is to work with a mode of 
inquiry in which "[i]t is not present standards that pass judgment on past forms, but rather 
past forms that return to try present standards" (de Grazia and Stallybrass 257). Their 
valorization of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century social practices is part of an attempt to 
denaturalize current ones; de Grazia and Stallybrass attempt to reverse what they, 
following Fredrlc Jameson, call the "dynamics of the historical tribunal" (257). 
Accordingly, the "Materiality" essay contests the categories ofwork, word, character, and 
author on the basis of their meanings for the Renaissance. These meanings were different 
in significant ways, and the differences have implications for literary interpretation, since 
its current standards are involved with the categories contested by the essay. But one can 
accept that these implications matter without accepting what the "Materiality" essay 
makes of them. 
The essay's second section-the one devoted to words, to how what counts as a 
single word now is not necessarily the same as what counted as a single word in the 
Renaissance-is particularly persuasive. It includes sorne intriguing discussion of the 
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heir! hair! air homonym in Macbeth, in the context of more general remarks about how 
"the mutable Renaissance signifier" (de Grazia and Stallybrass 266) works. But then, just 
when 1 start thinking about how 1 am going to adapt this way of reading to my own 
critical practice (and indeed, 1 think 1 have done something in this vein in, for example, 
my treatment of "portance"), 1 come to their, in my opinion, hyperbolical commentary on 
the difficulty of learning to read with this kind of flexibility. The sections on work, 
character, and author all end with analogous gloomy admonitions. Then, in sharp 
contrast, the fmal section-the one about paper-presents itself as pointing to the best, 
most relevant, therapeutic, and also exciting program ofstudy. Paper is set up to replace 
work, word, character, and author. In the end, de Grazia and Stallybrass only barely 
leave open the possibility of any kind of engagement with the words of the text. Or, 
rather, they leave the possibility open, but they trivialize it, or at least show a conspicuous 
lack of interest in theorizing it. 
"There is no reason not to," is what they have to say about our having what they 
call "a modemized, translated, rewritten 'Shakespeare'" (282). They do add, rightly, in 
my view, that "[i]n an important sense, that is all we can have, because the material signs 
of early modem quartos and folios will themselves necessarily mean differently when 
read within different systems oftextual production" (282). Presumably there is no reason 
not to read, as weIl as have, a modemized text, but 1 am left with some pressing questions 
which the essay, with its off-hand way oftreating present-day literary interpretation, 
seems to trivialize in advance. This brings me to one of my main reservations: The 
"Materiality" essay has a certain tendency to evade discussion of the possibility of any 
kind ofliterary interpretation other than the kind it puts on trial. For my part, 1 would 
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suggest that literary interpretation (which is a major component of many of "our 
labours") does not have to he motivated by a desire for one-on-one contact with a ghostly 
genius. It is necessarily, however, a matter of complex dialogue. Ifwe are going to 
engage in any worthwhile way with the words ofthe inescapably modernized 
Shakespearean text, the engagement has to be understood as a kind of dialogue. Of 
course, what exactly worthwhile means in this context, as well as what dialogue means, 
has to be developed in some detail. 
Dialogue and what 1 have described in terms of disposition or attitude are 
intimately related in Cavell's work on skepticism and morality. When, in the context of 
his response to the "Materiality" essay, Cavell refers to "the constitution of my relation to 
the existence of such knowable objects as ... a Shakespearean text," he is bringing out the 
way in which he sees the interpretation of Shakespearean texts as something social and, 1 
would say, postural. It is "my relation" because he understands himself as being spoken 
to, and as being caUed upon to respond. It is "my relation" because, for him, modes of 
knowing crucially involve attitudes. My own way of describing Cavellian 
acknowledgment brings out its postural/ gestural dimension this way: 1 say that 
acknowledgment is a matter of a particular attitude-a receptive one-and a response. In 
"Skepticism as Iconoclasm: The Saturation of the Shakespearean Text," which is in part 
Cavell's answer to de Grazia and Stallybrass (it is also his only work to address textual 
issues), he describes his relation to the existence of the Shakespearean text as a relation of 
acknowledgment. Whereas his earlier essays focus on skeptical characters in 
Shakespeare, and their relevance to real people and their skepticism, this more recent 
work focuses on what Cavell caUs "skepticism about the Shakespearean text" 
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("Iconoclasm" 232). So, in other words, he revisits the issue of acknowledgment in this 
more recent essay, but from a different perspective. Cavell re-emphasizes, in this new 
context, his conviction that there is a relevant analogy to be drawn between any reader's 
relation to a Shakespearean text and any person's relation to another's mind. Like 
people's minds, the text cannot be known with certainty, but it can be-has to be-
acknowledged. 
To sorne readers, a statement like "the text has to be acknowledged" willlikely be 
off-putting. It may sound like a thoroughly conventional humanist platitude. It may 
sound like an old-fashioned caU for homage to works of genius and to the awe-inspiring 
achievements of western civilization. 1 would suggest, however, that Cavell is really 
saying something much more nuanced than that. Not only is it more nuanced, it is also 
something on which can be built a coherent argument about what it is to ta1k about what 
engagement with a Shakespearean text is. Furthermore, such an argument would not 
have to reflect the same values and interests that have guided now-demonized editorial 
methods-methods that were meant to purify the text of non-authorial contributions and 
to yield definitive editions. 
A considerable number of critics have in the last twenty years or so examined the 
ideological elements of critical editorial practice. For example, Anne Mette Hjort, whose 
treatment ofthis topic has in common with de Grazia's and Stallybrass's the value it 
places on the labour of non-authorial agents involved in the production and transmission 
of Shakespearean texts, is notable for the clarity with which she articulates "what is at 
stake in a debate over critical editorial practice" (Hjort 259). "What really should be at 
stake," she writes, are "the deep-seated interests and values that guide a series of 
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decisions that are motivated by intersubjectively sustained norms" (260). Hjort's 
examination of the practices of the New Bibliography leads her to dec1are them to be 
generally "guided by an egological attitude-that is, byan individualistic and even 
solipsistic interpretation ofhuman subjectivity" (264). A theory of Shakespeare editing 
argued in a way responsive to Cavell's moral philosophy, however, would not have to be 
egological. 
It is certainly the case that Cavell focuses on private experiences of reading; at the 
same time, though, it is also the case that his philosophy is an attempt to counteract 
solipsism. According to Cavell's interpretation ofhuman subjectivity, to the extent that 
we can come to know ourselves, it happens as we make ourselves receptive to other 
people and accept our obligations to them. Self-knowledge is not otherwise possible. 
For Cavell, this way ofthinking about self-knowledge has a great deal ofrelevance to his 
way of thinking about what engagement with a text is, though emphatically not because 
the author is some kind of exceptional self to be idolized. 1 mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter that Cavell argues that "the stillness of the text, the achievement ofwhich 
perhaps constitutes textuality, or a text's self-containedness, should be interpretable 
politicallyas rebuke and confrontation" ("Politics" 175). He offers this as part of a 
description of "how a text can be therapeutic" ("politics" 175)--which, interestingly, 
brings us to a c1uster of possible points of contact between Cavell and de Grazia/ 
Stallybrass. Like the authors of the "Materiality" essay, Cavell emphasizes and values 
the text's resistance, and the resistant text's action on the reader. Further, like de Grazia 
and Stallybrass, Cavell suggests "freedom from the person of the author," freedom from 
"an attachment ... of idolatry" ("Politics" 176) as a goal. 
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Nevertheless, Cavell's understanding ofwhat confrontation with the text is 
remains very much at odds with the "Materiality" essay's. For de Grazia and Stallybrass, 
the text's resistance is the text's materiality. They specify that by "the materiality of the 
text" they mean "old typefaces and spellings, irregular line and scene divisions, title 
pages and other paratextual matter, and textual cruxes" (256). These "remain obstinately 
on the pages of the early texts, insisting upon being looked at, not seen through" (de 
Grazia and Stallybrass 257). De Grazia and Stallybrass insist that when someone looks at 
these things the looker is him- or herself exposed. They describe the way the resistant 
text should act on the reader as follows: 
These older forms return as active agents calling our own forms into question. 
When the materiality of the early texts confronts modern practices and theories, it 
casts those modem practices and theories into doubt, revealing that they, too, 
possess a specifie-and equally contingent-history. It makes us face our own 
historical situatedness. (257) 
The idea here is that, if we face our own historical situatedness, we Can open up to the 
possibility of social change. 
One issue this idea raises, though, is that, for anyone without highly specialized 
training and without regular access to the right rare book collections, the experience of 
the "materiality" of the early texts is inaccessible. De Grazia and Stallybrass stress this 
inaccessibility. They tell us that, even when we consult the Norton Facsimile of the First 
Folio, we will be misled by the photographie medium of reproduction into thinking that 
what we are looking at is "real, accurate, genuine" (de Grazia and Stallybrass 261). If, 
wary ofthis danger, we decide to make a point of travelling to a library where we can get 
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our hands on a First Folio in the Renaissance "original," we will still be misled in 
innumerable other ways: We will, for example, not be able to stop ourselves from 
mentally amending irregular spellings. So, as 1 have acknowledged here already, there 
can be for me no unedited Shakespeare. But 1 think 1 can accept that reality and still have 
various options open to me. 
1 have indicated my concem about the pre-emptive way in which the "Materiality" 
essay presents the particular option it advocates. My reservations about that option also 
have to do in part with the fact that 1 would have to accept on authority de Grazia's and 
Stallybrass's interpretations of the material features of the early texts. As 1 have 
indicated, 1 share Cavell's sense of the philosophicallimitations of the "Materiality" 
essay; like Cavell, 1 see de Grazia's and Stallybrass's rhetorical use of metaphysical 
arguments as a way of standing or moving in relation to other Shakespeare readers. 
Cavell suggests that what he calls the "dispossessiveness" of the de Grazia-Stallybrass 
project may not after aIl be so different from "that tradition of transmission in which 
individuals fall to wanting to mark Shakespeare as theirs in their possessive editing of 
him" ("Iconoclasm" 237). "Dispossessiveness" in Cavell's "Skepticism as Iconoclasm" 
essay refers to two things: 1) an inclination to offer exorcism, to cast out the "ghostly 
genius," and thus free the reader; and, 2) an inclination to take the text away from the 
reader. 1 would make a similar point this way: 1 am left wondering whether de Grazia 
and Stallybrass are not making themselves into trial judges; after all, they are the 
interpreters ofthose material historical features that are going to "return as active agents" 
to "reveal" and "try" present standards. 
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ln some ways, though, Cavell's model and the de Grazia-Stallybrass model have 
similar limitations. Like de Grazia and Stallybrass, Cavell expresses the hope that 
confrontation with Shakespearean texts may open people up to changing and improving 
present sociallife. We may weIl want to ask him what his evidence is that important 
political change comes from private healing, one Shakespeare (or Emerson, or Thoreau) 
reader at a time. We may want to ask de Grazia and Stallybrass much the same thing, 
though, about the therapeutic value of the material object. For them, subject-object 
relationships exist in and are shaped by material culture. But even if we wholeheartedly 
accept this premise, we may still find the "Materiality" essay's therapeutic project 
dubious. To the extent that social healing depends on individuals' contact with rare and 
expensive antiquities, or at least with commentary and theory written by authorities on 
such antiquities, it is difficult to summon a lot of optimism about its possible reach. In 
other words, 1 am saying that the political efficacy ofboth therapeutic agendas is bound 
to be very limited. But Cavell's approach nevertheless has several advantages. In order 
to develop what these advantages are, 1 need to discuss-and expand on-Cavell's 
analogy hetween the problem ofhow we can know other minds and the problem ofhow 
we can know Shakespearean texts. 
One way of drawing the analogy might he: In the case of Shakespearean texts we 
have only what Cavell caUs "partial recoverings" to go on; in the case of other minds we 
have only behaviour. Where we want to go with the evidence we have is open to debate. 
It's evidence of what? What are we seeking to know? However they defme their goals, 
practitioners and theoreticians in both textual studies and, say, psychology usually 
recognize that there are limits to how far they can actuaUy get. We may take issue with 
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their particular ways of accommodating themselves to those limits, or in some cases we 
may decide that their goals are fundamentally misconceived. We may make arguments in 
favour of different goals for textual studies and! or for psychology. 
And of course, even people who are more or less indifferent to explicit theories 
ask themselves related questions. Consider, for example, the following scenario: 
Someone hears a friend say something that sounds to the listener like mere parroting of a 
parent's (or someone else's) words. The listener may respond by trying to figure out 
what's motivating the parroting. She may try to understand what she thinks of as the 
friend's true selfby trying to understand that motivation. Maybe she will decide that it's 
impossible to figure out the motivation. Or maybe the listener will respond by saying 
that, when the friend parrots like that, he is in a sense not there. The listener may try to 
imagine what the friend would have been like if he had been free of such influences. 
Maybe she will think that's the true self. Or the listener may say that the friend is always· 
parroting someone else's words, and maybe to the listener that means the friend is never 
there, never real. Maybe the listener will conclude that the friend does not exist. 1 use 
this particular example because the matter of parroting tends to raise the question, "whose 
words, really?"-which clearly tends also to arise in connection with the Shakespearean 
text. 
But, now, it is important to note that the question "can 1 get access to someone's 
private mental states?" is different from the question "does that other person even really 
exist?" Cavell's work is centrally concemed with how language, philosophy, and human 
relationships are damaged when people try: 1) to answer either of these questions with a 
yes or no; and! or 2) to reformulate the problem reflected in the fust question more or less 
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in terms of the second question. These-the yes or no answers to the questions, and! or 
the reformulating of the problem-are for Cavell basically evasive ways of dealing with 
difficult interpersonal situations. They are the paradigmatic instances of words getting 
"away and lost," "stray[ing] into metaphysics" ("Politics" 162). He is interested in the 
psychological needs that motivate this tendency to stray and get lost, and in the ethical 
consequences of it. He is also interested in how difficult it can be to recognize "when 
and where our words have strayedll (Ilpoliticsll 162). The "skeptical problematic,1l which 
he articulates as "the question whether 1 know with certainty of the existence of the 
external world and of myself and others in itll (Disowning Knowledge 3), is, he maintains, 
a distorted and displaced expression of doubts about relationships with other people. Can 
1 trust people? How weIl do l, or can l, know them? 
Cavell's interpretation of the motive for skepticism is, of course, open to question. 
Many people will not like that he makes major movements in philosophy out to be little 
more than symptoms of a psychological pathology. Indeed, as he himself notes in a 
somewhat different context, Il[d]iagnosis of one's enemies caUs forth counterdiagnosis as 
surely as anger calls forth anger" (Ilpolitics" 158). But his point about the confusion of 
the metaphysical and the empirical is, 1 think, in the case of the IlMateriality" essay, 
irrefutable. 1 also think that the confusion serves a rhetorical purpose in that essay, and 
that it makes sense to consider this social move in the context of social behaviour-
specifically, in the context of attempts to avoid or even block dialogue. In his very tactful 
way, Cavell suggests that de Grazia and Stallybrass relate themselves to the existence of 
the Shakespearean text in the particular way they do because they do not want to talk 
about the ways in which the plays are about relationships between people. To that 
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criticism 1 would add, because of my sense of the Shakespearean text as constituted in an 
ongoing dialogue, that 1 find de Grazia's and Stallybrass's approach to block discussion of 
some of the most interesting things about how the texts are, as Jerome J. McGann would 
say, fundamentally social products. 
Like de Grazia and Stallybrass, 1 understand the texts as constituted in relations 
between people, and between people and objects. The history of paper making is 
interesting and relevant to those of us who want to think seriously about these relations. 
But 1 cannot accept that the study of paper making should he privileged to such a degree 
and in such a way as to preclude study of the ways the ethical dimensions of the texts 
have been both uncovered and added to by generations of interpreters in dialogue with 
each other. For my own part, 1 am particularly interested in the ways in which points of 
engagement for interpreters are constituted in the texts' posturaI/ gesturallanguage. The 
fact that these points of engagement are often unacknowledged could be considered of 
interest to current editors and textual scholars who, following suggestions made by 
McGann and others, may he concemed to bring out and not, or not necessarily, to clear 
away meanings accumulated during the course of a text's production and transmission 
history. 
And so now, having not dispensed with the issues that arise from Hamlet's textual 
multiplicity, but having rather prepared myselfto open up to them, 1 will go on to ask my 
question about HamIet and his fatal fencing match. 
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3. 
P ACKING AND UNP ACKING: HAMLET 
Why does Hamlet go through with the fencing match at the end of the play? Why 
doesn't he allow his own misgivings to have more influence on his decision? The plan 
for the match is, the audience knows, a plot hatched by Claudius. He intends to rig things 
to make sure that Hamlet will die. HamIet does not know the details of Claudius's plot, 
but he does have a bad feeling about the fencing match. To Horatio he says, "thou 
wouldst not think how ill all's here about my heart" (5.2.226-27).1 Horatio's response is: 
"If your mind dislike anything, obey it" (5.2.231). So then why does Hamlet accept the 
king's invitation? Why does he agree to "play with Laertes" (5.2.212)? 
The character explains his decision, of course, in a very famous passage. "We 
defy augury. There is a special providence in the fall of a sparrow" (5.2.233), he says. 
He then continues: "If it be now. 'tis not to come; if it he not to come, it will he now; if it 
be not now, yet it will come. The readiness is aIl. Since no man of aught he leaves 
l Except where otherwise noted, quotations from Ham/et are from the Folger Shakespeare Library edition 
edited by Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine. 1 find this edition convenient because, while it is based on 
the Second Quarto (Q2), it also includes as much of the First Folio (F) version as possible-and, 
importantly, it clearly marks aU Q2-only passages and aU F-only words and passages. 
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knows, what is 't to leave betimes. Let be" (5.2.236-38). These words have no doubt 
been inspiring to many people. And yet there are also many people with whom Hamlet's 
explanation does not sit weil. In performance the passage has, in fact, often been 
abridged. Until the late nineteenth century, according to John A. Mills, directors usuaIly 
cut most of the speech. They would have Hamlet speak only the sentence about defying 
augury.2 Even one ofthe twentieth century's best-known performances, Laurence 
Olivier's film version, cuts everything after "the readiness is aIl," and instead tacks on a 
fragment from another speech: "There's a divinity that shapes our ends,/ Rough-hew 
them howwe will" (5.2.11-12).3 
For my own part, 1 have for a long time been stuck on "no man of aught he leaves 
knows"-a line which, as weIll see later on, is rendered differently in the First Folio 
version, and variously interpreted by modem editors. In the Second Quarto version, at 
least, 1 have tended to feel that the line suggests that Old Hamlet's ghost has been 
forgotten. If no man knows anything of what he leaves, then why was the ghost hanging 
around and complaining? How could it have been in any way troubled by anything that 
might have been going on in the "royal bed of Denmark" (1.5.89)? For that matter, is 
what Hamlet says about dead men knowing nothing of what they leave compatible with 
belief in, or even with agnosticism about, the existence of ghosts? The ghost has not 
made an appearance since Act 3, nor has it been mentioned by any character since then. 
So maybe this passage from Act 5 really is supposed to suggest that Hamlet does more or 
less forget or stop believing in the ghost. 
2 See Mills 21,43, and 103; Robert Hapgood 268n. 
3 See Mills 248. 
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Can any of Hamlet's many editors clear this up? Samuel Johnson, for one, had a 
way of dispensing with the problem. Re glossed the line in question this way: "Since no 
man knows aught of the state oflife which leaves, since he cannotjudge what other years 
may produce, why should he be afraid of leaving life betimes? Why should he dread an 
early death, ofwhich he cannot tell whether it is an exclusion ofhappiness, or an 
interception of calamity" (Johnson and Steevens 404n). Rowever, 1 know of no recent 
editor who interprets "no man of aught he leaves knows" along Johnson's lines. Recent 
editors are, 1 suspect, generally less anxious than eighteenth-century editors to make the 
lines in question not be an expression of disbelief in life after death (after all, it's not only 
ghosts that don't seem to exist for the Ramlet of the "no man knows"; angels presumably 
can't exist either). Even ifwe accept Johnson's gloss, though, what are we to make of 
"what is 't to leave betimes"? Surely Old Ramlet left "betimes, fi thanks to Claudius, and 
surely the earliness ofhis demise was one of the main problems with which Ramlet and 
the ghost were so intensely concemed. There are ways of trying to dispense with this 
issue as well, clearly, but none that put my doubts to rest without raising still more 
questions about Act 5's peculiarities. 
These (i.e., "no man of aught he leaves knows fl and "what is' t to leave betimes") 
were the original sticking points for me; they started the inquiry that eventually gave rise 
to this chapter. They were what initially caused my sense that Ramlet's decision about 
the fencing match, and his explanation of that decision, would be worth interrogating, and 
that they would for me still be worth interrogating even if 1 were squarely in the camp of 
those who want to see Ramlet get his act together and avenge his father. 1 admit that 1 
am not in that camp, or at least that is not my inclination. 
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As countless people have noted, the Hamlet of Act 5 seems different than the 
Hamlet of the earlier Acts. Many modem readers and theatrical spectators who have an 
attachment to Hamlet-the-tormented-thinker are disappointed by, or just relatively 
uninterested in, Act 5's Hamlet. This was the case with me for many years, although, as 
this chapter will show, careful study of Act 5 has changed my attitude. Readers in this 
group may ask: "What happened to our all-time favourite depressed intellectual?" "We 
lilœd him more complex and conflicted!" "Why do we have to sit through this tedious 
sword fighting?" If, following Samuel Taylor Coleridge and others, we believe that 
Hamlet delays because his "great, enormous, intellectual activity" cornes with "a 
consequent proportionate aversion to real action" (Coleridge 34), we may decide that the 
Hamlet ofthe fencing match must be a Hamlet who has stopped thinking. However, 
sorne modem readers find Act 5's Hamlet very satisfying. Maynard Mack, for instance, 
believed that at the play's conclusion Hamlet "accepts the world as it is, the world as a 
duel" (127). For readers like Mack, Hamlet behaves as he does in the last Act because he 
finally grows up. Such readers may say: "Thank goodness he finally stops moping 
around and does what he has to do!" In other words, then, sorne people are glad to see 
the prince in action in the end; other people lose interest in the character at the point 
where he stops soliloquizing. How my readers think about these matters will clearly 
affect what they make of my related "why does Hamlet go through with the fencing 
match" question. 
1 don't for a minute think that 1 have come up with the final answer to that 
question, or even that it makes sense to look for a final answer. In one form or another, 
the issue of the prince's rashness in the last act has obviously been addressed many times 
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before; nevertheless, 1 think that it can be worthwhile to keep asking questions about this, 
and that there are better and worse ways of doing it. In this chapter 1 will attempt to show 
that one good way of approaching the issue of the main character's fatal decision is to 
consider how the fencing scene's language works in relation to language elsewhere in 
Hamlet. 1 will argue that the relationship between the match and certain other elements 
of the play has been under explored. The sword fight is not just a way of wrapping things 
up, duH or even ridiculous to sorne, stirring for others-not that 1 think there are many 
serious interpreters whose considered opinion is that the match is nothing other than a 
way of killing off a lot of characters in a single scene. There are, though, no doubt quite 
a few who think that "Elizabethan audiences liked to watch sword fighting,,4 is more or 
less sufficient as an explanation for the presence of this scene in Ham/et. Many 
Elizabethans did apparently like to watch fencing; according to Charles Edelman, "[t]he 
Elizabethan fascination with swordplay and the duello, the rivalry of the fencing schools 
and the notorious fatalities, are aH weIl documented" (Brawl173). My own position, 
however, is not that Elizabethan enthusiasm for such spectation doesn't matter, but rather 
that, like so many things in Shakespeare, the fencing match in Ham/et Act 5, scene 2 is 
overdetermined. 
Most published work that addresses the fencing match is, understandably, 
performance centred. Treatments are available of equipment and stage fighting 
techniques used in this particular match.5 This work is often aimed at actors, especially 
4 See the fIfst part ofEdelman's Brawl Ridiculous: Swordfighting in Shakespeare for a fairly detailed 
treatment of fencing matches held in the Elizabethan playhouse. 
5 One particularly interesting treatment oftechnique and equipment is James L. Jackson, "'They Catch One 
Another's Rapiers': The Exchange ofWeapons in Hamlet." Jackson points out that the swords do not have 
to fall on the ground in order for Laertes and HamIet to exchange weapons. He draws his readers' attention 
to "a method of disarm, known and apparently common in the Renaissance, called the 'left-hand seizure,' a 
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student actors.6 Works that deal with Ham/et from a theatre-history perspective are also 
available, and these obviously have to try at least to pro vide sorne description of the final 
scene as it was performed in various productions, though the evidence on which such 
descriptions depend can in many cases be frustratingly limited.7 Another type of 
treatment of Act 5, scene 2 attempts analysis of the scene's implicit commentary on 
Elizabethan social rituals.8 However, although performance-centred discussions of the 
fencing match can he relevant to the discussion that 1 will develop here, and although, 
likewise, what 1 am doing here may have relevance for performance, it is beyond the 
scope of my project to deal in detail with past performances of Ham/et. Treatments of 
the fencing match that engage closely with the complexities of the text are surprisingly 
hard to find, and 1 felt there was caU for such work. 
1 would like my readers to think of thls chapter as an invitation to consider the 
match's involvement in networks ofhomonymic play active throughout Ham/et. More 
move in which the fencer, after discarding the dagger, takes his opponent's rapier hilt with his left hand and 
twists the weapon outward from his grasp" (281-82). The question of whether or not Ramlet uses the "left-
hand seizure" has significant implications for character development. As an experienced fencer, RamIet 
would know that his opponent, also an experienced fencer, would have studied this method of disarm, and 
therefore would know that the "only practical move in response is to take the same action, grasping the 
attacker's hilt with his left hand and disarming him, the two actions resulting in the exchange ofrapiers" 
(Jackson 282). Thus, a HamIet who uses the "left-band seizure" is far more calculating and in control 
during the fencing match than the Hamlet to whom we're more accustomed. In many modem productions 
HamIet appears to get possession of the sharp sword purely by cbance. 
6 See, for example, Gordon Gilbert, Stage Fights: A Simple Handbook of Techniques 69-79; Laurie E. 
Maguire, "The Fencing Scene," Approaches to TeachingShakespeare's Ham/et 191-96. 
7 The following excerpt from Mills's discussion of William Charles Macready's performance of Ham/efs 
fmal scene may serve to give us sorne sense both of the value and of the limitations of the kind of 
impressionistic reports which, on many points, provide the best or only evidence available to the theatre 
historian: "As for the fencing itself, Macready 'handled a foillike a pitch-fork,' in the opinion of John 
Coleman. But that assessment seems difficult to reconcile with another report, which has the actor showing 
offhis skill, in the course of choosing a foil, by 'making a spring and lunge together, hitting the edge ofthe 
wing nearest the footligbts with unerring certainty'" (Mills 103). 
8 See, for example, Henry E. Jacobs, "The Banquet ofBlood and the Masque ofDeath: Social Ritual and 
Ideology in English Revenge Tragedy" 39-50. 
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specifically, 1 have two main claims to make about the relationship between the fencing 
match and the rest of the play. My first claim is that the match ties in with an often-noted 
pattern of repetitions of various kinds in Hamlet. That is, the pattern of repetitions has 
heen noted; what Act 5's fencing has to do with it, however, has not heen fully explored. 
My second claim is that the match is very much involved in Hamlet's exploration of the 
implications of certain ways of thinking about what it is to try to know a person. Stanley 
Cavell's has been my favourite treatment of this theme to date, but he does not give the 
fencing match the emphasis which it, in my opinion, merits in this connection.9 What 
exactly the fencing in Act 5 has to do with these themes l'm singling out (Le., repetition 
and knowing), and how exactly these themes work, will he developed over the course of a 
fairly extended discussion. What we can hope to gain from close examination of Act 5's 
fencing match is quite a rich sense ofthe play's ethical dimension, although, of course, it 
is again important to note that, the way 1 conceive of it, the ethical dimension of a 
Shakespearean play is never finished, because interpreters continue to contribute. 
"Why does Hamlet go through with the fencing match?" is a question analogous 
to the one with which 1 began my Coriolanus chapter. 1 caU the two opening questions 
analogous because they both concern a character's decision about whether or not to go 
through with a particular ritual. Here, as in the earlier chapter, 1 am asking questions that 
are ethical, and 1 am addressing the questions via close engagement with the specifie 
language of the play. Again also, an important part ofwhat 1 am trying to bring out is the 
working of a complex interpretive dialogue. What 1 have called the plays' postural/ 
gesturallanguage provides especially interesting points of engagement for me and, in 
various ways, for other interpreters. As we'll see in the case of Hamlet, the moves that 
9 See Cavell's essay, "Hamlet's Burden ofProof' in Disowning Knowledge 179-91. 
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the characters enact and talk about in the context of the fencing scene are relevant to the 
plotting and foiling that happens e1sewhere in the play. And there is a lot of plotting and 
foiling going on throughout: Hamlet, Claudius, and their agents repeatedly make plans, 
offensive moves, and defensive moves. 
ln this chapter 1 will, as l've said, focus my discussion on terms related to the 
fencing match in Hamlet-specifically "foil," "fence," and "pack." Crucial enacted 
gestures in other scenes are in sorne cases relevant to the fencing scene too. In Hamlet 
characters often talk about the possibility of getting at someone's truth by figuratively-
and, in at least one or two cases, literally-striking and cutting. 1 will argue that the play 
shows up this way of thinking as problematic, even in cases where the imagined striking 
and cutting is only figurative. Specifically, 1 will show how thinking in this way about 
approaches to others presents a problem for HamIet's self-understanding. 
The rationale for my project is not that the postural! gestural terms 1 deal with 
were Mr. William Shakespeare's favourite, or that they are irrefutably and for all time 
central or key terms in the play. Rather, my rationale is that there are certain payoffs, 
now specifically, to approaching the play through careful study ofthese terms. And, 
obviously, 1 could be wrong about this; the rewards ofthis approach may he very limited. 
But 1 may he right and, if so, that will have to do with Shakespeare's language; it will 
also, however, have to do with meanings that have come to he absorbed by the plays over 
time, and with conversations currently going on among Shakespeareans. The way 1 
understand them, those things are part of what the plays are. 
In the case of Hamlet the interpretive tradition is so notoriously extensive that it 
would be a rare person who could set out now to write about this play without getting all 
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kinds of warnings from friends and acquaintances: "So much has been done on Ham/et; 
howean you not get bogged down reading prior eritieism?" Not only is the interpretive 
tradition for Ham/et extensive, it is also highly reeursive, whieh makes for a situation in 
whieh, for example, people's writings about people who write about writing about this 
play become, aeeording to my way oflooking at this, part ofwhat the play is! Instead of 
being put offby this, 1 decided to make refleetion on this state of affairs a part of my 
treatment of Ham/et. 1 came to the conclusion that, anyway, Ham/et eritieism is always 
metaeriticism, whether a given critie aeknowledges that or not. Strictly speaking, fuis is 
true of critieal work on aU texts for which there is any significant interpretive tradition-
except, 1 suppose, in the rare instance in which a particular interpreter has truly had no 
exposure to the tradition. This play, however, is a special case in this regard because of 
the unmatched extensiveness and influence of the tradition. And another important 
factor-another thing that makes Ham/et a special case for metacriticism-is the 
importance of metatheatre in Hamlet. As Marjorie Garber observes, "Hamlet as a play is 
from the fust concerned with playing, and the play offers its spectators not only a series 
ofnested plays, but a series ofnested audiences" (After Ali 495). We watch HamIet 
watching the other characters watching the play within the play, for example. So, Hamlet 
interpreters have more than one reason for feeling acutely that they are among, with, and 
after other interpreters. And that is what the Greek prefix meta means: "among, with, 
after" (Merriam Webster).l0 
10 The OEn provides a similar etymology for the prefix "meta-" ('with,' 'after,' 'between'), but of course its 
treatment is much more extensive (the etymology, definitions, and examples run to nine pages in the online 
edition). One suggestion put forth in the OEn is that 'together with' is "perh. the original sense in Greek" 
("meta-," prefIX). 
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WeIl, but what about this feeling ofbeing meta, then? There are sorne rather 
predictable postmodem things 1 could say about it, but 1 would like instead to take a bit of 
a different tack. 1 want to think about being among, with, and after other interpreters as a 
social situation. 1 will discuss what l'm going to calI imagined topographies of the play 
and imagined topographies ofinterpreters' relationships to the play. And, although it will 
take a while, l'm going to explore what it means to think of accepting the meta-ness of aIl 
Hamlet interpretation as a matter of accepting the necessity oftaking into account the 
ethical implications of anY move, in the context of an imagined space, in relation to other 
interpreters. 
1 have opted to alternate, in the pages that follow, between more and less 
explicitly metacritical subsections. In my own slightly adapted version of Garber's 
"nested audiences" model, audience members who are living people (or who were living 
people at one time) would not aIl or not only be in the outermost nest, so to speak. What 
1 mean is that over time a lot of living people have left various marks-sorne literally 
visible, sorne not-on the words of the fictional characters in Hamlet. 1 have wanted to 
write about this play in a way that takes into account the interpenetration of fictional and 
non-fictional interpreters. There is, of course, no way of completely separating them out, 
nor is there any way of providing comprehensive description and analysis of their 
interpenetration. But although my practice of altemating between more and less 
metacritical subsections cannot be fully satisfactory, 1 would hope that it has enabled me 
to consider characters' behaviours in light ofnon-fictional interpreters' behaviours, and 
vice versa. Of Hamlet Act 5 (especially Act 5, scene 2) 1 would go so far as to say the 
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following: Interpreters11 cannot make coherent sense ofit without projecting onto it their 
own expectations and desires. If this is true of other parts of the play (or perhaps of all 
works ofliterature?), it's true of Hamlet's final scene to a particularly high degree. And 
yet, 1 also maintain that Act 5, scene 2 is intricately tied to the language of the rest ofthis 
play. Are these two c1aims compatible? 1 think they are, and 1 intend in the rest ofthis 
chapter to show how they work in relation to each other. 
"What, bas tbis tbing appeared again .•• ?" 
Many people who have writlen about this play have had something to say about 
repetition. T. S. Eliot, for example, noted Hamlet's "repetition ofphrase," and suggested 
that it seems to be for the character "a form of emotional relief" (102). Then there's the 
"Mousetrap" play, the main point ofwhich hinges on its repetition of the story behind 
Hamlet as a whole. And that's not even the only way in which the "Mousetrap" is 
repetitive. As W. W. Greg among others emphasized, there is something a bit weird 
about the extent to which the scripted part of the play within the play simply repeats the 
same action represented in the dumb show. Although dumb shows were common in the 
sixteenth century, this particular way of using them was rare or, as Greg c1aims, unheard 
of ("Hallucination" 399). We can think too of Michael D. Bristol's observation that 
Hamlet is an "iterative figure in an interminable fugue of revenge and retribution" (Big-
Time 210). Bristol notes that Hamlet's self-recognition (however troubled and 
incomplete) in connection with the player's speech about Pyrrhus's revenge brings out 
this iteration, and that then "The Murder of Gonzago" (which the prince adapts for his 
11 For the sake ofreadability, here and in the rest of the chapter 1 call1iving and formerly living interpreters 
of Hamlet simply "interpreters"; 1 will find other ways ofreferring to tictional characters who interpret. 
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"Mousetrap") re-emphasizes the point (Big-Time 209-10). Frank Kermode who, like 
Greg, also notes the repetitions involved in the "Mousetrap," draws our attention to the 
importance of doublings in general in this play; he claims that they are aIl over the place: 
"Whenever something can be doubled, it is: revenges and revengers, lawful espiaIs, 
ghostly visitations" (51). Kermode even caUs duplications in Ham/et "compulsive" (52). 
Garber, for her part, in an essay entitled "Ham/et: Giving up the Ghost," discusses 
Sigmund Freud's idea of the repetition compulsion in considerable depth. 
Garber goes so far as to assert that "[e]very criticaI observation on doubling in 
this play is an implicit commentary on the compulsion to repeat" (Ghost Writers 129). 
Further, she argues that there are tell-tale signs of the repetition compulsion not only in 
Hamlet, but also in the work of critics who deal with Ham/et: 
That critics write their own Hamlets, as, for example, Coleridge, Goethe, and T. 
S. Eliot, have done, is something of a commonplace for us. That they are 
compelled to do so-that this is the;r compulsion to repeat-because the play 
limns a preconscious moment that can only he retrieved through repetition and 
not through memory, reinscribes the paradox of the play as itself a mise en abyme 
without (exactly, precisely, without) the primai scene at which it is constantly 
hinting, and which we are constantly on the brink ofremembering, faIsely, 
fictively. The ghost of Ham/et-the ghost in Hamlet-is this illusion of the 
articulation of our own perception of desire and its deniaI, our own conviction that 
'the spot where it reaches down to the unknown' can he plumbed, even if it is 
found to he a hollow void. (Ghost Writers 158-59) 
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Garber is direetly quoting Freud when she refers to the spot that reaehes down to the 
unknown. For Freud, it's dreams that have sueh spots (he caUs the spots "navels"; every 
dream, according to him, has at least one navel) (Interpretation of Dreams Illn, 525). 
So, in the passage quoted above Garber is implying that: 1) Ham/et erities are 
ineompletely aware of what they are aetually doing beeause, whatever it is they think 
they have set out to do, their work is also something akin to a neurotie symptom, in that it 
expresses a compulsion to repeat; and, 2) whether they realize it or not, Ham/et erities 
treat the play as if it were a dream, or something akin to a dream. 
Not only do we, psyehoanalytie and non-psyehoanalytie erities alike, treat the 
play as if it were a dream, Garber seems to suggest that we tend on sorne level to treat it 
as if it were our own dream---our own dream, whieh we are neurotieally eompelled to 
interpret, without realizing that's what we're trying to interpret. For her, the eritic's 
reasons for doing what-he or she does with Ham/et are ultimately personal and 
incompletely understood. Like Hamlet, we often seem not fully to understand what we 
are doing, no matter how mueh we think about it-though Garber seems to be of the 
opinion that anyone who comments on "doubling" in the play is at least revealing partial 
awareness of the importance of the repetition compulsion to the play, and possibly also 
its importance to critics' relationships to the play. Garber, of course, has a tactful way of 
eoming at aIl this; she doesn't hit her fellow critics over the head with "You're neurotie! 
And you don't really know what it is you're actually doing!" She does come a lot closer 
to the friendlier "We're neurotic, and we don't really know what we're doing"; even this, 
however, especially once 1 put it that bluntly, is not likely to go over aIl that weIl with 
crities who aren't sold on psychoanalysis. 
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But then, Garber's handling of concepts and vocabulary from Freud turns out to 
be a lot more fun and a lot less doctrinaire than those of us with experience of more run-
of-the-mill psychoanalytic criticism might expect. Amusingly enough, what, according 
to Garber, keeps Hamlet criticism going is this: a ghost in relation to which the critic 
develops a transference neurosis. While Hamlet critics have their own diverse 
acknowledged and unacknowledged concerns, and their correspondingly diverse personal 
Hamlets, they also have, Garber claims, this analyst ghost in common. That ghost is 
something more thanjust a character in the play (it's not simply the figure of Hamlet's 
dead father, in other words), and it's something other than the critics' idiosyncrasies or 
what T. S. Eliot called their "critical aberrations" (95),12 though it is in the context of the 
critic's relationship to this shared ghost that these "aberrations" come out. On the last 
page ofher Hamlet essay, Garber informs us that "The Ghost is Shakespeare" (Ghost 
Writers 176), though she specifies that by "Shakespeare" she means to refer to "a 
concept-and a construct-rather than an author" (Ghost Writers 175). 
1 want to emphasize that 1 relate the concepts and vocabulary Garber uses to non-
psychoanalytic critics' attempts to describe what it is that keeps Hamlet criticism going. 
And, in fact, the vocabulary 1 will use throughout most of this chapter is in general closer 
both to the language of the plays and to language used by Kermode and by Morris Weitz. 
As we'll see, Kermode argues that criticism of this play, or indeed of any canonical work 
of art, depends for its renewal on critics' repeated attempts to move something they see in 
12 Eliot begins his essay on Ham/et by distancing himselffrom Goethe and Coleridge; he accuses them of 
writing criticism of "the most misleading kind possible" (95) because they "make their critical aberrations 
the more plausible by the substitution ... oftheir own Hamlet for Shakespeare's" (95). But, for ail that, Eliot 
introduces bis own aberrations, makes bis own substitutions. His essay on "Hamlet and His Problems," in 
which he declares the play to be "most certainly an artistic fallure" (98), continues to intrigue readers, 
though not usually because they are inclined to agree with his assessment of the play. Readers keep going 
back to that essay because they are interested in Eliot and his problems. 
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the work from the margins to the centre of attention. And, inevitably, as they move sorne 
things from the margins to the centre, critics also move other things from the centre to the 
margins. Weitz, for his part, tries to show in his survey of Hamlet criticism that, over and 
over again, critics have attempted to answer the question "what's central in Hamlet?" as if 
it were a question to which a final answer could be found. For both Kermode and Weitz, 
critics' attempts to move their readers' focus of attention are not in themselves 
problematic; what can be problematic, as Weitz especiaUy emphasizes, is critics' 
confusion about what they are doing, about what they are moving, and why. Now, what 1 
want to suggest is this: It's worth drawing a Hnk between what Garber caUs "the ghost of 
Hamlet-the ghost in Hamlet" and the elusive answer to the "what's central" question, 
which, according to Weitz, critics are always trying to find. 
Wait. Didn't Ijust quote Garber as saying that the ghost is Shakespeare? Yeso 
But doesn't that make for a pretty empty formulation when you add it aIl up-something 
along the lines of "what's central in Hamlet is Shakespeare"? WeU, but you have to keep 
in mind that when Garber says "The Ghost is Shakespeare" she means not simply 
William Shakespeare the author, but rather Shakespeare the concept. And it is only when 
you think very carefully about this that you can see how what Garber has to say 
complements Kermode's and Weitz's accounts of the history of Hamlet criticism. 
The ghost that Garber talks about both haunts interpreters and accommodates 
interpreters' various displacements. In its haunting capacity the ghostl Shakespeare is an 
illusory product of the interpreter's repetition compulsion. According to Freud, people 
under the sway of the repetition compulsion give the impression "ofbeing pursued by a 
malignant fate or possessed by sorne 'daemonic' power; but psycho-analysis has always 
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taken the view that their fate is for the most part arranged by themselves and determined 
by early infantile influences" (Beyond the Pleasure Principle 21; qtd. in Garber, Ghost 
Writers 161-62). If Hamlet critics are under the sway of the repetition compulsion, then, 
according to a Freudian view, that means that while it may at times seem as if the ghostl 
Shakespeare is running our lives, there is nothing really pursuing or possessing us other 
than our own repetition compulsion. At the same time, however, in its accommodating 
capacity the ghostl Shakespeare is the analyst ghost. And while it is the interpreter who 
displaces things onto the analyst ghost, the analyst ghost does itselfhave certain 
characteristics that facilitate this. 
First and foremost, what 1 want to draw attention to here is how important 
topographical ambiguity is in this account. Where is Shakespeare (the ghostl 
Shakespeare, that is-Shakespeare the concept)? It seems to pursue the interpreter, but 
actually it comes from within the interpreter; also, though, it really is something outside 
of the interpreter, something in relation to which the interpreter acts. The difficulty 
involved in, so to speak, finding the location of Shakespeare the concept reminds Garber 
of the difficulty that the watchmen of Hamlet Act 1 have when they try to get the ghost of 
Old HamIet to stay put. Several times in the course of her essay she quotes the exchange 
that follows Marcellus's attempt to strike the ghost with his weapon: 
BARNARDO: 'Tis here. 
HORA TIO: 'Tis here. 
MARCELLUS: 'Tis gone. (1.1.155-57) 
Further on in this chapter 1 will discuss this same moment from Act 1 in the context of a 
detailed discussion of physically enacted striking gestures and of described literai and 
134 
figurative striking; 1 will show what striking has to do, in Ham/et, with characters' 
attempts to fmd things out and know for sure. One of the main purposes of this 
dissertation as a whole is to draw attention to the ways in which the plays show how it 
matters where you imaginatively locate what you want to know. That should be clear by 
this point. Now, the connection between the topographical ambiguity in Garber's 
treatment of the ghostl Shakespeare and the critic's ever recurring question "what's central 
in Ham/et?" is, basically, this: What a given critic thinks is central in Ham/et also tends 
to he, aceording to that same eritie, what has been lost. 
eritics have a sense that somewhere somehow contiguous with the play there is 
some lost story. We want to bring back the lost story, however we conceive ofit, 
whether we think that it is a story about character psychology, or a story about literary or 
theatrical conventions, or a story about religion or philosophy, or a story about something 
else. Where do we imagine this lost story to be? Is it floating out at the margins? Is it 
somehow hidden deep in the centre of something, somehow buried in the play, perhaps? 
The story the critic has to tell needs somehow simultaneously to be brought out in the 
open from deep in the centre, and brought into the .centre from out in the margins. 
A possible objection to this account of the situation, however, might he that what 
the critic may think of as the deep, and in some sense concealed, centre of the play could 
be on the margins, so to speak, of interpreters' field of attention. In other words, there is 
not necessarily any paradox or inherent topographical ambiguity implied in my 
description of the critic's work as a matter of both bringing out from the centre and 
bringing in from the margins. Ail we have to do is imagine two partially overlapping 
fields. Each field has its own centre and its own perimeter, and each can be imagined as 
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independent ofthe other. The area of overlap represents what the critic knows of the 
thing that we can calI for now "the play itself." And, anyway-please, we can discuss 
critics' need to keep moving, or moving in relation to, centres and! or margins, but can't 
we do it without starting up with talk about "displacement" in a psychoanalytic sense? 
WeIl, 1 can respond to that. First of aIl, consider the disorientation to which Weitz 
draws critics' attention. He is concemed to point out a philosophical confusion which, he 
believes, is a problem in literary criticism generaIly. Using Ham/et as an example, he 
argues that, while it can make sense to say that something is central or essential to the 
play, that way of speaking only makes sense so long as we do not actually forget that "[i]t 
is the critic who projects this centrality or essence onto the data so that these data are 
thereby unified by means of his hypothesis about the play" (34). 80 that would mean that 
the image of the two fields, with one representing the critic and the other representing 
"the play itself," does not work as a model after aIl. And as for the question of whether 
or not it does anything for us to bring in a psychoanalytic conception of" displacement," 
the justification for bringing that term to bear would be based, first of aIl, on a claim 
something along the following lines: There can be a psychological reason for the kind of 
philosophical confusion that surrounds the "what's central in Ham/et" problem. Cavell 
makes similar claims in other contexts; as we have seen, he argues, for example, that 
skepticism about the existence of other minds is motivated by a desire to evade sorne 
kinds of painful interpersonal situations. It's my conviction that good literary criticism 
involves ethical reflection. And, because it is not possible to think seriously about the 
ethics of self-deception without thinking about the psychology of self-deception, 1 
maintain that a critic cannot address the possibility of certain kinds of philosophical 
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confusion in his or her own work without engaging in some psychological self-scrutiny. 
Not everyone will agree with me on this, and even people who do will not necessarily 
want to get entangled with psychoanalytic theory. 
Nevertheless, 1 have wanted to start offhere by entertaining Garber's 
psychoanalytic insights, because where they bring her does, 1 think, allow her to add to 
her account something that we do not get from most other accounts ofhow Ham/et 
criticism works. Recall Garber's claim that the critic's repetition compulsion "reinscribes 
the paradox of the play as itself a mise en abyme." While the mise en abyme has been 
very much a favourite trope among postmodernists, what Garber does with it is not what 
one might expect from a garden-variety postmodernist. And it is what Garber does with 
psychoanalytic theory-though, as 1 have stressed already, what she does is not typical of 
psychoanalytic criticism-that makes her use of the mise en abyme trope so illuminating. 
While Freud believed that the navel of a dream is unplumbable, Shakespeare 
critics, in Garber's view, are generally driven by an obscure sense that Ham/et has 
something like what Freud called the dream's navel-a "spot where it reaches down to 
the unknown"-but that it's one that "can be plumbed, even if it is found to be a hollow 
void." This sense she thinks interpreters have that Ham/et has what 1'11 go ahead and calI 
a plumbable navel is, according to Garber, a function of displacement; interpreters 
displace onto the play their "own perception of desire and its denial." They then, still 
under the sway of the repetition compulsion, attempt to decipher the play as if it were a 
dream. If 1 understand rightly, the reason this would make for a mise en abyme is that 
Freudian dream interpretation involves finding and interpreting instances of 
displacement. So, in other words, we could say that Ham/et interpreters try to correct for 
137 
instances of displacement, but that very activity is in them a function of displacement. 
Or, to put the same thing slightly differently, interpreters attempt to undo the effects of a 
defence mechanism, but their sense that there are any such effects to undo is itself 
produced, at least in part, by a defence mechanism similar to the one against which they 
(consciously or unconsciously) think they are working. The result ofthis work on the 
part of the interpreter can only be yet another image, so to speak, of Ham/et (critics 
"write their own Hamlets"), and not a once-and-for-all plumbing of any navel. 
This is, to me, intriguing. However, 1 am again anticipating resistance. 1 imagine 
myself interrupted before 1 can get to my point-before 1 can, in other words, explain the 
payoff of Garber's account as 1 interpret it. The main objection 1 imagine would be 
something along the following lines: Is Garber seriously asking me to entertain the idea 
that, not only am 1 neurotic, and-weirdly-a Freudian or a kind of Freudian (at least 
when it cornes my attempts to interpret Hamlet), even if 1 don't know it, but aIso, as if 
that were not enough, that 1 am not even a good Freudian, since it doesn't sound Iike l'm 
reflective enough about my own defence mechanisms, or able to accept the limits of 
interpretation? 
ln response to that, 1 would say that, yes, it does sound, especially when it's put 
that way, like a funny thing to be implying. But, as Garher elsewhere explains more than 
once (see, for exampIe, Symptoms of Culture 5-6; Manifesto 11-12), she believes that one 
of the most worthwhile things she can do as someone engaged in literary studies, and 
cultural studies more generally, is to make a case for the importance of, and to deal in, 
what she calls "the counterintuitive." So, to the hypothetical objector-the one who asks 
"is Garber seriously asking me to entertain the idea ... ?"-I would say that the answer to 
138 
that may very well be "yes," though of course taking something seriously is not 
necessarily the same as taking sometbing literally. In my view, Garber's description of 
the Ham/et critic's repetition compulsion is not only rather counterintuitive, in a 
potentially good way, but also even quite humorous, or at least potentially humorous. 
And 1 think it is legitimate to bring out some of the humour latent in Garber's essay, even 
if 1 have been using some exaggerated paraphrases in order to do it. 1 say tbis partly 
because, although she applies to all interpreters of tbis play her description of the critic's 
repetition compulsion, there is, to my mind at least, a particular kind of interpretation in 
connection with which the description is perhaps funniest. 
That said, the Hamlet essay in question is a chapter in Shalœspeare's Ghost 
Writers: Literature as Uncanny Causality-a book wbich is almost twenty years old 
now-and it is possible that what 1 hear as implicit jokes may have had a different ring to 
them for earlier readers and! or for the author herself. And, inescapably, reinterpreted 
and rearticulated here, the jokes must mean differently than they did in their original 
context. Maybe 1 could give my version of Garber's argument a Bakhtinian label, caU it 
an "intentional dialogized hybrid.,,13 At any rate, ifit works the way 1 want it to, my 
interpretation of Garber's 1987 Hamlet essay will help me to indicate my point of 
divergence from a particular way of dealing with questions about Hamlet's "self' or bis 
"interiority." 1 have in mind a certain kind of argument that was very influential in the 
13 See M. M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination 51-82. Bakhtin explains that an "intentional dialogized 
hybrid" is a parodic or semi-parodic image of someone else's "direct word." 1 hasten to emphasize that for 
him parody "by no means" necessarily discredits the "direct word" (see Bakhtin 56), though in it the "direct 
word ... is reflected as something more or less bounded, typical and characteristic of a particular era" 
(Bakhtin 60). The "languages that are crossed in [the intentional dialogized hybrid] relate to each other as 
do rejoinders in a dialogue" (Bakhtin 76). 
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mid-eighties, and it is exactly the kind of argument in relation to which 1 think Garber's 
account of what keeps Hamlet criticism going has a special funniness. 
The critics to whom Garber alludes who attempt to plumb Hamlet's navel and end 
up declaring it to be "a hollow void" are represented in her essay by Terry Eagleton. She 
quotes Eagleton's claim that "Hamlet has no 'essence' ofbeing whatsoever, no inner 
sanctum to be safeguarded: he is pure deferral and diffusion, a hollow void which offers 
nothing determinate to be known" (Eagleton 72; qtd. in Garber, Ghost Writers 158). Still 
on the subject of Hamlet, Eagleton continues: 
His 'self consists simply in the range of gestures with which he resists available 
definitions, not in a radical alternative beyond their reach ... Hamlet's jealous sense 
of unique selfhood is no more than the negation of anything in particular. How 
could it be otherwise, when he rejects the signifiers by which alone the self, as 
signified, cornes into its determinacy? (72) 
Garber calls the passage she quotes from Eagieton "a postmodem and somewhat satisfied 
prote st" (Ghost Writers 158)--an interesting phrase, since the words "postmodem" and 
"satisfied" are not usually supposed to go together. We might expect a postmodem 
protest to be "savvy," maybe, and "playful." "Satisfied" is a problem, partly because of 
its tendency to connote smugness, and partIy because it implies a sense of completion and 
closure with which most proponents of postmodem thought wouid not want to be 
associated. Eagleton emphasizes the importance of indeterminacy in Hamlet ("nothing 
determinate to be known," etc.), and yet his reading is itself, according to Garber, 
"satisfied. " 
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Interestingly, Eagleton's treatment ofthis matter is extremely close to Francis 
Barker's argument in The Tremu/ous Private Body. Barker writes: 
... the narrative of Ham/et is nothing but the prince's evasion of a series of 
positionalities offered to him by the social setting .. .interiority remains, in Ham/et, 
gestural. .. For Hamlet, in a sense doubtless unknown to him, is truly [the] hollow 
reed which will 'diseourse most eloquent music' but is nonetheless vaeuous for 
that. At the centre of Hamlet, in the interior ofhis mystery, there is, in short, 
nothing. (32-33) 
The striking similarity of this passage to the one from Eagleton quoted above says 
somethlng, 1 think, about the formulaic quality of the argument, but 1 don't want to dwell 
on that too mueh. From my perspective, one very important feature ofthese passages 
from Eagleton and from Barker (dating from 1986 and 1984 respeetively) is what they do 
with the words "gestural" (Barker) and "gestures" (Eagleton). For Eagleton and Barker, 
as for many others before and after them, what's central in Ham/et is what's central in 
Hamlet. Like so many others, Eagleton and Barker respond to Hamlet's way of verbally 
gesturing again and again toward his "heart" and what he says is hidden in it. But, 
whereas Romantic eritics, for example, took Hamlet at his word when he claimed to 
"have that within which passes show" (1.2.88), critics like Eagleton and Barker are what 
Cavell might eall iconoclastie skepties: they say that the supposed contents of Hamlet's 
heart do not exist. 14 
14 See Cavell, "Skepticism as Iconoclasm: The Saturation of the Shakespearean Text." Some skeptics are 
frightened of the possibility that something they value may not exist, and so they try to prove the reality of 
the thing by trying to grasp (so to speak) the thing. Most ofCavell's Shakespeare criticism deals with the 
plays' depiction of this kind of skepticism. Other skeptics, however, think that it is admirably tough-
minded to entertain the possibility that some highly valued thing may not realIy exist; such skeptics may 
work to shatter belief in these things, as if such beliefs were false idols. This is what Cavell in his 1996 
essay calls "skepticism as iconoclasm." He notes that iconoclastie skeptics are very prominent among 
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It would, in my view, be a mistake to try to counter the Eagleton/ Barker 
argument by insisting that Hamlet's "interiority" is not merely "gestural" (in Barker's 
sense of the word, not minelS) and that there is something (as opposed to "nothing" or "a 
hollow void") "in the interior ofhis mystery." 1 want to argue that to believe that it 
makes sense to formulate the problem of "the heart of [Hamlet's] mystery" (3.2.396) as a 
yes or no, container-and-contents question (anything in there?) is a mistake in the first 
place. As 1 will show later by means of a detailed reading of the "0, what a rogue and 
peasant slave am 1" soliloquy, it is a mistake perpetrated by Hamlet. My basic position is 
that the play shows up this way of thinking as a mistake--one with significant ethical 
consequences-and that, furthermore, the play thematizes Hamlet's mistake by tending to 
pull interpreters into mistakes loosely analogous to the character's. 1 am prompted to this 
in part by what Garber says about the illusions that tend to affect Hamlefs interpreters. 
The illusion of the plumbable navel makes for an oversimplified imagined 
topography of the play, often of the character Hamlet, and of the interpreter's relationship 
to the play. The creative use that Garber makes of psychoanalytic theory complicates 
these imagined topographies in a way that most poststructuralist readings do not. The 
blend oftheoretical influences behind Eagleton's and Barker's readings is complex (and, 
in fact, it notably includes, like Garber's, a strong Lacanian element). But the peculiar 
blend makes for what is, in one respect at least, a funny situation. These readings, which 
initially seem bravely to open up new ground, end up tending to constrain discussion of 
Shakespeare prof essors (more so in 1996 than when Cavell frrst started writing about Shakespeare, he 
claims). He contrasts the "possessiveness" of the former (grasping) type of skeptic with the 
"dispossessiveness" of the latter (iconoclastic) type, but he also makes a point of suggesting that 
possessiveness and dispossessiveness can tend to resemble each other ("Skepticism as Iconoclasm" 237). 
An implicit comparison of the closed, grasping fist and the closed, smashing fist is active for Cavell, 1 
think. (See bis treatment of the outstretched hand! fist of the humanitarian in The Claim ofReason 437). 
15 For me, "gestural" doesn't have to go with an implicit "merely. Il 
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this play. They tend to make it seem as ifwe have two basic options-"yes" or "no" to 
the question, "is there anything in that container Hamlet tends to call ms 'heart"'? 
Garber's essay implies that, instead of taking skepticism further than a Freudian 
reading would, readers who declare Hamlet's mystery to be a "hollow void" end up 
producing readings that are actually less open-ended and less self-aware than a good 
Freudian reading would be. Like earlier Hamlet interpreters, the finders of the hollow 
void "reinscrib[ e] the paradox of the play as itself a mise en abyme," apparently without 
realizing that they are doing it. For both Garber and Cavell, Hamlet's attempts to know 
for sure (Is the ghost honest? What is the state of Claudius's conscience? What about 
Gertrude's?) are picked up and repeated by critics who want to know for sure what this 
play is really about (what's central?). To the extent that interpreters do not, in a given 
case, realize that they are suffering from a repetition compulsion, their interpretations will 
suffer. This is just as true of critics steeped in poststructuralist theory as it is of someone 
like J. Dover Wilson. 16 
It is, however, important to take note of the vital political dimension to Barker's 
work and to Eagleton's. And, in fact, political commitment is something that Garber's 
way of understanding the interpreter's relation to Ham/et would certainly accommodate. 
She notes that Jonathan Goldberg "locat[es] the play's power precisely in its capacity to 
assume the guise of contemporaneity and timely contestation" (Ghost Writers 158), and 
she seems to agree with him. The problem with the Barker-Eagleton argument is not that 
it makes the play timely, which is something that it emphatically does do: Eagleton, for 
example, argues that HamIet is "proleptic," that he "look[ s] forward to a time (our own?) 
when the individualist conception of the selfwill itself enter into crisis" (75). Rather, the 
16 Wilson's What Happens in "Hamlet" (1935) constitutes an attempt to settle numerous plot-related details. 
problem with the argument is that it is based on an insufficiently interrogated 
understanding ofrelationships between interpreters and the play. 
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Here it is worth noting that displacement is unlike other defence mechanisms, in 
that it offers the possibility of working through, in a new context, issues that originate in 
another context. So, when Hamlet takes on "the guise of contemporaneity and timely 
contestation," it makes it possible for the interpreter to work through contemporary and 
timely issues. 1 said earlier that interpreters' reasons for doing what they do with Hamlet 
are, according to Garber, ultimately personal and incompletely understood. But that does 
not mean that what interpreters displace onto the play is purely idiosyncratic. What's 
displaced and then (however partially) worked through via the interpreter's engagement 
with Hamlet can, and often does, have broader significance-which is one of the main 
reasons why interpreters can care what other interpreters have to say. 
There are also other reasons for caring about what theory-heavy readings from the 
1980s have to say. These are reasons that have to do with the present moment in literary 
studies, and the ways in which the concerns of people working in this field are now 
different than they were twenty years ago. My own reason for devoting so much space to 
what may, to up-to-date readers, seem like issues that are no longer in this field 
considered absolutely pressing (i.e., issues like Hamlet's rejection "of the signifiers by 
which alone the self, as signified, cornes into its determinacy," etc.) has to do with 
something that Garber points out in her 2003 Manifesto for Literary Studies. She notes, 
in this more recent work, that in the 1990s "the question of literary study's place in the 
intellectual and academic hierarchy was an unsettled matter. Even literally. Suddenly 
the word 'material' was everywhere (to be contrasted, presumably, with its antonym 
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'formaI,' but also with the complicatedly intellectual and highly verbal playing fields of 
theory)" (Manifesto 9). As we saw particularly clearly in the case of Margreta de 
Grazia's and Peter Stallybrass's 1993 essay on "The Materiality ofthe Shakespearean 
Text," Shakespeare critics have certainly been known to involve themselves with 
collections of material objects (rare books collections, for example) and at the same time 
also with the "verbal playing fields oftheory." As 1 explained in my last chapter, the 
results of this complex involvement can be problematic. Perhaps we could say that the de 
Grazia-8tallybrass essay marked a transitional moment between the vogue for "theory" 
and the vogue for "material culture." Garber describes the overall trend of the 1990s as 
follows: 
... scholars ofliterature shifted their interests, whether consciously or (more 
likely) unconsciously, away from the play oflanguage, the ambivalent 
ambiguities of the signifier, and the modes of counterintuitive argument that had 
marked the most brilliant literary work of the 1970s and 1980s (and, indeed, the 
1940s and the 1950s), toward less controversial terrain and more supposedly 
objective (and even "scientific") methodologies ... Literary study was in the 
process of disowning itself. (Manifesto Il) 
To the extent that they were attuned to "the rich allusiveness, deep ambivalence, and 
powerful slipperiness that is language in action" (Garber, Manifesto 13), the "literary 
theorists" oftwenty years ago were doing something which is, in Garber's view and in 
mine, currently somewhat undervalued. 80, in spite of whatever limitations 1 may see in 
intensively theory-involved interpretations of Hamlet, in spite oftheir ironies and 
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sometimes inadvertent funniness, there is something there on which present critics can 
build. 
Now then, the question is: How exactly is what 1 am going to do in the rest ofthis 
chapter different from what other critics have done? The answer is emphatically not that 
l, unlike everyone else, can avoid the repetition compulsion. It is, rather, that 1 think 1 
can nevertheless do something to show, with a certain amount of deliberateness, even 
though 1 definitely do not think that perlect deliberateness is possible in a case like this, 
how the mise en abyme of Hamlet works. Like any other interpreter, 1 have certain 
matters which, you could say, 1 want to bring from the margins to the centre of attention. 
It happens that what 1 want to focus on are those elements of the play which 1 think offer 
implicit commentary on what 1 will call "container-and-contents thinking." Often in the 
play characters talk about knowing (especially knowing a person) in terms that make it 
out to be a matter of getting at the contents of a container. As we'll see, this wayof 
thinking, though it initially seems simple and schematic, ends up giving rise to 
tremendous complications. And so, because 1 am dealing with the ways in which the 
play complicates oversimplified imagined topographies and explores the ethical 
implications of such oversimplifications, 1 have all the more reason to interrogate my 
own ways of thinking about such things. 
1 do think, however, that this play accommodates interpreters' displacements 
particularly well-so weIl, in fact, that 1 would calI its accommodating capacity one of its 
most notable features. 1 will not be able to be fully aware of every instance in which 1 
displace something onto the play. But 1 have isolated a spot in Hamlds final scene 
where 1 think 1 can show that the play almost forces displacement; toward the end of this 
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chapter, 1 will discuss some of the things that happen to interpreters when they try to deal 
with this crucial spot. My aim is not to argue that Hamlet's ending is simply 
indeterminate, but rather to show how it may thematize displacement and repetition by 
implicating interpreters in something they have already, and again and again, seen in the 
play. 
Plotting and Foiling 
1 have said that 1 am interested in container-and-contents thinking as it is 
represented in Hamlet. 17 The title ofthis chapter-"Packing and Unpacking"-reflects 
that theme. "Unpack" is an unusual verb in Shakespeare; in fact, it appears only once, but 
the one instance is memorable. Hamlet speaks the word in an important soliloquy, the 
17 As 1 explained in my last chapter, the textual situation for Hamlet is very complicated. There are three 
early printed versions: the First Quarto (QI), Second Quarto (Q2), and First Folio (F). Except where 
otherwise noted, this chapter deals with Q2 and F-the more familiar versions of the play. There is a high 
degree of similarity between Q2 and F; however, since some of the differences between these two versions 
are very significant, aIl quoted words, phrases, or passages peculiar to Q2 or to F will be clearly identified. 
Passages from QI will he cited in cases where 1 consider them interesting. Modem editors have usually 
treated QI as an inferior text. It is what used to be called a "bad quarto." Although, as Ann Thompson and 
Neil Taylor note, such texts are "now known as 'short quartos' or even 'textually challenged quartos'" (223), 
and although some literary critics and some theatre practitioners have made efforts to rehabilitate QI 
Hamlet, "[m]ost recent editors continue to assert that QI is a memorial reconstruction" (Marcus 135). 
Altematively, QI is sornetÏmes regarded as an early version of the play. Recently there has been some 
revival ofinterest in this possibility (see Marcus 132-76; Ioppolo 134-46), though the idea is not new; this 
view of QI as early sketch was favoured in the nineteenth century (QI was [rrst discovered in 1823). 
Mowat and Werstine make a point, in the introduction to their edition of Hamlet, of expressing skepticism 
about all narratives about the texts' origins (see Mowat and Werstine "Introduction" xlix), and take no 
position on the question of early draft vs. memorial reconstruction. Modem editions of Ham/et tend to he 
basically sorne kind of combination ofQ2 and F. Most editions lean more toward Q2, (though, notably, the 
Wells-Taylor Ham/et in the Oxford Complete Works and G. R. Hibbard's Oxford Ham/et both favour F) but 
there is usually some degree of conflation (on this subject see Thompson and Taylor, "'0 That This Too 
Too XXXXX Text Would Melt"'; Mowat, "The Form of Ham/ds Fortunes"; Werstine, "The Textual 
Mystery of Ham/et"). Editors do often make use of QI in places where they find problems with F and! or 
Q2 readings. However, Leah Marcus suggests that "to the extent that they adopt readings from QI or 
confirmed by QI, editors tend to avoid rnentioning that text in their notes" (134). Sorne recent editions of 
QI are available. Paul Bertram's and Bernice W. Kliman's Three-Text Ham/et (1991) is a diplomatic 
edition that gives side-by-side texts of QI, Q2, and F. Graham Holdemess and Bryan Loughrey put out an 
edition of Q 1 in 1992; Kathleen !race put out another in 1998. 
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one beginning "0, what a rogue and peasant slave am I!" (2.2.577).18 In the speech in 
question he berates himselfrepeatedly, at one point saying with bitter sarcasm that it is 
"most brave" (2.2.611) ofhim to "unpack [his] heart with words" (2.2.614). We will 
retum to this soliloquy, and to the idea of speaking as unpacking. But this "Packing and 
Unpacking" chapter began with questions about the fencing match of Act 5, scene 2, and 
l'm sure sorne readers are wondering what packing and unpacking have to do with the 
fencing match plot. 
Interestingly, "pack" in early modem English could, according to the OED, mean 
"[t]o contrive or plan (something) in an underhand way; to plot" (~ def. 3a)19, and, in 
fact, the word is used in this sense elsewhere in Ham/et. For example, in Act 3, scene 4, 
shortly after he has killed Polonius, Hamlet reminds his mother that Claudius has already 
decided to send him offto England. In the exchange that ensues, Hamlet's "[t]his man 
shaH set me packing" (3.4.234) is a multivalent Hne. We may take "packing" in this 
context to mean, as a note in the Mowat-Werstine edition suggests, "carrying off a 
burden" (182n). Ifwe take it that way, the line refers to what Hamlet does with 
Polonius's body a very few lines later: he lugs it out of the room. According to G. R. 
Hibbard, however, "set me packing" means both "cause me to he sent off in a hurry" and 
"make me start plotting" (287n). Constance Jordan, too, gives "set me to making 
schemes" (87n) as one ofher glosses on the phrase in question. 
18 This particular line has understandably been cited by critics who feel strongly about the aesthetic 
inferiority of QI. The QI version is "Why what a dunghill idiote slaue am I?" (TLN 1134). 
19 The OED entry explains that the origin of "pack," in this sense, is obscure. It does, though, suggest that 
there rnay be "sorne connexion with PACT n. (also COMPACT n.' c); the implication here being however 
always bad." 
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It is also worth noting that Hamlet discovers Claudius's scheme to have the king 
of England execute him when, on board the ship, he dares to open (the word is "unfold" 
in Q2, "unseale" in F) the "packet" (5.2.18) entrusted to Rosencrantz and Guildenstem. 
QI handles this part of the story quite differently than Q2 and F; if anything, though, that 
text does more than the others to play up the implicit wordplay around packetl packing/ 
unpacking. In QI, Horatio relates to the queen the events that took place aboard the ship 
bound for England. The more familiar versions of the play have Hamlet tell this story to 
Horatio. Importantly, the QI queen's loyalties are much less ambiguous than are the 
loyalties ofthe Gertrude of Q2/ F; indeed, she actively conspires with Hamlet and 
Horatio against her husband. The QI passage in which we learn about Hamlet's 
discovery of the "packet," the contents ofwhich reveal the "subtle treason that the king 
had plotted" (TLN 1812),20 sets up a c1ear parallel between, on the one hand, Claudius's 
plotting with Rosencrantz and Guildenstem and, on the other hand, Hamlet's plotting 
with the queen and Horatio. The word "packet" appears twice in QI (TLN 1814; TLN 
1837): one "packet" is Claudius's, one "packet" is Hamlet's. The plotting/ packing 
Hamlet unpacks Claudius's packetl plot, and replaces it with a packet ofhis own. This is 
the case in all versions of the play, but the language of QI does more to emphasize the 
paralleIs between Hamlet's "packing" and Claudius's. 
Laertes's and Claudius's fencing match plot cornes to Iight, and their pact cornes 
apart, following the exchange ofrapiers in Act 5, scene 2. 80, ifwe think ofplotting as 
packing, we could say that this is a moment of unpacking as un-plotting. The plot cornes 
20 TLN stands for "tbrough line number." Charlton Hinman established this line numbering system for The 
Norton Facsimile, The First Folio of Shakespeare. Bertram and Kliman use Hinman's line numbering for 
their Three-Text Ham/el. Throughout this chapter, wherever 1 specify that 1 am quoting from QI, Q2, or F 
(as opposed to a modernized Ham/et), the Bertram-Kliman text is the one 1 am using. 
undone with a mutual foiling-and, as 1 am going to go on to show, the enacted rapier 
exchange invites and repays unpacking (in the sense of "analyz[ing] the nature ofby 
examining in detail" ("unpack," Merriam Webster def. 3». 
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The planned fencing match has, in aIl three early printed versions of Ham/et (the 
First Quarto, Second Quarto, and First Folio), three treacherous elements. These are: 1) 
that, while Hamlet will have the sort of practice sword (foil) appropriate to play, Laertes 
will, by sneaky means, manage to take a sharp sword for himself; 2) that Laertes's 
unbated sword will also he poisoned; 3) that a poisoned drink will be on hand for when 
Hamlet gets thirsty. In Q2 and F, Laertes collaborates more actively in the planning than, 
in QI, Leartes ( sic) does. QI has the king think up aIl three treacherous elements, but 
poisoning the sword is Laertes's idea in Q2 and F, and thus in aImost all modem editions. 
In aIl versions, if Claudius's plot is to be successful, it has not only to get rid of Hamlet, 
but also to neutralize the threat posed by Laertes, who has just retumed to Denmark ready 
to avenge Polonius's death. He is angry with the king in aIl three early versions, but in 
Q2 and F we learn that Claudius has a lot more than just the one angry young man to deal 
with: A popular rebellion in support of Laertes is brewing. So, especially in Q2 and F, 
winning Laertes over is an urgent matter for the king, and the extent to which he succeeds 
at getting Laertes plotting with him is emphasized. 
However, although Laertes eagerly participates in the plot against Hamlet, he 
ends up pronouncing the following verdict against himself: "1 amjustly killed with mine 
own treachery" (5.2.337). He says this once he realizes that he and Hamlet have 
exchanged rapiers. Laertes is now holding the blunt foil and Hamlet is holding the sharp, 
poisoned sword, the "treacherous instrument ... Unbated and envenomed" (5.2.347-48). 
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This exchange of weapons has, of course, been discussed by interpreters a great deal. 
But, to my knowledge, nobody has in this connection drawn attention to a subtle but 
relevant difference between current idioms involving the word "foil" and early modem 
idioms involving the same word. While we still sometimes speak of foiling plots or 
villains, or ofbeing foiled (for example, Oil Can Harry's line-"Curses, foiled again!"-
still gets quoted), the early modem idiom "to take (or give, receive, or have) the foil" 
seems to have fallen out of use. The relevant definition given by the OED for "foil" as a 
noun reads as follows: "A repulse, defeat in an onset or enterprise; a baftling check. 
arch. In eady use often in phrases: to give a or the foi!, to have, receive, ta/œ a (the, 
one's foi/); to put to (a, the) foil" (n2 def. 2). 
The idiom "give the foil" appears in Shakespeare in 1 Henry VI. Near the end of 
the play, when things are looking bad for the French, Joan puzel summons up sorne 
fiends, and tries to enlist their help. When it seems that they will not help, she says, 
Cannot my body nor blood sacrifice 
Entreat you to your wonted furtherance? 
Then take my soul-my body, soul, and all-
Before that England give the French the foil. (5.2.41-44) 
For the sake ofthose who are especially particular about these things, however, 1 want to 
note that William Shakespeare himself May not have been responsible for the inclusion of 
the phrase "give ... the foil" here. IHenry VIis likely a collaborative work-and notjust 
in the broad sense in which we might call aIl Shakespearean plays "collaborative." 
Rather, this play was probably the work of more than one playwright. But, be that as it 
May, "giving! having! taking! receiving the foil" idioms would certainly have been 
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familiar to Shakespeare's first audiences, and 1 want to suggest that these now-obsolete 
phrases are literalized in the exchange ofrapiers in the last scene of Ham/et (Act 5, scene 
2). 
Consider again the structure of the exchange. Of the two rapiers in play in the 
fencing match, one is a foïl and the other is not. Hamlet takes a foi! from the selection 
Osric offers at the beginning of the match. The sword that Laertes takes is not a foil. But 
then, with the exchange of rapiers, Laertes literally takes the foi!. When the exchange is 
to be performed, many options are, of course, available to actors and directors. Clearly, 
though, if a performance is going to follow the textes) at all closely, the actors playing 
Hamlet and Laertes will enact a mutual foïling. Both characters take the foU, figuratively 
and literally. Once Hamlet has literally taken the foH, and Laertes in turn has as well, the 
Laertes-Claudius pact dissolves. Laertes confesses his treachery, discloses the details of 
the plot, and (in Q2 and F) declares, "the King, the King's to blame" (5.2.351). Then 
Hamlet finally kills the king. 
As 1 have noted, Hamlet's rashness in Act 5, scene 2 is often contrasted with his 
earlier hesitation. Without wishing to contest that way of looking at the character's 
behaviour, 1 want to suggest that the action-packed final scene can also be regarded as a 
repetition of something that happens a number oftimes elsewhere in the play. As we will 
see in detail further on, both Hamlet and his adversaries attempt at various points to know 
another character without being known. The play tends to develop this theme in terms of 
22 In light of Patricia Parker's detailed treatntent, in her "Black Hamlet: Battening on the Moor," of the 
"preoccupation," in aIl three early texts of the play, with "sullying, soiling, or fouling" (137), the meanings 
of "foil" that associate it with "foui" (i.e., "foui, defile, pollute" for the verb, "stigma" for the noun) look 
very worthy of attention in connection with Hamlet; indeed, 1 am convinced that the fencing scene should 
be considered in relation to the whole network ofterms related to staining, contaminating, etc. that Parker 
describes. 
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figurative language of striking and offending; characters are represented as, so to speak, 
trying to strike or to offend in situations in which they cannot be struck or offended. The 
fact that the fencing match is set up so that one player has a sharp sword and the other has 
a blunt one can be connected to this pattern. 
The name for the sport of "fencing" is, according to the OED, derived from the 
word "defence" (as in Claudius's flattering comment about the visiting Frenchman who 
gave Laertes "such a masterly report! For art and exercise in yOuf defense,/ And for yOuf 
rapier most especial" (4.7.109-11». The verb "to fence" cornes from the noun "fence" 
which is, in turn, according to the OED, an "aphetic" form of "defence" ("fence," n.). 
(An "aphetic" form of a word is one that has lost a short unaccented vowel). 
Nevertheless, defen- words (defend, defence, etc.) appear far less frequently in Ham/et 
than do offen- words (offend, offence, offending, etc.). The defen- words appear a total 
of five times in Q2 and fOUf times in F, whereas the offen- words appear thirty times in 
Q2 and twenty-six times in F. The relative frequency of the offen- words versus the 
defen- words is significant, 1 think, as both Claudius and Hamlet seem often to be of the 
opinion that the best defence is a good offence. 
Indeed, one thing that the exchange of rapiers and the mutual foiling can do is to 
make us think about whether or to what extent Hamlet's ways of standing and moving in 
relation to his adversaries are symmetrical with his adversaries' ways of standing and 
moving in relation to him. 1 contend that, especially between the "mighty opposites" 
(5.2.69) (Le., Hamlet and Claudius), tbis play depicts a kind of symmetry of approaches 
and attitudes when it cornes to ways of thinking about, knowing, and relating to people. 
One of the purposes of this chapter is to show a way of thinking about what implications 
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this symmetry has when understood in the context of what Hamlet says about his own 
interiority (1 consider this symmetry to be a part ofwhat 1 have previously referred to as 
the "repetition theme"). Hamlet's insistence that he has "that within which passes show" 
(1.2.88) may he seen as, at least in part, a defence against the threatening possibility that 
he could be subject to striking and unpacking; that is, it may be considered a defence 
against the possibility that whatever he thinks of as private could be touched, and brought 
out as if from a container-from the centre of his heing to the outside. That he defends 
himself against the possibility that other characters might do this to him is something of a 
commonplace in Hamlet criticism. 1 want to suggest that, in addition, it can make sense 
to say that Hamlet defends against the possibility that he could do this to himself. And 1 
will suggest too that this thing 1 say he's afraid of is exactly what he tries to do to others. 
1 should at this point note that to say that something literalizes an idiom is not 
necessarily to say that it returns to the idiom's true origins. Indeed, in this case, "to give 
(or receive, take, or have) the foil" does not seem to have been originally based on a 
metaphor from fencing. The noun in "give the foil" and the verb in Oil Can Harry's 
"foUed again!" share the same etymology. They both come from the Old French verb 
fuler,foler,fouler, meaning "to full cloth, to tread, trample down, press hard upon, crush, 
oppressIf ("foH," OED VI, n2). According to the OED, in wrestling "to give (a person) the 
foil" used to mean something quite specific. A "foil" was "[t]he fact ofheing almost 
thrown; a throw not resulting in a flat faIl" (n2 def. 1). In fencing, of course, a "foil" is 
not any kind offaU, or near faH, but rather a sword. "Foil" in this sense may not come 
from the same root as "foil" in the wrestling sense; the etymology of "foïl" in the fencing 
" 
sense is obscure ("foïl," OED nS). 
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But, in this connection, it's worth considering Gordon Williams's entry for "foil" 
in his Dictionary of Sexual Language and Imagery in Shalœspearean and Stuart 
Literature. The entry shows how the wrestling "foïl" could in the period overlap with 
other "foils," homonyms that modem dictionaries treat as separate, etymologically 
distinct words. One "foïl" homonym means "a thin metal backing to set off a precious 
stone" (Williams 522). Another ofthe homonyms is "foïl" meaning "stigma" (Williams 
522); according to the OED, this "foil," like the related verb "foil" meaning "to fouI, 
defile, pollute,,,22 is "[i]nfluenced by 'foul'" (n2 def. 2b; vI def. 6). Williams gives an 
example from Marlowe in which there are three, or possibly even four, senses of "foïl" 
involved (these are senses that a modem reader would usually consider distinct). In The 
Jew of Malta Barabas caUs his daughter "a diamond that ... ne'er was foil'd" (2.3.57, qtd. 
in Williams 522). According to Williams, "laid out for inspection" is one meaning of 
"foil'd" in this context (522). The OED, as he notes, cites this as its earliest example of 
"foil" in the sense of a backing for a gem; Williams adds, however, that "the overlying 
idea is that the girl is free from stigma" (522). Williams also cites a number of examples 
in which the standard wrestling sense of "foil" is used metaphorically to mean "sexual 
faU" (521); he notes that this sense too is in play in the above cited example from 
Marlowe: the girl in question has never been "sexually thrown" (522). "Foiling" could 
also mean "fencing"-a sense that is clearly in play in another one of Williams's 
examples. Here a foH is simultaneously a sword and a penis, and associations of 
"foiling" with fouling (foH as filth), and probably falling (foil as defeat) and filling come 
out too: "Rowlands, Letting of Humours Blood (1600; 1.15) uses the figure of a fencing 
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thrust when a man returns from France 'filthy full of French, In single combat, being hurt 
by chaunce, As he was closely foyling at a Wenchtll (Williams 522). 
So, as we can see, the examples Williams includes in his dictionary entry nicely 
illustrate that important quality of early modem English described by Margreta de Grazia 
in her article on ttHomonyms before and after Lexical Standardization. tt As de Grazia 
puts it, ttphonetic overlappings" that to us tend to look like ttaccidental quirks" could, in 
the early modem period, be treated as ttintegral to language, directing and encouraging 
associations that made sense" ("Homonyms" 155). De Grazia's argument has significant 
implications for interpreters of early modem texts, because if we accept what she says, 
then we have to leam to think differently about the kind of sense that wordplay in these 
texts can make. Clearly, sorne early modem texts do more than others with their 
language's tendency to yield up complex and flexible associations between "farflung 
cognates and unlike1y kintt (de Grazia, ttHomonyms" 146). Most notably, for my present 
purposes, certain Shakespearean texts make such associations do serious intellectual 
work. In the case of The Winter's Tale, a text she discusses in her ftHomonyms" article, 
de Grazia stresses that wordplay is "not marginal but pivotai both to the structure and 
importft of the play (148). Patricia Parker, too, develops a closely related argument, 
though in greater detail, in her book Shakespeare from the Margins. With her careful 
readings of numerous texts, Parker has probably done more than anyone eise to give 
Shakespearean wordplay its due. 
And one thing this means is that, for her, a so-called pun is not a decoration. 
Sorne critics who consider Shakespearean wordplay to be more or less decorative 
disapprove of it, while others find that it enhances the works, even if it does not convey 
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meaning. As de Grazia notes, for Samuel Johnson, famously (or infamously), "quibbles" 
are a very bad habit ofShakespeare's: they are his "fatal Cleopatra" (Johnson 429; qtd. in 
de Grazia, "Homonyms" 150). At the other end of the spectrum, as de Grazia also notes, 
for a critic like Stephen Booth, networks of homonyms in Shakespeare have a purely 
aesthetic function, but that's not, according to him, a bad thing: "Reason not the need," 
he says (Booth 66; qtd. in de Grazia, "Homonyms" 148). But if critics from the 
eighteenth century onward have tended to regard so-called puns as basically 
embellishments, Parker shows the contribution they make to the plays' simultaneously 
aesthetic and intellectual richness. 
With aIl this in mind, we will return to the last scene of Ham/et; we'll again 
consider the mutual foiling of Laertes and the prince. It certainly has more than one 
aspect to it. The enacted, literalized giving! taking of the foil is one aspect but, as the 
gesture is enacted, "farflung cognates" of "foil" are also in play. Hamlet himselfplays 
with the word "foil" when, as the match is about to begin and the two characters are about 
to choose their swords, he says, "l'Il be your foil, Laertes; in mine ignorance/ Your skill 
shaH, like a star i' th' darkest night,/ Stick fiery off indeed" (5.2.272-74). So, the idea, 
frequently taught in high schools, that Ham/et features pairs of character "foils" (Hamlet 
and Laertes, Hamlet and Fortinbras, Claudius and Old Hamlet, Gertrude and Ophelia ... ) 
is in fact, at least in the case of the Hamlet-Laertes pair, suggested by the main character 
as he plays on the word "foïl" meaning both "practice sword" and "backing for a gem.,,23 
23 Jacques Lacan discusses this bit of wordplay at some length. His discussion culminates as follows: 
"Hamlet's pun touches the immediate question ... : the distribution of the weapons. He says to Laertes, 'l'Il 
be your foil.' And, sure enough, what will appear a moment later but the very foil that wounds him 
mortally and that also will permit him to complete bis circuit and to kill both his opponent and the king, the 
final object ofhis mission. In thls pun there lies ultimately the identification with the mortal phallus" (34). 
It's always difficult to respond to Lacan, but 1 hope l'm not being too obtuse if 1 point out that he doesn't 
seem to realize that a "foil" is, by definition, a practice sword. There is only one foil in play in Hamlet's 
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It's probably also worth thinking about what the mutual foiling might have to do with 
"fouling." Recall that Hamlet and Laertes both break the normal mIes of a gentlemanly 
fencing match: they fouI each other. Someone has to be called upon to intervene when 
the match degenerates into a brawi ("Part them. They are incensed" (5.2.331». And 
then, in the end, when Laertes and the prince have each taken the foil and Hamlet has 
killed the king, the "foui practice" (5.2.348), the "shuftling" (4.7.156) (as Claudius calls 
it) with the foils has failed. 
When he is introducing to Laertes the idea of the fencing match plot, Claudius 
promises to "work [Hamlet]/ To an exploit, now ripe in my devicej Vnder the which he 
shall not choose but fall" (4.7.71-73}-a passage which may be worthjuxtaposing with 
another passage, this one from the beginning of the play's last scene in the Q2 (1605) 
version. Speaking to Horatio, Hamlet says: 
Our indiscretion sometime serves us weIl 
When our deep plots do faIl, and that should learn us 
There's a divinity that shapes our ends, 
Rough hew them how we will. (TLN 3507-1 oi4 
At the end of the play aIl the main characters faIl, and aIl the plots fall. As George T. 
Wright puts it, ''No one's plot entirely succeeds. The great employers of agents-
Claudius, Hamlet, Polonius, Laertes-all see their plans go awry and come to grief' 
fencing match. and it's the one that doesn't wound anybody. The other sword, the fatal one, is "unbated," 
and therefore not a foll. 
24 The 1604 ("uncorrected") Q2 bas "pail" instead of "fall." F has "paule." In this instance 1 have quoted 
from the Kliman-Bertram Three-Text Ham/et, which, for its Q2 text, follows the 1605 Q2. 1 have 
modernized the spelling in the quoted passage. Most recent editions (including Mowat-Werstine) print 
"pail," not "fall." Q3 (1611) has "faII," and a number of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century editions (for 
example, Pope, Furness) printed "fail." A search ofEarly English Books Online reveals that "fall" and 
"fail" could be synonyms in early modem English. 
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(180). As for indiscretion serving us well, the "divinity that shapes our ends," and, 
generally, Hamlet's "rashness" in Act 5 and what he has to say about it-we will come 
back to these matters. We will especially want to consider again Hamlet's own rationale 
for going through with the fencing match. 
First, though, we return to explicit questions about Ham/et interpretation. 
Specifically, the next subsection pursues further discussion of interpreters' imagined 
topographies, and interpreters' ways of standing and moving in relation to the play and in 
relation to each other. We will also consider further reasons for which it may be a good 
idea to come at questions about characters' choices via discussion of wordplay, and 
especially wordplay involving postural! gesturallanguage. 
"Edified by the Margin" 
Now, when a reader of a text starts out by glossing words and phrases, 
particularly when that involves explaining the meanings andl or resonances that these had 
in an earlier period, he or she may be doing what Parker calls a reading "from the 
margins." What margins? WeIl, fust of aIl, the margins metaphor "evokes early modem 
texts such as the Geneva Bible, which facilitated translation into plainer English through 
their marginal glosses" (parker, Margins 15). Of course, modem editions of 
Shakespeare, too, usually include marginal glosses (sometimes along the side of the page, 
but more often along the bottom, in footnotes). Glosses on, for example, "packing" in its 
early modem senses, appear in most editions of Ham/et. And, while 1 have never seen 
the phrase "take the foïl" mentioned in the margins of any edition, a gloss on the phrase 
could, in my view, make for an illuminating footnote to Act 5, scene 2. 
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So then, since my reading of this play will proceed from detailed examination of 
unfamiliar words and idioms back to more sustained discussion of the main body of the 
text, could 1 have called this chapter something along the tines of "Ham/et from the 
Margins," by analogy with Shakespeare /rom the Margins, the title ofParker's 1996 
book? That would, of course, have been an obnoxious move on my part-self-
aggrandizing and a kind of disrespectful appropriation. But that's not aIl. It would also 
be a potentially misleading title, as there are, in addition to important points of contact, 
also important divergences between my ways of reading and Parker's. The phrase "from 
the margins" really has a multi-dimensional meaning for her--one 1 want to unpack 
before 1 proceed any further with my discussion of "unpacking" in Ham/et. 
As Parker points out in her introduction, her title alludes to a tine from Ham/et. 
The character (Osric) who delivers the invitation to the fencing match has a remarkably 
pretentious way of speaking. He will not use an ordinary word when he can think of a 
fancier, more obscure one. Hamlet and Horatio give him grief about this habit. For a 
while (in Q2 and in modem editions that follow Q2 here) Hamlet does a mocking 
imitation of the puffed-up courtier's speech. Then, (in all versions) when Osric informs 
him of the details of the king's bet, and goes on to describe, in his very affected way, the 
special features of the weapons and accessories that are among the objects wagered, the 
prince demands that he be plainer. Osric has said that "Three of the carriages, in faith, 
are very dear to fancy, very responsive to the hilts, most delicate carriages, and ofvery 
liberal conceit" (5.2.163-66), but what on earth are "carriages" supposed to be in this 
context? "What calI you the 'carriages'?" (5.2.167), Hamlet asks-at which point Horatio 
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inteIjects with: "1 knew you must be edified by the margent25 ere you had done" 
(5.2.168-70). 26 
Clearly then, Parker's title almost echoes Horatio's words-almost, but not 
exactly. Parker slightly alters the line in order to make it more fully applicable to her 
own multi-dimensional project. "By the margent! margin" becomes "from the margins" 
in her title. The latter version implies, or at least tends toward implying, a trajectory in a 
way that Horatio's version does not: from the margins to somewhere. Parker also 
changes the singular "margin" to the plural "margins." This change makes sense because 
her book is concemed with several difIerent, yet interrelated, kinds ofmarginality, 
several difIerent "margins" (sorne are "margins" in a more highly figurative sense than 
others). In addition to the marginal glosses in books, Shakespeare from the Margins also 
concems itself with marginalized Shakespearean plays (plays not terribly often studied or 
performed), and with marginalized scenes in more canonical Shakespearean plays (scenes 
25 Q2 has "margent"; many modem editions print "margin." F does not contain this line at aIl, and neither 
does QI. Hibbard's Oxford edition is slightly quirky on this point. While it uses F as the control text, and 
therefore usually omits Q2-only passages (or, rather, it relegates them to an appendix), it does print in the 
main body of the text the bit about needing to be edified by the margin. For whatever reason, Hibbard is 
unwilling to exclude the line, despite bis professed intention to follow F. Hibbard does in his section on 
"Editorial Procedures" explain that in bis text "[o]missions from F which are obviously accidental. .. are, of 
course, supplied from Q2" (131). But this-the question ofwhat's "obviously accidental"-is exactly the 
kind of matter on which editors ofthis play can never consistently agree. This gives us a hint as to why no 
two modem editions are ever the same. Wells and Taylor, whose editorial procedures for Ham/et are 
generally similar to Hibbard's, apparently did not feel that the omission from F of the line about edification 
by the margin was "obviously accidentaI": they exclude it. 
26 Osric's gloss on "carriages"-"The carriages, sir, are the hangers" (5.2. 170}--may clear things up for 
HamIet and Horatio, but modem readers usually require still further "edification by the margin," a gloss on 
the gloss. What are the "hangers"? Modem editions commonly include a note explaining that "hangers" 
were part of the apparatus that hung a gentleman's sword at his side. Hibbard explains that "The rapier was 
attached by hangers, i.e. straps, to the gird/e, i.e. belt" (341n). Charles Edelman, for bis part, offers a 
further gloss on the modem editor's usual gloss on Osric's gloss! Observing that "[i]t is widely understood 
that virtually every implement associated with fencing serves as a bawdy allusion somewhere in 
Shakespeare's plays," Edelman, although he acknowledges that "it would do weIl to bear in mind Freud's 
warning that sometimes a cigar is just a cigar," suggests that "bangers" are testicles ("Bawdy" 22). He 
offers an example from Mallory in which the word is more clearly used in that sense (Edelman, "Bawdy" 
22-23). 
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often overlooked by readers and cut by theatre directors). Equally or more importantly, 
Parker's book deals with the plays' depiction and discussion of marginalized members of 
society (people with little access to power, whether because of their gender, race, social 
rank, geographical origin, etc.). And another related issue is Parker's careful 
differentiation ofher work from that of "formalist" critics. She explains that, although 
she shares with such critics an interest in close, detailed examination of the plays' 
language, she emphatically does not share their tendency to treat questions about 
historical context as marginal matters. Parker handles all of these various marginalities at 
once, and the result is a unique accomplishment. 
The basic move, however-the critic's attempt to shift to the centre of attention 
something that had previously been perceived as marginal-had, weIl before Parker's 
book appeared, been explicitly described by Kermode in his 1985 Forms of Attention as 
the'necessarily recurring gesture on which interpretive renewal, "alteration of the current 
course oftraditional commentary," (36) depends. According to Kermode, "there must be 
new appraisals"-always, in every generation, new appraisals---of a canonical work like 
Ham/et "and they will be possible only so long as new relations, new adjustments of 
center and margin, are perceived in the play and given licit expression in commentary" 
(37). "It may be," he adds, "that to be conscious ofthis state of affairs is to recognize an 
element of play in aIl commentary" (37). He describes his own "Cornelius and 
Voltemand: Doubles in Ham/et" as "a kind of scherzo, not quite a joke but a self-
consciously extravagant and fallible exercise" (xiii). It's important to note, though, that 
for many of the most intluential Shakespeare critics playfulness and importance are not 
mutually exclusive. This is certainly the case for Kermode, and pretty clearly for Parker 
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as weIl. Kermode compares the work of literary critics with that of the early rabbis who. 
he argues. recognized "an element ofplay" in what they did, "without supposing for a 
moment that what they were doing wasn't serious; the most serious thing in the world. in 
fact" (37). He points out too that "the hermeneutical guidelines or middot of the early 
rabbis were not merely restrictive; they gave one useful tips about how to achieve new 
interpretations" (37). He then suggests that the following could he considered a kind of 
middot for literary criticism: "what has been thought marginal may belong more properly 
to the center" (37). 
Based on the argument in Forms of Attention, it may even be fair to say that for 
Kermode every one of the most important interventions in the playful-yet-serious 
ongoing conversation about Shakespeare is in a sense a "Shakespeare from the Margins." 
Parker's book is, to a more ambitious extent than most, an attempt to reposition readers of 
Shakespeare. After reading the book readers may find that their own positions have 
shifted, and that the plays look somewhat different when seen from the new vantage 
point. Perhaps the most significant change for me came from learning to re-activate the 
interpretive possibilities that come with more flexible ways-inspired by study of pre-
eighteenth-century ways~f thinking about relationships among words. But, for that 
matter, 1 don't particularly like the idea of re-marginalizing anything that Parker de-
marginalizes, though 1 suppose that is a risk l'm running. 
As 1 explained in my introduction, my own intervention in the conversation 
involves a re-consideration of something that Parker marginalizes: i.e., literary criticism 
that focuses on character psychology and! or ethics. Near the beginning of Shakespeare 
!rom the Margins Parker goes out ofher way to insist on her method's incompatibility 
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with character-centred readings. Or, more precisely, she claims that her approach shows 
up such readings as invalid. She asserts that "wordplay itself, of course, ... complicates 
the certainties of characterological integrity or the assigning of a particular speaker's 
intent, operating as it does in ways often independent of any given character's control" 
(Margins 16-17). 1 would point out, however, that this statement is based on a 
conception of character far simpler than, for example, Harry Berger, Jr.'s. His way of 
thinking about Shakespearean characters does not depend on under-theorized notions of 
integrity or agency. Berger has shown that it is possible to discuss the ethical 
implications of characters' words without making the kinds of old-fashioned assumptions 
about which Parker is so cautious. 
What about questions like the following: When a character--Coriolanus, for 
example, or Hamlet-makes a moral argument, what are sorne of the terms he uses, and 
how does his vocabulary work in relation to the language of the rest of the play? He may 
at crucial moments undermine his own moral arguments; if so, how? And if he does 
undermine himself in these ways, does that prove that "character" is pretty much a useless 
concept in the context of discussion of Shakespearean plays? Or, on the contrary, could 
it mean that via engagement with plays like Caria/anus and Ham/et we can have 
interesting conversations about what a moral argument is, and about how and maybe why 
such arguments can go wrong? Parker's remarks in the introduction to Shakespeare fram 
the Margins would seem to preclude such inquiry. In my view, however, her ways of 
dealing with wordplay accommodate themselves well to the exploration of these and 
other questions about Shakespearean characters. It seems possible that Parker is mainly 
concemed to distance herselffrom "Bradleian character criticism" and "the continuing 
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influence oflargely eighteenth-century assumptions about character, chronology, or 
logical consistency as weIl as singularity and authenticity" (Margins 16). She does not 
rai se the possibility of any other kind of criticism that might deal in some preferable way 
with character. But that doesn't mean that there can be no such possibility. 
My Coriolanus chapter showed that wordplay is crucial to the plays' ethical 
dimensions as 1 understand them. 1 dealt with wordplay in the context of a discussion of 
the ethical implications of characters' words. 1 invite readers to consider wordplay in 
relation to the plays' ethical dimensions, and 1 invite readers to consider the ethical 
dimensions as an important part of what makes these plays philosophical art. 1 want to 
re-emphasize, though, that 1 do not want my readers to think that what l'm saying is 
equivalent, basicaIly, to an assertion like "the ethical dimensions are central or basic to 
what the plays essentially are." As Weitz has argued, we misunderstand "the question of 
what is central in a work of art" if we think of it as "a factual question, to be settled by 
looking and apprehending" (34). There are, according to Weitz, "questions about Hamlet 
that can he decided in this way"; however, "[w]hat is the core, or central or spiritual 
reality in Hamlet cannot be decided in this way ... Instead, what we do, when we interpret 
a play, is formulate a hypothesis about what is central and then use this hypothesis to 
c1arify everything else" (34). Weitz asserts that a play has "nothing that is its true 
essence, which we can discover in the light ofits own nature" (34); that's not to say, 
though, that various kinds of truth can't he discovered in various lights. So, 1 intend this 
dissertation as an invitation, as opposed to an answer or a proof; 1 also intend it as, in 
Kermode's sense, an "extravagant and fallible exercise." Or, to use a more postural! 
gestural metaphor, this dissertation is an attempt to encourage readers to re-think the 
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ways they've positioned themselves in relation to the plays, but it's an attempt made with 
the expectation and the hope that further repositionings will keep going on. 
More emphatically than Parker's, much of de Grazia's work could, 1 think, be 
fairly described as an invitation to readers to try to think about what it would mean to 
understand the plays apart from the influence of traditions of author-and-his-works and! 
or character-based psychologizing criticism. At the same time, although she herself does 
not frame it this way, 1 think it's fair to say that sorne ofwhat de Grazia discovers relates 
to the ethical dimensions of the plays. For example, her essay on "Homonyms" deals 
with issues ofrejection and acceptance in The Winter's Tale. The essay brings out the 
ways the play develops these issues in terms of the language of "bearing." De Grazia 
shows a network of connections between the noun "bear" (the animal), "barne" (baby), 
bearing as childbearing, bearing as comportment, and bearing as taking something up. 
She sums up her reading as follows: "the play has reaffiliated farflung cognates and 
unlikely kin, faintly gesturing toward an Edenic classless society and an Adamic univocal 
language" ("Homonymsll 146). This discussion is right up my alley: "bearing" is a great 
example of what 1 like to call postural! gesturallanguage. And it seems clear to me that 
this treatment ofhomonyms in The Winter's Tale thematizes characters' ways of standing 
and moving in relation to other characters. For example, Antigonus is considered in 
relation to the bear that devours him, in relation to the barne he abandons, and in relation 
to the shepherd who takes up the barne. De Grazia focuses on The Winter's Tale for only 
a little over three pages before moving on to address more general issues related to 
homonyms. If someone were to pick up where she leaves otIher discussion of the play, 
he or she would have a number of options, many of which de Grazia herself might not 
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care for. For my part, 1 can't help thinking about the discussion's potential to open up into 
in-depth consideration of the play's exploration of the at once ethical implications of 
characters' "bearings." But that's definitely not de Grazia's angle, nor am 1 saying that it 
oughtto be. 
De Grazia's approach has a number of advantages. For one thing, it allows her to 
"demonstrat[e]," as Juliet Fleming puts it, "sorne of the things that we cannot learn from 
Shakespeare's plays as long as we take their central characters and concems to be those of 
modernity" (par. 7). According to Fleming, de Grazia shows us that, until we learn to 
recognize "the past in itself' (Fleming, par. 6), we will be unable to notice: 1) "the 
different notion ofpersonhood, and its relation to property, knowledge, and the body, that 
governs Shakespeare's assumptions as to what it means to be human"; and 2) "the 
representational codes that govemed the meaning and consequence of early seventeenth-
century drama" (Fleming, par. 7). By comparing samples of post-1800 criticism of 
Hamlet with earlier responses to the play, de Grazia brings out important differences in 
emphasis. She draws her readers' attention to blind spots in the post-1800 critical 
tradition, and offers a corrective. 
"Why does Hamlet delay?" is, in de Grazia's account, the "question of questions" 
("Hamlet's Thoughts," par. 4) for Hamlet criticism beginning with Coleridge. Her article 
on "Hamlet's Thoughts and Antics" argues that tI[i]t is the question ... that makes the play 
modem, and that keeps it so" (de Grazia, "Hamlet's Thoughts," par. 4). In a passage that 
tends toward satire, she writes: 
Hamlet's psyche has proven phenomenally receptive to new theories, 
accommodating reams ofthem for 200 years now. In no small part the appeal 
of the approach lies in the simplicity of its hermeneutic format: its fill-in-the-
blank structure. 'Why does Hamlet delay?' 'He delays because of ---' and-
eureka!-you have the answer to Hamlet's character which is also the key to 
the entire play (for the play is his character), as weIl as a new way of 
constituting the emergence of the modem period that in tum guarantees its 
fresh relevance. (de Grazia, "Hamlet's Thoughts," par. 4) 
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According to de Grazia, "[w]hat we have after I800 ... is a long tradition offinding the 
most recent modem understanding of consciousness in the answer" to the "question of 
questions"; Hamlet's much discussed interiority "is constantly being reconfigured in light 
of more avant-garde understandings of subjectivity" (de Grazia, "Hamlet's Thoughts," 
par. 4). She calls on Shakespeareans to escape this absurdity by returning to an emphasis 
on plot and genre, rather than on character and consciousness. 
There's plenty to satirize in the tradition of Hamlet criticism. Anyone who sets 
out to add to the huge amount of writing that has been done about this play needs to be 
able to laugh at him- or herse If, as well as at certain aspects of the tradition. De Grazia's 
point about the fill-in-the-blank structure of a lot of Hamlet criticism strikes me as very 
apt. l'm not sure, however, that her own essay is itselffree ofthis tell-tale sign. 
Although she does not set out to answer the "why does Hamlet delay" question, "Hamlet's 
Thoughts and Antics" does hinge on another very belaboured question-i.e., "what's 
central in Hamlet?" In Weitz's survey of Hamlet criticism up to the late 1950s this is 
exactly the question that shows up again and again. Critics of different stripes answer the 
question differently, of course, but for an important group of the critics discussed by 
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Weitz,27 the place to look for the answer to the "what's central" question is the available 
evidence of what was thought to be central to the play in Shakespeare's own time. 
Likewise, for de Grazia, the basis upon which her "plot and genre" answer to "what's 
central?" is to be preferred over answers that have to do with Hamlet-the-tormented-
thinker is, simply, that there is no evidence that the character's thinking was accorded that 
much importance before 1800. For my part, 1 maintain that criticism that privileges past 
audiences over CUITent ones is valuable to the extent that it can make us see things about 
the play, and about our own assumptions, that otherwise would remain invisible. 
1 do not, however, think that it is in any way obvious that the real or best Ham/et 
should necessarily be a seventeenth-century Ham/et. Many kinds of interpretations can 
bring out interesting aspects of the play, and teach us about interpretation itself. And, 
although "Hamlet's Thoughts and Antics" is not particularly clear on this point, de Grazia 
elsewhere stresses that we have no way of completely escaping our tendency to 
modernize Shakespeare in one way or another?8 There is no way of making direct 
contact with a seventeenth-century Ham/et. Ifwe keep this important caveat in mind, 
then it can make sense to regard historicist readings as invitations to us to work, to the 
extent that we can, against our tendency to modernize. But valuing this kind of 
exercise-because it helps denaturalize our experience of our own social world, for 
example, or because of a number of other possible reasons--does not require us to accept 
that whatever was thought to be central to Ham/et in Shakespeare's time is more truly 
central than what Coleridge, for example, considered central. Weitz seems to me to be 
27 This is Weitz's group of "historical critics." It includes five people whose work Weitz treats in sorne 
detail. These critics are: J. M. Robertson, E. E. Stoll, Levin Schücking, Theodore Spencer, and Lily 
Campbell. See Weitz 44-94. 
28 See, for example, "Materiality" 282. 
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right about Itthe question of what is central in a work of art": it just doesn't make sense to 
think of it as the kind of question to which any interpretive intervention can give a single 
correct answer. 
OtTence and Defence 
And so now we retum to the fencing match, not to look for a single answer to the 
"what's central" question, but intending nevertheless, in the spirit of play, to bring certain 
aspects of Hamlet to the centre of attention. As l've said, 1 think questions about the 
choices that the main character makes in the final scene can be approached via analysis of 
language throughout Hamlet that connects up to the fencing scene. In the ItPlotting and 
Foiling" subsection 1 brought into focus the ways in which Act 5, scene 2 highlights 
symmetries and repetitions in the prince's relationships with his adversaries. Now here 1 
will again pick up that theme, but 1 will aIso show in more detail what fencing in Hamlet 
has to do with Cavell's favourite theme (which earlier 1 awkwardly called the Ittheme of 
knowing")-that is, the theme that evolves through characters' attempts to know others, 
their attempts to know themselves, and their attempts to avoid being known by others. 
One of the fust things to note in this connection is the fact that "fencing" is one of 
a number of important words in this play that share the Latin rootfendere, "to strike." 
Such words include "offend," "offended," "offender's," and "offence." The words 
"defend" and "defence" also appear. And, in the gravedigger's hilarious routine in Act 5, 
there's the pseudo-Iegalese phrase, "se ojJèndendo,"29 "in self-offense," by which the 
29 "Se offendendo" is found in F only. Where F has "It must be Se offendendo, it cannot bee else," Q2 has 
!fIt must be so offended, it cannot be els" (TLN 3198). Modem editors usually follow F here. Q2's reading 
is, however, intelligible. The gravedigger is talking about the coroner's ruling on Ophelia's death. In F, the 
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character would seem actually to mean "in self-defence." The fendere words repay close 
exarnination, not so much because of the number of times they come up in Hamlet, but 
rather because of where they appear and what they do. As we'll see too, words 
semantically connected to the ftndere group are also important. 1 will point out a number 
of instances in which links to "strike," "strokes," and "strucken" are activated. 
Right from the very beginning, the play links words in the "offend" group to 
characters' attempts to knowand to characters' attempts to strike. Recall the watchmen's 
tirst attempt to interrogate the ghost: 
HORA TIO: What art thOU that usurp'st this time of night 
Together with that fair and warlike form 
In which the majesty ofburied Denmark 
Did sometimes march? By heaven, 1 charge thee, 
speak. 
MARCELLUS: It is offended. 
BARNARDO: See, it stalks away. (1.1.54-60) 
Then note that, when the ghost cornes again a bit later, Horatio again demands that it 
"Stayand speak!" (1.1.153), and he asks Marcellus to try to force it to stay. "Shall 1 
strike it with my partisan?" (1.1.154), asks Marcellus. "Do, ifit will not stand" (1.1.155), 
answers Horatio. But the ghost responds to literai striking the same way it responded to 
the verbal offence: it disappears. 
gravedigger's phrase ffIt must se offendendo" refers to Ophelia's mode of death: she killed herself in self-
defencel self-offence. In Q2, on the other hand, the gravedigger may be understood as saying that there 
would he only one way to defendl offend the coroners decision: "it" in the Q2 phrase ffIt must be 80 
offended" would then refer to the coroners decisioD. 
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Hamlet, of course, has more success with the ghost; it will speak to him. And 
once he has spoken with the ghost, the watchmen want to know the details. But Hamlet 
is, as Horatio points out in the following exchange, riddling and evasive: 
HORA TIO: These are but wild and whirling words, my lord. 
HAMLET: 1 am sorry they offend you, heartily ... 
HORA TIO: There's no offense, my lord. 
HAMLET: Yes, by Saint Patrick, but there is, Horatio, 
And much offense, too. Touching this vision here, 
It is an honest ghost-that let me tell you. 
For your desire to know what is between us, 
O'ermaster 't as you may. (1.5.148-56) 
So, again there is talk of offences and offending. In this case it would seem that Hamlet 
is using these words in at least two or three ways. Since we have been party to his 
conversation with the ghost, we can pick up on the allusion, unintelligible from Horatio's 
point ofview, to Claudius's offence against Old Hamlet. We may also get the sense that 
in this passage Hamlet is implying that the watchmen's "desire to know" is an offence 
against the ghost. If so, Hamlet here protects the ghost from the watchmen's offence in 
two ways. His more straightforward defensive move is his request to the watchmen that 
they "o'ermaster" their "desire to know." His less straightforward defensive move is his 
use of riddling speech in such a way as to protect what he knows. 
Although we are accustomed to think of "offence" and "defence" as c1ear 
antonyms, in Hamlet the opposition between the two terms is by no means always clear. 
1 might say that the opposition collapses, but it is rather that "offence" predominates over 
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and tends very often to take the place of" defence." 1 made reference earlier to the much 
larger number of instances of" offen-" words, both in Q2 and F, as compared to the 
number of instances of "defen-" words. 1 suggested then that Ramlet and Claudius seem 
to believe that the best defence is a good offence. 1 have also already mentioned the 
gravedigger, according to whom Ophelia's right to a Christian burial can only be 
"offended" (defended, he means) on the grounds that she killed herselfin "self-offence" 
(self-defence). Now here, in the part of the exchange in Act 1, scene 5 where Ramlet 
apologizes to the watchmen for the offensiveness of his "wild and whirling words," his 
use of the word "offend" implies that in this context his own offence is his defence 
against other people's attempts to know his business. Of course, we have to note too that 
Ramlet's apology for his offensive! defensive clownishness is itself clownish. And it is, 
in fact, just a bit further on in the same scene that Ramlet explicitly mentions his "antic 
disposition" (1.5.192). We do not necessarily have to take at face value Hamlet's claim in 
Act 1 that his strange behaviour from here on in will be entirely calculated; we should, 
however, take note of the fact that he at least talks about his bearing as something 
defensive, a disguise. The "antic disposition" is something he may "put ... on" (1.5.192), 
he tells the watchmen, and he makes them swear that they will not let on that they "know 
aught of [him]" (1.5.201). 
If 1 were to recast this discussion in Cavellian terros, 1 could say that Act 1 
introduces to us the importance, for this play, ofwhat Cavell in other contexts describes 
as characters' attempts to know and characters' attempts to avoid being known. Further, 
the play's tirst Act uses language of offending and! or striking in developing its treatment 
ofboth types ofattempts. Now we'll see that it is also the case that the language of 
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offending/ striking is extremely important in the middle of Hamlet, and that this language 
continues to be very much involved in the depiction of characters' modes of knowing. 
Remember what Hamlet says at the end of Act 2. There, when he tirst raises the 
possibility of using a play as a trap, he says: 
.. .1 have heard 
That guilty creatures sitting at a play 
Have, by the very cunning of the scene, 
Been struck so to the soul that presently 
They have proclaimed their malefactions. (2.2.617-21) 
And note Claudius's question to Hamlet part way through the play within the play: 
tlHave you heard the argument? Is there no offense in 't?tI (3.2.256-57)--to which 
Hamlet offers the following equivocal response: "No, no, they do butjest, poison in je st. 
No offense i' th' world" (3.2.258-59). Then we again hear the language of "striking" 
when Claudius, who does indeed seem to have been "struck ... to the soul" by the play's 
representation of murder, suddenly rises from his seat. Right after the king rushes out of 
the room, Hamlet sings a song: 
Why, let the strucken deer go weep, 
The hart ungallèd play 
For sorne must watch, while sorne must sleep: 
Thus runs the world away. (3.2.297-300) 
The "strucken deer," clearly, is Claudius. 1 will deal a bit further on with the sense in 
which he's a "deer"; fust 1 want to deal with Hamlet's sense that his uncle has been struck, 
and with Claudius's own sense ofhaving been struck. 
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When Claudius next appears, the play's language again connects striking with 
offending. The king who exits as a "strucken deer" at the end of Act 3, scene 2, reappears 
in the next scene (Act 3, scene 3) and, after a brief interview with Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstem and then a very short exchange with Polonius, speaks a soliloquy that 
begins: "0, my offense is rank, it smells to heaven" (3.3.40). And, in fact, this speech 
uses the word "offense" four times (in Q2 and also in F). Claudius's offence is his crime 
against his brother, clearly. But, by metonymy, this speech also applies the word 
"offence" to otherthings. When Claudius refers to "the visage of offense" (3.3.51), it's 
God's "visage" he's talking about (because God is offended by Claudius's offence). Then 
when he asks, "May one be pardoned and retain th' offense?" (3.3.60), the word "offense" 
refers to the things that he has gained as a result ofhis offence. And then, when he talks 
about "offense's gilded hand" (3.3.62) he is talking about the offender's hand. So, in this 
context, 1 hope it will not seem too far-fetched in suggest that the offence that's "rank" 
may be not only the king's crime against his brother, but also the wound that Hamlet's 
offensive play has left on the king's conscience. The "strucken"f offended Claudius is 
painfullyaware ofhis offence. 
Claudius tries to repent, but he is conflicted: his guilty feelings about his offence 
are opposed by certain defences that "defea[t] [his] strong intent" (3.3.44). He struggles, 
he tries to pray, he asks angels for help. He knows that he is failing, though, to strike 
back with sufficient force against his desire to retain his crown and his queen. He 
imagines "mercy" (presumably "in the person of Christ," as the note in the Mowat-
Werstine edition suggests (l64n)), confronting "the visage of offense" (3.3.51) (i.e., "the 
face of the offended Deity" (Mowat and Werstine 164n)). But he knows there can he no 
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hope of that kind of intervention on his behalf so long as he is unwilling to give up "th' 
offense" (in other words, "those effects for which [he] did the murder" (3.3.58». Still, he 
tries to repent; he orders himself to assume the posture of prayer: "Bow, stubborn knees, 
and heart with strings of steel! Be soft as sinews of the newborn babe" (3.3.74-75). He is 
kneeling when Hamlet enters. 
Then we get Hamlet's abortive decision to kill Claudius. We can infer from 
Hamlet's speech that he goes so far as to draw his sword to strike the kneeling king. The 
play gives us a kind of tableau here: Claudius kneeling, Hamlet standing behind him 
with his sword raised. However, neither the king nor the prince manages to effect the act 
for which his posture, as captured in the tableau, would conventionally stand. As the 
bodily postures in the tableau suggest, the king is vulnerable, and the prince has the 
advantage. But then, as Hibbard notes, "there can be no question that the Prince as he 
makes his exit [at the end of the scene] has lost the advantage that was his when he 
entered. He has allowed the initiative to pass to the King" (270n). In a sense, the two 
characters trade places. 
There are, as we aIl know, various ways oftalking about what the "something" is 
that prevents Hamlet from kiIling Claudius. But most, if not aIl, justifiable ways of 
describing what's going on in this part of the play would involve sorne notion of "inner 
conflict": we could say that both characters have a kind of inner fighting at this crucial 
point (as Hibbard notes (270n), Act 3, scene 3 is exactly at the centre of Hamlet), and that 
in each case the play develops the conflict in terms (both verbal and bodily) that have 
something to do with striking. Hamlet almost strikes Claudius with his sword, but 
doesn't; Claudius almost repents, but doesn't. With Hamlet it is a literaI striking that he 
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fails to do, in spite of a part ofhimselfthat wants to do it. With Claudius it is a figurative 
striking, which, though he may attempt it, is not strong enough to defeat his inclination to 
"retain th' offense." 
Here is a question to keep in mind: What relationship does the enacted sword 
fighting at the end of the play have to the fighting that goes on within each of these two 
characters here at the centre of Hamlet? The prince and the king are pitted against each 
other throughout the play, obviously, and we could say that the rmal fencing match 
reflects the pattern oftheir repeated attempts to strike at each other. 1 want to show too, 
however, that Act 3, scene 3 suggests that the language of striking and offending in this 
play is relevant not only to characters' ways of thinking about and dealing with each 
other, but also to characters' attempts at ethical reflection. We will have cause to retum 
to this issue. 
Meanwhile, in connection with the issue of characters' approaches to other· 
characters, one of the most important scenes to consider is Act 3, scene 4. This is the 
famous "closet scene" in which Hamlet confronts his mother. Here again, striking and 
offending figure prominently. As we'll see, it's easy to draw connections between the 
strikingl offending motif that we have seen elsewhere in the play and the same motif as it 
is developed in this scene. Significantly, the tirst thing Gertrude says to her son in this 
scene is: "Hamlet, thou hast thy father much offended" (3.4.14); Hamlet then replies: 
"Mother you have my father much offended" (3.4.15). He is determined to force her to 
confront her own offence. For her part, she makes it clear early on in the scene that he 
offends her by failing to behave respectfully: "Why, how now, Hamlet? .. Have you 
forgot me?" (3.4.16-18), she asks. 
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Both the mother in Act 3 and the ghost in Act 1 make an issue of forgetting and 
remembering. Forgetting the parent is offensive; if the parent is offended, it may have 
something to do with someone's forgetfulness. And we may get the sense, both from 
Ramlet's exchange with Gertrude in Act 3 and from the watchmen's attempted exchange 
with the ghost in Act 1 (a vaguer sense, perhaps, in the watchmen's case), that the 
interlocutor's offence against the parent is not a matter of just forgetting or failing to 
observe sorne merely arbitrary rules of decorum. Remember, too, that the watchmen seek 
to make the ghost stay still by striking at it. As Marcellus soon realizes, the ghost is "as 
the air, invulnerable" (1.1.160); live mothers are, however, easier to restrain than ghost 
fathers. "You shall not budge," RamIet tells Gertrude, " ... till 1 set you up a glass/ Where 
you may see the inmoseo part ofyou" (304.23-25). Ramlet is able to make his mother 
stay put, and he strikes with harsh words, which Gertrude compares to daggers: "These 
words like daggers enter in my ears./ No more, sweet Ramlet!" (304.108-09). By this 
point in the exchange, the son seems to have discovered something by means of his 
forgetfull offensive use ofhis word daggers. And this is interesting, partly because, 
while forgetting and discovering would seem pretty obviously to be antonyms or near 
antonyms, theyare not always opposites in Hamlet. Well then, what does Ramlet 
discover? Re extracts a confession from his mother: she sees inside herself, she adroits, 
"such black and grained31 spots/ As will not leave their tinct" (304.101-02). 
30 Q2 has "most part" where F has "inmost part" (TLN 2400). Modem editors tend to follow F here. 
31 Q2 has "greeued spots! As willleaue there their tin'ct" where F has "grained spots/ As will not leaue their 
Tinct" (TLN 2466-67). Modem editors tend to follow F here. However, Parker suggests that both versions 
make sense. She argues that "leaue" can suggest "both a stain and its removal" ("Black Ham/et" 130). As 
for "greeued," Parker points out that it "suggests simultaneously the blackness of grieving and the graphic 
or engraved, as in the later figure of the blackened Desdemona as a 'fair paper' inscribed or written on by a 
Moor" ("Black Ham/et" 130). 
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So it would seem that we have come across a major difference, here, between 
HamIet's offensive interview with his mother and the watchmen's with the ghost. The 
watchmen cannot get the information they want by offending the ghost, whereas Hamlet 
does get a confession out ofhis mother. But what exactly do the "black and grained 
spots" represent? As Garber puts it, "These spots are not certainties but gaps, doubts-
what did she do? And why?" (Ghost Writers 134). Did she actively conspire to have her 
first husband killed? Did she commit adultery with Claudius while Oid Hamlet was still 
alive? Not necessariIy. Maybe when Old HamIet was alive she sometimes just thought 
he was boring. Maybe she never did anything worse, but now, because she did 
sometÏmes wish he would go away, she feels disproportionate guilt. Or maybe she did 
something else, thought something else. We know that she feels bad, but we never find 
outwhy. 
Sorne people will be interested in pursuing further speculation about the state of 
Gertrude's conscience. Actors, for instance, may, as part oftheir preparation for the roIe, 
do exercises in which they fill in the blanks in the queen's history. And, indeed, in 
productions of the play sorne Gertrudes are more ambiguous than others. Sorne readers, 
too, are very much inclined toward how-many-children-had-Iady-Macbeth-type 
speculation, and they find that it helps them get more out of the play. Other readers avoid 
this kind of speculation. In any case, though, there is really no evidence, in the familiar 
texts of the play (i.e., texts based on Q2 and! or F), that could ever be invoked to sertIe for 
once and for aIl questions about spots on the queen's soul. In the Q2 and F texts the 
mother remains as elusive, in her own way, as the ghost who "stalks away" when it is 
offended by the watchmen. 
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At this point 1 want to draw attention to what 1 consider a particularly clear link 
between Act 3, scene 4 and the play's final scene. 1 have already explained why 1 see 
good reasons to indicate links between Act 3, scene 4 and other scenes in which the 
strikingl offending motif figures. Now 1 want to show why 1 also see reason to suggest 
that, if we take note of certain specific details, we may want to say that, of all the scenes 
in Hamlet, Act 3, scene 4 has the most definite connection to the fencing in Act 5, scene 
2. This would be because figurative daggers and a literai rapier connect Act 3, scene 4 to 
the rapier-and-dagger fencing match.32 The figurative daggers are, in fact, mentioned 
twice: once by RamIet, and once by Gertrude. When he is on his way to his mother's 
closet, Ramiet promises himseIfthat he will "speak daggers" to her, "but use none" 
(3.2.429). In the event, however, while the "daggers" which, as she says, "enter in [her] 
ears" do remain only figurative, he does use an actual rapier. It's what he uses when he 
kills Polonius by stabbing at him through the arras; this is emphasized, as Gertrude makes 
explicit mention of the instrument when, at the beginning of Act 4, she tells her husband 
what RamIet has done to the old man. 
But what does the link between the confrontation in the closet scene and the 
fencing in the fmal scene do to the play? First of all, on a basic level, it serves to 
emphasize that the fencing match is loaded with meaning, and not or not only with the 
traditional meanings attached to aIl such ritual contests. It highlights the extent to which 
the fencing match repeats things that come up in Hamlet's earlier episodes. We could 
32 Some people (see, for example, Gordon 70; Maguire 192) have suggested that rapier-and-dagger feneing 
had aIready gone out of style by the time ofF's printing (1623), and that there is reason to believe that the 
match at the end of the play would by that time have been performed without daggers. Instead of a dagger, 
eaeh eombatant would have had a gauntlet. 1 would, however, point out that the faet remains that when 
Ramlet asks "What's his [i.e., Laertes's] weapon?" (TLN 3613), Osne, who answers "Rapier and Dagger" 
in Q2 (TLN 3614), in F still says "Rapier and dagger" (TLN 3614). 
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say, because of the specificity of the rapier-and-dagger connection, that Act 3, scene 4 
serves to re-emphasize what would otherwise be a somewhat vaguer relation between the 
strikingl offending motif, which itself appears repeatedly, and the fencing in the last 
scene. 
l'm saying, then, that HamIet's attitudes and actions toward his mother and 
Polonius in the closet scene are relevant to and somehow repeated in the fencing match. 
Further, l'm saying that, in order to understand this repetition better-in order, in other 
words, to get a sense ofwhat the relevance is, and ofhow the repetition works-we need 
also to consider other repetitions, and other links to Hamlefs last scene. Often in this 
play things are repeated not just once, but several times. In this case, 1 want to suggest 
that there are strong similarities between what Hamlet does to Gertrude in Act 3, scene 4 
and what Claudius does to Hamlet elsewhere. There are also strong similarities between 
what Claudius does to HamIet and what HamIet does to Claudius. 
According to Cavell, HamIet's "mode of perception" (Disowning Knowledge 186) 
is radically different from Claudius's and Polonius's. Other critics have made similar 
remarks. 33 l, however, disagree, and 1 want here to stress the importance of parallels 
between HamIet and Claudius. The radical difference that 1 see between these two 
characters has to do with the ways the prince thinks about himself, the ways his language 
works to suggest that his "mode of perception" has a troubling effect on his self-
understanding. In other words, Claudius and Hamlet often have quite similar ways of 
perceiving and relating to other characters-they are both prone to what 1 have called 
"container-and-contents thinking"-but it is oniy in HamIet's speeches that we can 
perceive some of the less immediately obvious implications of these ways of thinking 
33 See, for example, Lawrence Danson, Tragic Alphabet 22-49. 
about and dealing with others. We might say that the reason for the difference is that 
Hamlet is a more profound thinker, and! or that he has more of a conscience than bis 
uncle does. For now, though, that's not where 1 want to put my emphasis. 
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It was, in fact, Hamlet's own language that first led me to think about possible 
paraUels between him and Claudius and, specifically, to think about these parallels in the 
context ofthe fencing match. Significantly, when Hamlet is explaining why he does not 
feel bad about sending Rosencrantz and Guildenstem to their deaths, he compares 
himself and Claudius to sword fighters. "'Tis dangerous," Hamlet says, "when the baser 
nature comes/ Between the pass and feIl incensèd points/ Ofmighty opposites" (5.2.67-
69). Rosencrantz and Guildenstem had no reason to expect that they could interfere 
without getting hit, and they don't matter very much anyway. They are base compared to 
Claudius and Hamlet. The two fighters, for their part, are both aristocratic, and Hamlet 
seems to imply here that Claudius is just as worthy ofhis high status as he bimself is. It's 
an implication which Harold Bloom, by the way, fmds unbearable. Bloom protests that 
"Claudius, the shuffler, is hardly Hamlet's 'mighty opposite,' as Hamlet caIls bim; the 
wretched usurper is hopelessly outclassed by bis nephew" (386). Nevertheless, BIoom's 
objection notwithstanding, the reference to sword fighting in Hamlet's "pass and feIl 
incensèd points/ Of mighty opposites" is not just about aristocratic traditions, although 
such traditions do provide a relevant context. In this play, when we hear about literaI or 
figurative sharp or pointed objects (whether partisans, arrows, daggers, or rapiers), it 
makes sense to tbink about them in the context of the strikingl offending motif. And, as 1 
hope 1 have shown, defending, knowing, and forgetting-in various senses-are aIl 
closely involved in the play's development of tbis motif. 
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Accordingly, for Hamlet to speak ofhimself and his uncle as sword-fighting 
"mighty opposites" is for him to be saying something about the characters' modes of 
knowing and of being known. Both the prince and the king seem to understand 
interiority, and its susceptibility to penetration, in much the same way. In this connection 
it is important to note that "offending" is not orny about striking in this play; it is also 
often about cutting. Rapiers don't just hit; they can also cut, break the skin, and so can 
partisans, arrows, daggers--all the weapons involved in the "offending" motif. Both 
Ramlet and Claudius make attacks on the contents of others' minds and! or hearts. For 
example, Claudius in Act 2 tells Rosencrantz and Guildenstem that he has enlisted them 
to try to figure out "Whether aught to us unknown aftlicts him thus34j That, opened, lies 
within our remedy" (2.2.17-18); he talks as ifRamlet's friends are in effect capable of 
making an incision that will expose the source of the prince's atlliction. It should go 
without saying that the king's expressed hope of curing the atlliction is disingenuous; 
interestingly, though, Ramlet also describes his own methods of interrogation as 
potentially curative, and while, of course, he is not as unambiguously evil as Claudius, 
there is nevertheless something suspect about RamIet when he is working in this mode. 
Think again of the closet scene. Once he has verbally attacked her and literally killed 
Polonius, Gertrude cries, "0 Ramlet, thou hast cleft my heart in twain!" (3.4.177). His 
answer is: "0, throw away the worser part ofit,/ And live the purer with the other half!" 
(3.4 . 178-79}-as if he has given her not offence, but rather surgery. 
But though Ramlet can be quite relentlessly offensive at moments like this, and 
though his determined attempts to know the contents of others' hearts imply that he 
34 This line appears only in Q2. Hibbard, who generally follows F, includes it, however, as do most modem 
editors. 
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believes that inner states can be exposed, he nevertheless insists on the undiscoverability 
ofhis own interiority. Most people will recall this withering response of Hamlet's to his 
mother's questions about why he seems so unwilling to get over his father's death: 
"'Seems,' madam? . .1 know not 'seems'" (1.2.79). Hamlet's speech, his fust of the play, 
then continues: 
'Tis not alone my inky cloak, good mother,35 
Nor customary suits of solemn black, 
Nor windy suspiration of forced breath, 
No, nor the fruitful river in the eye, 
Nor the dejected havior of the visage, 
Together with aIl forms, moods, shapes36 of grief, 
That can denote me truly. These indeed 'seem,' 
For they are actions that a man might play; 
But 1 have that within which passes show, 
These but the trappings and the suits ofwoe. (1.2.80-89) 
Cavell suggests-rightly, 1 think-that, beyond showing his "knowingness about human 
indirection" (Disowning Knowledge 185), Hamlet, when he says he knows not "seems," 
is "making claim to, or laying hold of, a power of perception ... that makes him unable to 
stop at seems" (Disowning Knowledge 186). In other words, the mourning Hamlet cuts 
through other people's forms, moods, and shows. At the same time, however, a hint of 
inconsistency begins to emerge here. Hamlet is defensively claiming that he has "that 
within which passes show" in the same speech in which he gives, as Cavell puts it, a 
35 Q2 has "coold mother" (TLN 258) instead of "good mother." 
36 F has "shewes of Grief' (TLN 263) where Q2 has "chapes of griefe." 
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"preliminary description" (Disowning Knowledge 185) ofhis drive to cut through other 
people's show. 
"In my heart there was a kind of fighting" 
1 said earlier that Hamlet's container-and-contents thinking gives rise to 
tremendous complications. One thing that becomes a problem is the value that he places 
on "that within which passes show." It seems that he becomes horribly tom between a 
desire to grasp and control his feelings and a desire to preserve his interiority. His 
tendency to think ofhimself as a container with contents ends up making these two 
desires conflict with each other. His soliloquy following the performance of one of the 
actors that visit Eisinore is crucially interesting in this regard: 
0, what a rogue and peasant slave am Il 
Is it not monstrous that this player here, 
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion, 
Could force his soul so to his whole conceit 
That from her working aIl his visage wanned,37 
Tears in his eyes, distraction in his aspect, 
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting 
With forms to his conceit-and all for nothing! 
For Hecuba! 
What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba, 
That he should weep for her? What would he do 
Had he the motive and the cue for passion 
37 F bas "wann'd" where Q2 has "wand" (TLN1594). 
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That 1 have? (2.2.577-89) 
An important ambiguity emerges in this passage taken from the beginning of the 
soliloquy, and persists to the end. What is it that's "monstrous": Ramlet's failure to 
manifest his feelings, or the player's ability to get so worked up "for nothing"? There 
seems to be nothing within the actor that is essentially him. Re is just the ability to "force 
his soul." AIso, considering how common it is for Renaissance writers to activate the 
root of "monster"-the Latin monstrare, "to show"-it is likely that there is sorne idea 
here of show as itselfinherently, or at least potentially, always monstrous. So does 
Ramlet recoil from this monstrous show, or does he respond with self-disgust at his own 
inability to match the actor's apparent degree of self-mastery? The prince tends to be 
very disturbed by false appearances, and so he is troubled by the actor's convincing 
acting. But, by failing to act on his feelings, he makes his own appearances false too. 
The answer to my question, then, is both: RamIet finds the actor sort of monstrous, and 
himself as weIl. We don't need to leave things here, though. If we take a doser look at 
the details of the soliloquy, we can come to a better understanding of the nature of the 
conflict that the speech crystallizes. 
As the speech goes on, Ramlet continues to berate himself: "1,/ A dull and 
muddy-mettled rascal, peak! Like John-a-dreams, unpregnant of my cause,! And can say 
nothing" (2.2.593-96). Rowever, if silence is blameable, so is speech. Hamlet's 
soliloquy continues to gather momentum, but once he really gets going he conderons 
himself for talking too much: 
Why,38 what an ass am Il This is most brave, 
38 F bas "Who?" where Q2 has "Why" (TLN 1623). 
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That 1, the son of a dear father39 murdered, 
Prompted to my revenge by heaven and hell, 
Must like a whore, unpack my heart with words 
And fall a-cursing like a very drab (2.2.611-15) 
A fear of losing something which, we will recall, he has publicly insisted that he has-
Le., "that within which passes show"-becomes a major implicit issue here. 1 want to 
stress that the "1 know not 'seems'" speech in Act 1 is not a soliloquy; Hamlet is speaking 
there to his mother and Claudius, and thus it may make sense to understand him as 
working hard to conceal an anxiety which may manifest more c1early, or at least 
differently, in soliloquy. In order to understand how such an interpretation would work, 
it is important to note that Hamlet does not contrast outer show and inner truth in exactly 
the same way he contrasted them in his fust ("1 know not 'seems"') speech. The actor, 
"his whole function suitingl With forms to his conceit" has the "forms, moods, shapes/ 
shows of grief." But does Hamlet have on the inside what the actor only shows on the 
outside? 
The prince does not, in fact, simply set up an opposition between the actor's 
empty soul and his own full one here. In part of the speech Hamlet thinks ofhimself as 
empty too--"unpregnant." Later in the speech, when he does think of himself as having 
something inside, Hamlet calls himself a whore. Now, we need to ask why unpacking 
one's heart could be considered a whore-like activity. The line makes sense ifwe think of 
whores as making public something which "should" he private. As well, taken literally, 
unpacking involves taking hold ofthings that are inside a container, bringing them out, 
39 Q2 has "the sonne ofa deere murthered"; F has "the Sonne of the Deere murthered" (TLN 1625). 
Modem editors tend to insert the word "father," which they import from the QI version of the Hne ("the 
sonne of my deare father"). 
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and putting them at a distance from the container. The most successful whores will 
presumably be good at self-remaking, good at viewing themselves as objects and making 
themselves the most attractive objects possible. In this play there is a kind of emptying 
out of subjectivity associated with the attempt to discover, grasp, and control the contents 
of the self. The more Hamlet unpacks his heart, the less he has "within." He sees himself 
as being in a no-win situation: he is either "unpregnant," which is in this context a bad 
thing, or he's a "whore." Hamlet is empty ("unpregnant") if he keeps his feelings inside; 
he is full, but already in the process of emptying himself out ("unpack[ing]"), ifhe 
articulates his feelings. 
But what does all this have to do with the fencing match? How exactly is 
Hamlet's final scene involved with the problematic consequences of container-and-
contents thinking as they are developed in the "rogue and peasant slave" soliloquy? In 
order to see the connection more c1early, we fust need to return to a passage we have 
already considered. Hamlet's musings about" guilty creatures sitting at a play" who have 
"[b]een struck so to the soul that presentlyl They have proclaimed their malefactions" are, 
in fact, part of the "rogue and peasant slave" soliloquy. The long speech fmally cornes to 
a close with Hamlet's often quoted "The play's the thingl Wherein 1'11 catch the 
conscience of the King" (2.2.633-34). As 1 have shown, HamIet's play within the play 
becomes part of the strikingl offending motif. 
Interestingly, the "strucken deer" (remember the song HamIet sings when he sees 
that his play has "struck" Claudius) has a certain kind of presence in the "rogue and 
peasant slave" soliloquy itself, though, as weIll see, it is a presence which sorne editors 
tend to obscure. Where in many modem editions, inc1uding the Mowat-Werstine edition, 
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Hamlet calls himself I1the son of a dear father murdered, Il Q2 has I1the sonne of a deere 
murthered" and F has I1the Sonne of the Deere murthered" (TLN 1624). In their Textual 
Companion Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor point out that Q2 and F "agree on the absence 
of'father' and on the trisyllabic spelling 'murthered.' Moreover, QI 's reading-'I the 
sonne of my deare father'-makes explicit the redundancy of 'father' in any version of the 
Hne" (406). Nor are Wells and Taylor alone in their opinion that the word "father" should 
not be inserted. Philip Edwards's Cambridge edition prints "the son of the dear 
murderèd" (2.2.536). Wells and Taylor also make the important observation that 
"Shakespeare elsewhere regularly puns on deer/ dear, and frequently associates 'deer' 
with 'death'" (406). And, indeed, playon dear/ deer, and also heartl hart, is commonplace 
in Renaissance literature generally. 
In case deer hunting has seemed to be a bit of an odd fit with the cluster of 
postural! gestural terms we have been considering (striking, fencing, packing, unpacking, 
etc.), think about it this way: Deer provide us with another link between the striking/ 
offending motif and "unpacking." Let me explain how the link works. Hamlet, again 
drawing a parallel between himself and ms uncle, talks about both Claudius and himself 
as deer. Not only is Hamlet the son of a deer in at least sorne versions (both recent and 
early) of the "rogue and peasant slave" soliloquy, he is also presumably the "hart 
ungallèd" to Claudius's "strucken deer" in the song he sings following the interruption of 
the play within the play. Apparently, striking someone to the soul and making him 
proclaim his malefactions puts Hamlet in mind of deer. At the end of Act 2, scene 2 the 
prince was berating himselffor "unpack[ing]" ms "hart" (to use the Q2 spelling). In Act 
3, scene 2 the self-condemnatory phrase echoes, but Hamlet defensively reverses "unpack 
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my heart" when he displaces it. Now he is a "hart ungallèd," and it is another deer that 
has been struck, someone else's heart that will be emptied out. An important question to 
ask at this point is: Is Hamlet's decision to strike Claudius to the soul and thus to expose 
the king's secrets a satisfactory resolution to the conflict captured in the "rogue and 
peasant slave" soliloquy? ln this connection it's worth noting that from here Hamiet goes 
on to pass up his best opportunity to avenge his father, and instead makes another attack 
on the contents of someone eIse's heart: he attempts to "wring" his mother's (3.4.43). 
As the "ungallèd" hart, HamIet, the ending ofhis cheerful song about deer 
implies, should be able to sleep well while Claudius is kept up nights by his guilty 
conscience: 
Why, let the strucken deer go weep, 
The hart ungallèd play. 
For sorne must watch, while sorne must sleep: 
Thus40 runs the world away. (3.2.299-300) 
At the beginning of the play's final scene, however, the prince describes to Horatio an 
episode ofinsomniaofhis own-though, admittedly, it is impossible to say, on the basis 
of this notably disjointed passage, what exactly is supposed to be the cause of HamIet's 
insomnia. He is talking here about his time on the ship bound for England: 
Sir, in my heart41 there was a kind of fighting 
That would not let me sleep. Methought42 1 lay 
Worse than the mutines in the bilboes.43 Rashly-
40 F bas "So" instead of "Thus" (TLN 2146). 
41 Q2 has "hart" (TLN 3503). 
42 Q2 has "my thought"; F has "me thought" (TLN 3504). 
And praised44 be rashness for it: let us know, 
Our indiscretion sometime 45 serves us weIl 
When our deep46 plots do pall;47 and that should leam48 us 
There's a divinity that shapes our ends, 
Rough-hew them how we will- (5.2.4-12) 
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The fact that Act 5, scene 2 begins with this reference to "a kind offighting" in Hamlet's 
heart and ends with the fencing match suggests to me that the enacted fighting fullctions 
as, among other things, an extemalization. In other words, my answer to my initial 
question about why Hamlet goes through with the fencing match is that he does it in 
order to attempt to resolve the fighting in his heart. The question remains, however, 
whether or to what extent Hamlet's attempted solution is adequate. Clearly Hamlet's 
attempt to unpack Claudius's and Gertrude's hearts in Act 3 does not resolve much of 
anything. Is the fencing match more satisfactory? In the end 1 think: it depends whether 
or not a given interpreter wants it to be. 
Many theatre practitioners and theatre critics have complained that HamZet's 
fencing match is difficult to stage. It is easy to bungle, and it has a certain tendency to 
look ridiculous.49 Usually people think: that the way to avoid ridiculousness is simply 
43 Q2 has "Bilbo" (TLN 3505). 
44 Q2 has "praysd"; F has "praise" (TLN 3506). 
45 F has "sometimes" (TLN 3507). 
46 F has "deare" where Q2 bas "deepe" (TLN 3508). 
47 Q2 has "fall" (TLN 3508). Also see above, p. 115n. 
48 F has "teach" (TLN 3508). 
49 See, for example, Mills 168. 
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practice, practice, practice; the actors need to develop a considerable degree of polish as 
stage fighters. Or, according to those who believe that the problem is basically that 
modem fencing techniques and equipment are ill-suited to the scene, the solution is for 
aetors and direetors to leam more about Elizabethan fencing techniques specifically.50 
Another response to the possible ridieulousness problem, however, might be to accept or 
even play up the scene's fareical potential. Such an approaeh would fit with Berger's 
view, put forth in the extensive "Acknowledgments" section of Making Trifles ofTerrors, 
that, in Shakespeare, "[h]istorieal vietories and theatrieal closures punetuated by athletie 
swordplay and other conventions that sound the 'music at the close' are often displayed as 
'smooth eomforts false'" (xvii). 
Making Trifles ofTerrors never specifically addresses the Laertes-Hamlet fencing 
match at aIl; nevertheless, Hamlet is implicitly involved in Berger's formulation of this 
idea about "theatrical closures." Berger goes on to invoke Eliot's discussion of the 
"objective correlative," albeit without mentioning that it is in "Hamlet and His Problems" 
that Eliot works with that phrase. Although many people have quoted it out of context, 
and Berger himself does not actually quote it at aIl, the famous passage about the 
"objective correlative" is in fact part of Eliot's attempt to persuade everyone that Hamlet 
is an artistie failure: 
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 
"objective correlative"; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of 
events which shall he the formula of that particular emotion; sueh that when 
the external faets, whieh must termina te in sensory experience, are given, the 
SO See, for example, Jackson 281. 
emotion is immediately evoked ... and this is precisely what is deficient in 
Ham/et. Hamlet (the man) is dominated by an emotion which is inexpressible, 
because it is in excess of the facts as they appear. (Eliot 100-01) 
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Berger, for his part, asserts that "Shakespeare beat Eliot to the punch, that 'objective' in 
Eliot's phrase meant 'inadequate' in the value system of Shakespearean dramaturgy" 
(Making Trifles xviii). In other words, Berger agrees with Eliot that "the external facts" 
in certain Shakespeare plays-unlike Eliot, Berger is not singling out or even mentioning 
Hamlet in particular-may provide inadequate expression or resolution of characters' 
inner conflicts. But that, for Berger, can he precisely the point: 
... the plays represent the coalescence of theatrical and narrative space-time as 
sites of ethical displacement: displacement from "inward wars" of discourse to 
"stem tyrant War," from "unseen grief' to its mere shadows in public grievances 
and "external manners of lament," from a conscience "swoln with sorne other 
grief' to the distracting spectacle of civil and "foreign quarrels." Such 
displacements are represented as conspicuously inadequate to repress or resolve 
latent conflicts. (Making Trifles xvi-xvii) 
Berger argues that an important and artistically successful dimension of many of the 
plays is their development of a "metatheatrical critique of theatrical conditions, a critique 
aimed at the aid and comfort the medium lends to ideologically dubious aspects of 
spectacle, pageantry, and historical narrative" (Making Trifles xvi). 
If we accept Berger's account of "the value system of Shakespearean dramaturgy," 
then we will hear self-deception and "smooth comforts false" in Hamlet's Christian! 
stoical explanation of his decision to go through with the fencing match. Of course, it 
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works the other way around as weIl: If we're inclined to hear self-deception in Hamlet's 
explanation, we're aIready the kind of people likely to accept Berger's account. But, in 
my view, aIl readers, not just skepticall ironic readers of Berger's ilk, have to face the 
question of Hamlet's apparent forgetfulness in the passage we considered at the beginning 
of this chapter: "There is a special providence in the fall of a sparrow. If it be now, 'tis 
not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it be not now, yet it will come. The 
readiness is aIl. Since no man of aught he leaves knows, what is 't to leave betimes. Let 
be." What, at this point in the play, is Hamlet's relationship to the ghost? Has he 
forgotten? 
1 mentioned earlier that there are important differences between the Q2 and F 
versions of the passage in question. Where Q2 has "since no man of ought he leaues, 
knows" (TLN 3671), F has "since no man ha's ought ofwhat he leaues" (TLN 3671-72). 
Some modem texts-notably the Wells-Taylor Oxford edition and the Norton (which is 
based on Wells-Taylor)-dispense with the apostrophe in F's version of the line and print 
"no man has ... " In their 1865 edition, Charles and Mary Cowden Clarke argued for the 
Q2 version on the grounds that it is "more characteristic of Hamlet that he thinks leaving 
life of little consequence because he cannot come to a right knowledge of its many 
mysteries and perplexities, than because he cannot carry with him life's goods and 
advantages" (436-37). 1 suspect that similar reasoning govems some recent editors' 
choices. l'm not sure what other reason Hibbard, for example, who uses F as his control 
text, could have for printing "knows." (Hibbard's version is "Since no man knows aught 
ofwhat he leaves" (5.2.169-70); he bases the syntax ofhis version of the line on F, but he 
gets "knows" from Q2). 
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Indeed, most editors of major recent editions favour "knows" over "has." Editors 
seem to like the skepticism of "no man ... knows." And yet, by choosing "has," they 
might he able to do something to clear up the problems created by the Q2 version of the 
passage. Replacing "no man of aught he leaves knows" with "no man has aught of what 
he leaves" gets rid of the problem posed by the audience's memory of the ghost who did 
knowaught ofwhat he'd left-though, importantly, choosing the F version does not get 
rid of the problem presented by the fact that no character has mentioned the ghost since 
Act 3. ''No man has ... " also accords weIl with concems explored by Hamlet in 
conversation with Horatio in the play's penultimate scene (the graveyard scene, Act 5, 
scene 1). In that scene, when Hamlet contemplates various skulls, including one which 
he imagines to be the skull of a "great buyer ofland" (5.1. 1 06), he observes that worldly 
goods have no meaning for the dead; the only land the dead property holder can hang 
onto is the dirt now contained by his skuIl. But then, the main thought expressed there is 
obviously commonplace, so much so that it may disappoint sorne interpreters. And, for 
that matter, one might even say that the "you can't take it with you" sentiment expressed 
in "no man has aught ofwhat he leaves" is so trite that, instead ofmaking the end of the 
play a satisfying resolution to what has come before, it invites Berger's skepticall ironie 
reading. It may, in other words, sound to sorne interpreters even more like "smooth 
comforts false" than the Q2 ("no man ... knows") version does. 
For my own part, 1 rather like the knowing/ having ambiguity. And, though 1 
used to find Act 5's Hamlet relatively uninteresting (as compared with the soliloquizing 
Hamlet of the earlier Acts), after careful study of the play's ending, 1 have become 
intrigued by his forgetfulness. 1 see the forgetfulness as working with the knowing/ 
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having ambiguity that emerges if the Q2 and F versions of the passage in which Hamlet 
explains his decision to go through with the fencing match are considered together. As 
we've seen elsewhere--in the closet scene, for example--in Ham/et knowing understood 
as having is a kind of forgetting. 
"Alas, poor YorickJ 1 knew him, Horatio--
afellow ofinfinitejest, ofmost excellentfancy." 
-Hamlet, Act 5, scene J 
CONCLUSION 
The question--or one of the questions-I have to deal with now is: Is there a 
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good alternative to what, in the Hamlet chapter, 1 called container-and-contents thinking? 
If so, what is it? It's aIl very weIl to point to sorne of the ethical implications of a 
particular way of imagining a topography of the self, but don't 1 then have to suggest an 
alternate model? WeIl, actuaIly, the most important point 1 want to emphasize in 
response is this: My sustained engagement with the postural! gesturallanguage of 
Coriolanus and of Hamlet has led me to the conclusion that the preferable alternative to 
container-and-contents thinking is precisely not an altemate-but-analogous model. 
Accordingly, at a certain point in my research 1 made a deliberate decision to work at 
abstaining from developing such models. The better alternative to container-and-contents 
thinking is, 1 have concluded, a way of thinking that directs attention first of aIl to the 
interpreter's own attitude--the constitution of the interpreter's relation (to the self, to the 
other, to the text), his or her rapport à soi, or, to retum to that key word from Coriolanus, 
his or her own "portance." 
197 
1 have, in this dissertation, tried to show that Corio/anus and Ham/et both suggest 
that, if 1 am going to imagine the cognitive dimension of interpersonal relations in terms 
of spatial/ bodily metaphors (which, really, it's virtually impossible not to), 1 ought to 
direct my attention tirst of aIl to my own approaches and attitudes. Following Cavell on 
this point-but literalizing in a way that he does not, and tracing the resonances of the 
plays' postural/ gesturallanguage in his texts-I believe, as 1 explained in chapter one, 
that explicitness can be an attitude, and that it should start on the side of the interpreter. 
To start on the other side, to begin by imagining in spatial/ bodily terms what kind of an 
object the other is, tends to give rise to certain ethical problems. 
As 1 showed in chapter three, one of the problems to which this way of thinking 
can give rise is that a conflict may develop between a tendency to make the logical 
inference that one's self is the same type of object that one has imagined the other to be, 
and a desire not to think of oIieself (or have others think of oneself) as such an object. 
But then, what if we resolve to imagine what the other is only in terms that we would be 
comfortable applying to oUfselves? That sounds like it might be a solution, and 1 don't 
consider myself to he philosopher enough to conclude confidently that it's never a good 
solution. However, based on what 1 know ofhow this problem has played out in 
Shakespeare studies, 1 have reservations. 
Shakespeare critics have at various times posed the question, "what kind of an 
object is this character, Hamlet, we're seeking to know?" The ever-recurring "what's 
central in Ramlet" question that that 1 discussed in chapter three can take more or less 
this form: "What's central in Ramlet is Hamlet ... so, what's central in Hamlet?" "What's 
central in Hamlet" is then often interpreted as "what is Hamlet?"-where the is is a 
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metaphysical (or at least quasi- or confusedly metaphysical) "is." To this question the 
humanist responds, "he's (a representation of) a deep and full selfl" The postmodernist 
responds, "he's a hollow void!" And the materialist responds, "he's ink marks on a page!" 
Surely, ifI were going to enter into this debate, I would choose the "humanist" 
option, since I would like to think that I am, and that I have access to a representation of, 
a deep and full self, right? So, why don't I embrace that as a satisfactory solution? Why 
do I hesitate to enter into the "what is Hamlet (or Shakespearean character x)?" debate on 
that side of the question, or, ifnot on that side, on another side? I have a few reasons. I 
doubt that the debate is philosophically winnable in any definitive way-but that's 
certainly not the main reason I want to stay out of it. My strongest reason for wanting to 
avoid ontological thinking about character is that, as I emphasized both in chapter two 
and in chapter three, I think we have cause to mistrust the rhetorical uses to which literary 
critics tend to put metaphysical arguments. Such arguments tend, far too often, to be 
used against other interpreters in pre-emptive and dismissive ways; in other words, such 
arguments are conducive to rhetorical/ social behaviour that I don't like. 
Well, but surely l'm not utterly going to reject the use ofmetaphysical arguments 
in this field just because they can be abused? Can't the arguments he put to good as weIl 
as bad use? In response to that objection, 1 would have to say that I think that 
metaphysical arguments about character are not conducive, even if it's true that they're 
not necessarily detrimental, to the development of reading as an ethical practice. The 
exercises by means of which one attempts to constitute oneself in accordance with what 
Foucault calls "an aesthetics of existence" do not depend on fust establishing, or letting 
someone else establish, what a self or what a literary character metaphysically is. Such 
ethical practices are totally independent of ontological arguments, just as they are 
independent of the findings of the cognitive or other sciences. 
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Of course, when 1 say that 1 made a decision to "work at" thinking in terms of 
approach and attitude instead of thinking in terms of models of what a self 
(metaphysically) is, 1 am, of course, implying that it can be tempting to engage in 
metaphysical thinking. 1 know that this has been true for me-which is one of the 
reasons 1 had for developing this attitude~adjusting practice. The approach developed 
here is intended to be conducive to the development of a habit of thinking of privacy, not 
as something for the self to hang onto, but rather as the stillness of the other; it's what 
reminds us that (as Cavell says) "we live our skepticism." 
1 also intend the approach developed in this dissertation to be conducive to a 
habit of thinking differently about what 1 called in the Hamlet chapter "the feeling of 
being meta"-the sometimes uncomfortably acute feeling ofbeing "among, with,and 
after" other interpreters. One of the biggest problems that 1 see in postmodem thinking is 
a tendency to interpret this feeling in metaphysical terms. My approach is, 1 hope, 
conducive to a habit of thinking of meta-ness in ethical terms instead. 
But as 1 reflect (again) on how very "meta" (meta-, meta-, meta-critical?) the 
discussion developed in this dissertation has been, 1 almost want to apologize at this 
point-or burst out laughing. 1 want, in closing, to recall to mind Kermode's most 
excellent way of describing his own Hamlet essay. He called the essay "an extravagant 
and fallible exercise." 1 want to appropriate that phrase for this un-finished gesture-this 
jesting, one of the aims ofwhich has been to loosen the grip that convention has had on 
argument in the field of Shakespeare studies. 
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